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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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Editorial: Constructive Energy of Leninism
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[Text] The true significance of historical events and the contribution of outstanding individuals to the development of civilization become fully revealed only in the course of time. As the years go by they do not fade out but, conversely, appear in front of us in their true scale, for we can judge with increasing confidence of how they influenced the trend and pace of social progress. It is becoming increasingly obvious that without the activities of these personalities the subsequent development of the historical process would have been quite different.

The outstanding role which V.I. Lenin played in the events of our century is now universally acknowledged, regardless of whether the attitude toward it is friendly or hostile. This is confirmed, among others, by the assessment of his activities as described in the "*Encyclopedia Britannica*:" "If the Bolshevik Revolution is, according to some, the most significant political event of the 20th century, then Lenin should be considered, for better or for worse, the most significant political leader of our century. Not only in the Soviet Union but many non-communist scientists consider him both the greatest revolutionary leader and revolutionary statesman in history and the greatest revolutionary philosopher since Marx."

Naturally, this does not mean in the least that the destiny of nations is shaped by the subjective wish of great personalities. Lenin himself clearly rejected such a naive-romantic and voluntaristic idea which ascribed to outstanding personalities the role of makers of history. It is not the personality that makes history but, conversely, it is history that creates the personality and the scale of the latter is defined by the extent to which the personality represents and embodies in his activities the objective and urgent needs of the age and expresses the basic interests of the broadest possible popular masses and general human values and is able to implement them in reality. It is precisely in Lenin, in his theoretical thinking and revolutionary activities that the social imperatives of our century obtained their most adequate and most concentrated embodiment. To this day these imperatives—the social and national liberation of mankind, the democratization of all political and economic life of society and the all-round development of the personality under the conditions of individual freedom and collective responsibility for the fate of civilization—have by no means exhausted their worth. Furthermore, their relevance has increased.

Our time of revolutionary perestroika and social renovation is also a time of the rebirth of Leninism. We turn to Lenin's legacy as a permanent achievement of revolutionary, democratic and humanistic thinking, which fructifies the new thinking for our country and the rest of the world. The rebirth of Leninism means, above all, the rebirth of the age-old social and moral values of civilization, the return to the highest criteria of socialism and the involvement of the broadest possible popular masses in the process of conscious historical creativity and emancipation of the intellectual potential of society, and consistent and irreconcilable struggle against dogmatism in theory and bureaucratism in practice.

To us Leninism is not a warehouse of "patience fitting all cases in life but a dialectical method of thinking which retains its fruitfulness and instructive nature under contemporary conditions. It means the most profound perspicacity in views and the ability to be guided in even the most complex social situations and to anticipate the immediate and more distant consequences of political decisions which are being made." That is why, as we turn to Lenin today, we say: if we want him to help us in perestroika and in renovation of society, Lenin must become familiar to everyone, "M.S. Gorbachev pointed out. "Everyone must know and understand, in the context of his entire theoretical and political creativity, the entire work accomplished by this gigantic universal mind, instead of extracting individual features for the sole purpose of obtaining 'weighty arguments' to substantiate even judgments that are accurate. To us Lenin's legacy is priceless as a school of scientific revolutionary thinking with its lessons which are never separated from reality, as an experience in the revolutionary reorganization of society."

At different periods in our history, the very image of the leader has been depicted differently and so have various of his statements, occasionally used to justify or support actions and intentions which were by no means Leninist. How not to remember in this connection the popular and, let us note, quite talented motion pictures made by the end of the 1930s in which the character made statements which resembled the statements made in the "*Short Course*," asserting the concept of the "two leaders" of the October Revolution and preaching the need for repressions. Unfortunately, to this day we come across efforts to take a "selective" approach to Lenin's legacy by truncating or splitting "inconvenient" quotations, depending on the tasks which a given author may set himself.

The stupidity of the quotation approach to the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism stems from the fact that it assumes that the views expressed by Marx, Engels and Lenin remained fixed for the rest of their lives. As we know, they never canonized either their own or anyone else's ideas. They spent their entire lives creatively developing and enriching their doctrine and not only greatly refined it but also revised some of its aspects. Antidogmatism, intolerance of meaningless

phraseology and loyalty to the objective logic of truth are characteristic features of the Marxist-Leninist style of thinking. Lenin constantly emphasized that there is no such thing as abstract truth, that truth is always concrete. On this basis, believed that in the study of social phenomena the dialectical method coincides with the specific-historical approach to them. The rebirth of Leninism—and it is precisely thus that the party formulates the question today—presumes not only a careful but also a creative attitude toward Lenin's theoretical and political legacy.

As we answer today the age-old question of revolutionary practice: "What is to be done?" we turn to the sources of our socialist history and try to understand the nature of phenomena which distorted the Leninist concept of the new society. Of late a number of authors have suggested that a search was initiated to determine the "doctrinal reasons for the deformation of socialism," essentially shifting the guilt for the cult of personality and its consequences to Marxist-Leninist theory. Such ideas have already triggered a number of substantiated objections. However, in itself this debate gives grounds for broader thoughts.

Let us note, above all, that a scientifically critical approach, an approach which must be mandatorily objective and analytical, which would question everything and would accept nothing on faith, is by no means contraindicated to the Leninist legacy. Leninism itself, in terms of its inner essence, is more revolutionary and critical than its individual interpreters can imagine. With a critical approach, Lenin begins "to stand even more firmly on his own two feet" than with an apologetic or bookish approach. Furthermore, a truly scientific analysis demands that we apply in the study of the past not lesser but even stricter demands compared to the mechanical repetition of quotations. It is important to be able to take into consideration the sum total of facts and not arbitrarily culled information; Lenin's doctrine must be considered in its dynamics and not as frozen at an arbitrarily selected point; Lenin's statements must be linked to the actual historical situation. We cannot consider accidental the fact that these elementary requirements of scientific methodology are being violated whenever efforts are being made to impose upon Lenin the role of "predecessor" of Stalinism. This is no accident, for this cannot be proved by adopting a strict scientific approach.

The most typical is the discussion on the role of coercion in the revolutionary reorganization of society and on the understanding which Lenin and Stalin had on this matter. In this case it is not a matter of determining "who was the first to invent" extrajudicial sentences, concentration camps or the mass persecution of the "enemies of the people." Incidentally, it is easy to prove that all of these "fruits of civilization" had been familiar to different countries long before the October Revolution and were known in old Russia as well. The entire question is

the type of violence and the purpose considered acceptable. It is one thing to use force for the sake of defending the revolution from counterrevolutionary violence. This was acknowledged as inevitable in all revolutions in world history. The leftist idea of using violence in building the new society and "remaking the human material," which was taken up by Stalin and developed into an entire "theory" of the aggravation of the class struggle as successes in the building of socialism were achieved, is an entirely different matter.

How and why do such unscientific concepts appear? Clearly, in this case it is a question both of a basic ignorance of facts and the fact that many events of the revolution are considered outside of the context of their time and the realities of the then prevailing life. The main reason, we believe, is the unconsidered reaction to the dogmatic stereotypes which dominated for decades in party theory and history, which were furthermore aimed at "sensationalism" and at gaining a certain "popularity." It is precisely this that explains the calls for "going beyond our ideological past," appeals which are as antihistorical as the stereotypes which are being "crushed" with their help.

For example, nothing could be easier than to invent a "war-communist" concept of building socialism which the Bolshevik Party allegedly immediately started to implement after the victory of the October Revolution. However, if we impartially read Lenin's works of 1918 we would be unable to find any theories about "racing" or "storming," or else a rejection of transitional economic forms and commodity-monetary relations, or else plans for the "elimination" of the peasantry and for the supercentralizing of the national economy. Conversely, it was precisely then, in the first spring of the Soviet system, that Lenin insisted on centralism understood "in its truly democratic sense," which "presumed, for the first time in history, the creation of an opportunity for the full and unhindered development not only of local features but also local initiative and undertaking, and of a variety of ways means and methods for progress toward the common goal" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 152), a mention of "fiscal accountability," financial instruments for accountability and control, a state-capitalist form of economy, etc. All of this had nothing in common with "sudden communism" (to use V.G. Korolenko's expression in his letter to A.M. Gorkiy) which, for a number of objective and subjective reasons began to take shape under the conditions of the Civil War.

Let us note, incidentally, that such "war-communist" intentions are not found in the works of Marx and Engels either. Conversely, we find in their works the idea of cooperation as a form of combining private with social interests and a firm rejection of suggestions about the coercive expropriation of the peasantry or many other features which some contemporary political writers either fail or are unwilling to notice.

What was the policy of "war communism?" Was it a "model" of a classical, a strategic plan designed by the bolsheviks, aimed at a "race" toward the "shining future," or else a specific tactic defined by the extreme conditions of war and dislocation? This journal recently reprinted the article by M.N. Pokrovskiy, which was written on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of the October Revolution and was published in one of the first issues of BOLSHEVIK. It contains a curious sociopsychological observation. The Civil War introduced "in our mentality, if not in our ideology, some new features which were alien to it in 1917-1918," this noted historian wrote. "I shall never forget our young communists-educators who went to the front with the entire set of mannerisms and ways and means of people of the pen and the book and returned from the front as gallant military men.... On the inside, naturally, they remained what they had been—good communists. They even became better communists than they had been, for their previous half-way theoretical struggle against imperialism had now become to them a living and harsh reality. However, they came back as **military communists**. They returned with the confidence that that which had yielded such brilliant results when dealing with the Kolchak and Denikin movements would be able to deal with all the vestiges of the old in any area whatsoever" (KOMMUNIST No 16, 1988, p 87). In speaking of the enthusiasm for the "war-communist" aspect of the matter at that time, when an effort was made "to make a direct transition to communist production and distribution," Lenin noted the following: "I cannot say that it was precisely in such definite and clear way that we imagined such a plan. However, it was roughly in that spirit that we acted" (op. cit., vol 44, p 157). Such was Vladimir Ilich's answer to the question of the correlation between the "ideal model" and the tactics, the ways of acting, and that same "method" which later, under Stalin, was absolutized and turned into the administrative-command "model" not only for the building but also the existence of socialism, which is extensively discussed by current authors.

Let us add yet another excerpt which clarifies the essence of the matter, this time taken from a document adopted at the 1st Expanded Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee in 1922: "...The course of the struggle for victory over the landowners and the bourgeoisie, which assumed the nature of a raging Civil War, inevitably triggered a number of illusions and even created an ideology which was in sharp conflict with the true theory and program of the party, which developed, under the new conditions, a new policy, a policy which, actually, is not new but is the old policy of prewar times" ("Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional v Dokumentakh" [The Communist International in Documents]. Moscow, 1933, p 272).

Indeed, the "change in all of our viewpoints on socialism," related to Lenin's intensified theoretical work in 1922-1923, until the very time when his illness interrupted the dictation of his "political testament," was a

new step. His thoughts on the destinies of socialist theory, which came in contact with the context of a mixed system of peasant Russia, and on the possibility of "changing the usual historical order" and the prospects for creating a "system of civilized members of cooperatives," became not a denial but an organic extension, a development of his views and convictions which had taken shape after years of theoretical work and political struggle. That is why there neither is nor could there be any question of any kind of "vivisection" concerning Lenin's legacy or the "two Lenins." That is why to single out isolated views expressed by Lenin borrowed, for example, from "*Materialism and Empiricriticism*," forgetting the fact that they were followed by the "Philosophical Notebooks," and "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," or else to quote from "The State and Revolution," while ignoring "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System," and Lenin's final letters means applying the method of dogmatism, which was firmly condemned by Lenin himself.

Marxism to Lenin was not dogma but a manual for action, a powerful incentive for creative thinking. Lenin considered loyalty to Marxism by no means as the textual reproduction of individual formulations borrowed from the works of Marx and Engels and their arbitrary interpretation, but the use of Marxist methodology as applicable to the new conditions and specific features of the age. In rejecting dogmatism, Lenin emphasized that "we do not look at Marx's theory as something completed and inviolable; conversely, we are convinced that it merely lays the cornerstone of a science which the socialists must advance further in all directions unless they wish to fall behind life" (op. cit., vol 4, p 184).

We must consider Lenin's creative attitude toward his great predecessors an example for ourselves in our attitude toward Leninism. In all cases a real revival in the history of world culture has been less a return to the prime sources than creative progress on the way to spiritual and intellectual renovation on the firm basis of already existing accomplishments and the mastery of the social experience of mankind. This fully applies to the restoration of Leninism today. As we know, not only different people but even one and the same individual will react to the same book differently at different times, depending on the personal experience and knowledge which have been accumulated. To an even greater extent this applies to different generations of people, who cannot fail to compare even the knowledge they have gained from classical works with the historical experience acquired by mankind since then. We as well, as we read Lenin, can see both the profound insight of his theoretical thinking and creatively master it as it applies to the new tasks. Lenin's legacy continues to give us a powerful intellectual charge and remains a source of new thinking.

At the turn of our century, Lenin metaphorically wrote that Marxism has been literally experienced by the entire

previous history of democratic and revolutionary thinking in Russia. Now, at the end of the century, we can claim with even better reason that Leninism as well has been **experienced** by the entire course of the revolutionary movement in our country and the building of socialism in the course of 7 decades. The more fully and profoundly we study our past the more obvious becomes to us the tremendous harm and irreplaceable casualties that accompanied the retreat from Leninism and its distortion and vulgarizing both in our country and the international communist movement. During the dark years of the cult of personality and the period of stagnation the main aspect of Leninism was forgotten—its democratic and humanistic content and the fact that it organically combined a class approach with universal human values, and its creative nature and openness to the achievements of world civilization.

Problems of the revolution are not solved by exhortations such as "let there not be civil war and let there not be sabotage," Lenin wrote in analyzing the reasons for disbanding the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. It is only by taking the specific historical context into consideration that one can seriously consider problems which are today in the center of the discussions—the role of revolutionary violence, formal and actual democracy, who has "priority" in the use of terror, etc. While regretting the victims of the Civil War and grieving for the human lives of those who fell on both sides of the barricades, we must not fail to realize that this did not occur "accidentally or all of a sudden, at the whim or because of the ill will of anyone," and that in October 1917 the toiling people had only one choice: "either take a daring, desperate and fearless step or perish, die a hungry death (op. cit., vol 35, pp 230, 239). In speaking of the need of a civil peace we cannot fail to take into consideration that such was the harsh reality of history and that rewriting it, even for the best and most humane of motivations, is impossible.

Lenin approached social progress by thoroughly weighing its human value: the price of the revolution and the price of counterrevolution were to him not abstract concepts but a specific historical scale, a humanistic criterion on which he weighed political activities. Now, in the course of perestroika, when we say that more socialism means more democracy and more humanism, we are thus following Lenin's behests.

Marxism to Lenin was, above all, a science which, like any other science, cannot develop without a self-critical analysis of previously mastered truths and without the persistent study of changing reality, enrichment with new knowledge and struggle among different opinions and comparisons among different viewpoints. As we turn to Lenin's theoretical and political legacy, we realize the groundlessness of efforts to depict Lenin as a fanatical supporter of official unanimity in the party and as someone who, allegedly, rejected out of hand any views if they differed from his convictions. Vladimir Ilich's polemic articles and speeches and the minutes kept of

discussions indicate that Lenin always supported the broadest possible discussion within the party on theoretical and political problems; in arguing with those whose views he did not share, he tried not simply to defeat his opponents but to change their thoughts, to promote unity of action even though differences in views remained.

Lenin's authority in the party was based not on organizational sanctions against dissidence but on theoretical principle-mindedness, substantiation and convincing nature of arguments. At the peak of the Civil War, when the slogans of the time were "centralization, discipline and unparalleled self-sacrifice" (op. cit., vol 40, p 241) in its resolution the 9th All-Russian RKP(b) Conference noted that "any kind of repressions against comrades for the fact that they may think differently on one subject or another or a party resolution, are inadmissible" ("*KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....*" [The CPSU in Resolutions....], vol 2, p 300). Furthermore, Lenin never demanded of those who disagreed with him to abandon their views or any kind of denigrating repentance. He was concerned with the psychological adaptation of those who had been derailed by the events of the internal party struggle and with gathering all party forces and ensuring the maximal concentration of everyone toward constructive and creative work. Is this not seen in all of his last works, above all his "Letter to the Congress?" Totally unacceptable to Vladimir Ilich was the atmosphere of competing ambitions, intrigues, or settling private accounts. It would be useful in describing the moral principles of the bolsheviks in Lenin's circle to cite an excerpt from the letter sent by N.K. Krupskaya to G.Ye. Zinovyev, in connection with the discussion on the "platform of the 46," in the autumn of 1923: "This moment is too serious to promote a division and to make it psychologically impossible for Trotsky to work. We must try to argue with him as comrades. Officially, today there is an odium (object of hatred and blame—editor) toward the division for which Trotsky is blamed. However, he may be blamed but, essentially, could it be that Trotsky was led into it? I am unfamiliar with the details and, furthermore, they are not the point, for frequently we fail to see the forest for the trees. What matters is the essence: we must consider Trotsky as a party force and be able to develop the type of situation in which this force could be maximally used to the benefit of the party" (IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS, No 2, 1989, p 202).

Naturally, Leninist humanism does not turn everything into total forgiveness, the more so since the age of revolutionary storms left very little scope for such feelings. Lenin himself frequently mocked abstract considerations about morality and justice. Did this mean that the theory and practice of the revolution had no place for universal human standards and values? Naturally, it does not! It was precisely such humanistic ideals and principles that moved forward the great cause of the October Revolution and these were the ideas which inspired the activities of the communists.

The image of Vladimir Ilich himself must not be simplified to a level of touching-fictional "simplicity." His life was full of drama. It included breaks with former friends, the withdrawal from the common cause of people who seemed loyal and like-minded, and slanders aimed at Lenin himself, his work and his party. In December 1916, Lenin wrote: "Such is my fate. One battle campaign after another—against political stupidities, baseness, opportunism, and so on."

"And this has been since 1893. This is the reason for the hatred shown by the vulgar people. Nonetheless, I would not change my entire destiny for the sake of making 'peace' with those vulgar persons" (op. cit., vol 49, p 340).

To this day we must defend Lenin and Leninism from the "hatred of the vulgar persons," and defend the purity of the party-wide, the national cause, as we restore the Leninist aspect of socialism and as we assert the principles of humanism and democracy, without which socialism is impossible.

In turning toward Leninism, we are guided in the social renovation of our society not by the same primitive concepts of socialism which had been instilled in the course of decades, but the loftiest criteria which had been formulated by Lenin. The new quality of socialism which we are trying to implement is to develop under the new conditions characteristic features which were largely predicted by Lenin: a higher labor productivity than capitalism, based on the latest technology, the increased needs of the working people and their increasingly fuller satisfaction, the elimination of the alienation of the popular masses from ownership and power through their economic and political self-management, unlimited access by the population to the achievements of all global culture and the knowledge accumulated by mankind with a view to ensuring the all-round harmonious development of the individual. Socialism, as conceived by Lenin, means the practical implementation of universal human cohesion among people free from exploitation, and the liberation of the humanistic potential of society. The specific tasks in building socialism, however complex they may have been, never prevented Lenin from seeing its historical objectives.

Systematically and firmly defending Marxist scientific ideology from distortions of dogmatic and "extreme revolutionary" phraseology, Lenin nonetheless blocked any attempts at turning it into something like a "laic religion," into ossified religious dogma which would separate Marxists from the spiritual development of mankind as a whole. Ideological and political sectarianism, Lenin cautioned, can only put the communists in a position of self-isolation and pit them against other democratic and liberation movements of their time and alienate them from the broad popular masses. Lenin boldly promoted a dialogue and a search for mutually acceptable compromises with the supporters of a great variety of political trends, from social democrats to conservatives, if this would make it possible to achieve

more favorable conditions for the building of socialism in our country and if it was consistent with the interests of the peoples in preserving the peace.

The history of our century has proved and continues to prove the accuracy of Lenin's methodological analysis of the contemporary age. Many of Lenin's predictions already came true in his own lifetime: the legitimate nature of the growth of the bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution, the possibility of the victory of socialism initially in a single country, mankind's objective need for peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, and other. Other Leninist predictions were confirmed after his death; they include the collapse of the imperialist colonial system and the victory of the national liberation movement, the variety of ways to socialism in the contemporary world, the growth of monopoly into state-monopoly capitalism, the growth of the democratic struggle in the capitalist countries, and so on. Unfortunately, history also confirmed the accuracy of many of Lenin's fears concerning the destinies of socialism in our country.

We draw from Leninism scientific strictness, theoretical daring and political realism, which are so greatly necessary for the new thinking on the threshold of the 21st century. As during Lenin's times, the present remains a field of struggle between the future and the past, and of clashes among objective confronting trends created by life itself. As Lenin taught, nothing is fatally determined as far as the outcome of this struggle is concerned. Lenin rejected the pseudo-Marxist theory of the automatic collapse of capitalism, as well as naive views of the self-realizing advantages of socialism. In the final account, he emphasized, in history everything is decided by the human factor, by the awareness and behavior of large masses of people.

Actually, the reason for which Leninism was able to arise as a new, as a distinct stage in the development of the theory of revolutionary Marxism, was the fact that Lenin had been able to detect at the turn of the century the immeasurably increased role of the awakened social energy of the masses in the sociohistorical process and to formulate a scientific theory of the decisive role of the subjective factor at crucial times in history. The accuracy of this theory has withstood successfully the revolutionary breach of the centuries-old social and national oppression and has withstood the test of the entire subsequent innovative yet also difficult and, occasionally incredibly difficult, historical experience. Through his brilliant mind Lenin encompassed the main components of the "peaks" and declines in this motive force of history—political, organizational, intellectual, ideological-moral and sociopsychological—expressing the profound development of the sum of contradictory and closely interrelated, similar and different, and clashing basic, long-term or current and even very short interests. The greatest possible attention he paid to all new phenomena in life, and to new ideas and views (not only in

politics but in the entire vast array of scientific knowledge), and to changes in the moods of the popular masses and of individual influential population strata are indications of the intensive research which helped Lenin, better than anyone else, to see the effect of objective historical laws and to detect clearly apparent trends in social (including global) development and to correlate the steps of revolutionary change with its timely requirements.

The Leninist theory of the role of the subjective factor in the historical process has nothing in common with the subjective illusions of those who, willy-nilly distorting Leninism while, at the same time, swearing loyalty to it, took and mercilessly exploited one aspect or another of this theory, believing in the omnipotence of individually selected means, such as state coercion or propaganda, etc. Lenin himself bitterly mocked such illusions, describing communist boastfulness as one of the most dangerous enemies in building the new society. Characteristic of Lenin's approach was a short but meaningful statement made in the first post-October days: "The soviets are an organization of the full freedom of the people." This is a statement which is striking, as is frequently the case with Lenin's works, by its unexpected nature and profound dialectical sense. Freedom? Yes, total freedom. However, this mandatorily implies the **organization** of freedom, born of the basic interests of the masses and turning them in the future into a self-organization, with the growth of their political and general standards and the enhancement of the level of their intellectual, moral and sociopolitical maturity.

The same type of understanding of the effect of the subjective factor is organically linked with Lenin's idea of that which we now describe as ideological work. We are bound to win, Lenin taught, if we learn how to look at the truth in the eyes and tell the people the entire truth, even the bitter truth. The party and the people must know the entire truth. They must have a clear idea of the real state of affairs, for only this will enable us to use the opportunities provided by history and to eliminate errors. He called upon the party members not to conceal their errors but to correct them and constantly to learn from the masses' historical experience and to sum their activities. As Lenin emphasized, "the minds of tens of millions of creators will create something immeasurably greater than even the greatest and most brilliant prediction" (op. cit., vol 35, p 281).

The current processes of revolutionary perestroika, initiated by the party, are taking place under difficult circumstances and, for the time being, the results are not identical in all areas. However, we are convinced of our eventual success. Obvious in our social life are the steady upsurge in the energy of the broad popular masses and the growth and strengthening of the ranks of the fighters for perestroika. The party's faith in the creative forces of the people and their mastery of the contemporary role as a political vanguard and the enhancement of their practical efforts in all areas of the struggle for the renovation

of socialism, on the basis of the Leninist concept, revived under contemporary conditions, provide a reliable foundation for confident progress along this way from which we shall not deviate.

Perestroika frees the image of Lenin from the simplistic gloss, making it more emphatic, closer to us and more human and helps us to see it in its dynamics and in its dialectical development.

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At the Turning Point

18020013b Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 7, May 89 (signed to press 21 Apr 89) pp 12-14

[Commentary by Vadim Nikol'yevich Nekrasov, editor of the international life department and member of the editorial collegium of *KOMMUNIST*]

[Text] The profound inner connection which exists between the developing processes of perestroika in our country and changes in the international situation and the practical steps taken to implement the principles of new political thinking are manifested with particular clarity at the present turning point, when the situation in the world, despite a noticeable drop in the threat of war and the improvement in the atmosphere, remains difficult and contradictory. Understanding the beneficial nature of this tie in terms of contemporary developments comprehensively triggers an unabated and great interest in events occurring in the Soviet Union and in each new step taken by Moscow in the international arena. This has been clearly confirmed by the atmosphere of worldwide highly interested attention in the recent visits paid by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, to the republic of Cuba and to Great Britain.

As we know, in its time the CPSU had noted that perestroika makes it possible to redefine the approach of the land of the soviets to international affairs and enriches Soviet foreign policy with new ideas consistent with the realities of the contemporary world and that progress toward improvements in the international situation, as well as the authority of our new way of thinking will largely, if not to a determining extent, depend on the successes of perestroika, the strengthening of glasnost and the broadening and strengthening of socialist democracy. The current reaction of the foreign public to the realistic analysis provided by the Soviet leader during his trips of the condition of perestroika processes in the Soviet Union, along with the initial results of the elections of USSR people's deputies, which became known by then, were obvious confirmations that the entire world had become aware of this connection.

Such is one of the most characteristic distinguishing features of the contemporary international situation which, unquestionably, is of great importance in terms of its future development.

Actually, the trips to Havana and London, as well as the Soviet-Irish Summit talks, which were held during that same time, had a common feature despite the great difference between the problems: the tremendous lively interest shown by those who welcomed the Soviet guest in perestroika and its achievements and problems as well as its international significance. The renovation of socialism through perestroika in the Soviet Union and "rectification," i.e., the correction of errors, in Cuba, became the subject of a detailed exchange of views between the heads of the two socialist states. In the meetings with the British prime minister, two-thirds of the time, as estimated by the journalists, was spent on discussing matters of perestroika. The public in both capitals, both sociopolitical and specifically journalist, tried to obtain first-hand information on what had been accomplished and what was planned. Essentially, this was a healthy although occasionally and reasonably critical interest in the new experience in the social development of mankind, which one way or another affects everyone in our interdependent world.

In responding to this interest, in London M.S. Gorbachev discussed our problems frankly and honestly: "We engaged in perestroika with our eyes wide open. We anticipated the difficulty and the unusual nature of this process. We realized that it will cause a major 'shock' in the entire society. We did not err in terms of the main features. The fact that the scale of many internal problems—political, economic, social and moral—was manifested not immediately but in the course of the project, is a different matter. This demands ever new approaches and solutions and most intensive intellectual and practical work."

The statements which the Soviet leader made in his address to the Cuban National Assembly was of essential significance to the peoples of the fraternal countries and to the representatives of all democratic and progressive forces: "We also fully realize our international responsibility for the fate of perestroika. We well understand that the international prestige of socialism and its influence on the development of global processes will largely depend on the way things will develop in our own country."

As the international response indicates, the effectiveness of the practical aspect of the trips is entirely consistent with the requirements which the existing circumstances formulate. Relations between the two socialist countries—revolutionary Cuba and the Soviet Union—are acquiring a new content, expressed in the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. By signing it, Havana and Moscow cut off various types of fabrications and speculations which had become lately widespread concerning alleged "serious differences" existing between the two countries.

The trip to Cuba, as was noted in many commentaries, emphasized the Latin American trend of Soviet foreign policy, along which major steps had already been taken previously. The trip made it possible, at the same time, to coordinate the approaches taken by the two socialist states to matters related to settling regional conflicts, eliminating the indebtedness of developing countries and resolving other global problems. "For the first time in international relations," F. Castro noted, "the Soviet Union has accurately and clearly linked the struggle for peace with that of development." Once again the USSR has demonstrated its understanding of peace as a guarantee for all countries—big and small—and its resolve to do everything possible to attain this objective as soon as possible.

In London as well documents were signed on some specific problems of bilateral relations. Considering that unsolved problems exist between the USSR and Great Britain, the existence of which no one conceals, and bearing in mind that there are forces in the British Isles which are opposed to normalizing relations, the new meaning and significance gained through the Soviet-British dialogue as a result of the visit, are unquestionable. We see meaningful and open talks, and an atmosphere of relations consistent with the spirit of detente and broadening the realm of confidence and reciprocal understanding and the possibility of constructive interaction in global and European politics.

The example of the London meetings indicates an attractive feature of present relations among countries with different social systems, such as the increased reciprocal interest in each other, serious attempts truly to understand the internal processes of the other side, the broadening of a variety of contacts, the elimination of stupid stereotypes, and growing tolerance for differences and peculiarities. Actions which lead to the strengthening and broadening of confidence are taking place on both sides. Actually, their significance should not be exaggerated. It is no accident that some Western observers characterize the London talks as being both "friendly and tough." A fact which must be taken into consideration remains: the warmth of personal contacts was occasionally truly combined with the toughness of principled views concerning, for example, tactical nuclear missiles and the expediency of their so-called "updating."

As M.S. Gorbachev noted, in his Havana speech, the dynamics of global positive processes "is not as yet consistent with the requirements of our time." The threats which remain to the very conditions of the existence of mankind require maximal concentration of all efforts on the solution of vitally important global problems. In this connection, against the predominant background of positive evaluations of the contents and results of the meeting, some contradictory opinions, which were heard in the Western press and were inspired, judging by all available information, by superficial views on the development of the situation, cannot be ignored.

We believe that in this case it is a matter, above all, of the fact that, as there have always been, there were commentators who tended to look everywhere for sensations and who, yielding to the hypnosis of their own fabrications, not founded on any whatsoever accurate information, predicted that in the course of the trips the Soviet side would formulate some kind of sensational conceptual stipulations or new and unexpectedly broad initiatives. Unquestionably, a contribution to such views was also made by reactionary circles, above all those in the United States, which openly expressed their reliance on further unilateral "concessions" to be made by the Soviet Union. The lack of both sensations and "concessions," in turn was the reason for "disappointments" and for various versions concerning the reasons for this situation. Thus, J. Hoagland, a columnist writing for the respectable WASHINGTON POST, and he was not the only one, citing anonymous "Western analysts," tried to explain their absence by "Gorbachev's obvious concern at this time about difficulties which have bogged perestroika down."

Yet, according to Western commentators noted for their considered views and objective evaluations, the trips to Cuba and the British Isles entirely and fully met expectations. In terms of their content, they follow the trend of concepts and suggestions which were presented 4 months previously in the basic speech delivered by M.S. Gorbachev at the UN General Assembly. Today these suggestions are being concretized and developed in accordance with what subsequent events have contributed to the situation.

In past few months new changes were made toward easing the nuclear threat and in the political settlement of military conflicts, in expanding and strengthening confidence among countries belonging to different systems and political alliances. The meetings which were held by the Soviet leadership with many governmental leaders of Western countries proved the possibility of progressing toward detente, strengthening confidence and eliminating international tension.

We must take into consideration, however, also the fact that the visits took place at a time when, as a result of the change in the occupant of the White House, U.S. policy, which plays such an important role in setting the overall tonality of Western politics, was "spinning idle" as was noted by some observers. Therefore, as we know from practical experience, to a certain extent this limits the freedom to maneuver of the entire diplomatic system of the NATO countries.

However, despite such restraining factors, most observers developed the firm view that what was maximally possible under existing circumstances was achieved in the course of the London visit. The speech by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman to the political leadership of Great Britain and the representatives of social and business circles in Guildhall was, according to

the journalists, a convincing appeal to abandon confrontation in the approach to international relations. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, the newspaper of British business circles, described the Guildhall speech as yet another "breakthrough toward a nuclear-free world."

Moscow, the Soviet leader said in London, has been proving and will continue to prove through its actions the possibility of establishing a peaceful order based on the principles of freedom of choice, and balanced interests under the conditions of reduced armament arsenals and lowered military confrontation. The Soviet state, now and in the future, intends to strengthen its security not by increasing its military potential or its huge outlays on defense but on the basis of a strictly defensive military doctrine.

The process of lifting the veils of secrecy in the various forms of military activities in the Soviet Union, starting with the conversion of the defense industry to civilian production, is continuing. The Soviet decision, which was announced in London, of terminating this year the production of high-grade uranium for military purposes and additionally to close down plutonium converting reactors may not seem, at a first glance, all that significant against the background of the other steps. However, this was justifiably seen by a group of American nuclear physicists as an essential step aimed at limiting the arms race and they urgently recommended to the Bush administration, in turn, to limit the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Similar statements were made by a number of U.S. congressmen.

In today's world, many are the number of well-wishers of our perestroika. For understandable reasons, we frequently present quite extensively in the press their views, assessment and friendly criticism. However, do we have the right to ignore the significant and quite influential circle of our basic enemies? It would be a profound error to underestimate both the extent of their hostility as well as their size and their possibilities and roots in political circles and in the propaganda machinery of the Western countries.

These days as well, when the attention of the entire world was focused on the trip of the Soviet leader, the mandatory reading in the headquarters of many American corporations and right-wing political organizations was the work by John Sheldon, a member of the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace, *"The Future Collapse of the Soviets."* The author cautions the Western public against any kind of "illusions" concerning perestroika. He calls for providing a tougher opposition to the socialist world and for consolidating efforts in the struggle against the "bulwark of communism," the Soviet Union. The position taken by Sheldon and by those who support such views is by no means new. It has been inherited from the propaganda arsenals of the cold war. Nonetheless, to this day it continues to be used by some circles which are hoping to block the growth of sympathy for perestroika by prophecies of its collapse.

Yes, we do come across problems and difficulties, as was said during the trip made by the Soviet leader. However, we consider them a natural manifestation of the contradictions of the transitional period. Not a single one of these difficulties indicates that the perestroika concept itself is erroneous. By big-policy criteria, the perestroika process is developing in the only possible direction. As to painful manifestations, they are inevitable. They reflect the transitional nature of the period experienced by the land of the soviets.

One of the noteworthy conclusions based on the events related to the trip by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman is that in international relations, which have been put into motion from their recent frozen positions, a transitional turning point is becoming increasingly apparent. The sincere wishes for success of perestroika with which the working people in Cuba and the majority of Britons accompanied the Soviet leader and the warm interest shown throughout the world in everything occurring in the USSR are clear manifestations of an overall warming up of the political climate on earth.

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Free From Myths and Dogmas

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[Article by Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Nekipelov, head of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System]

[Text] The groundlessness of the claim, widespread until recently, of the absence of ideological and political struggle on the subject of the renovation process which has developed in our society became clear once and for all after the 19th All-Union Party Conference. A variety of factors determine the separation of forces, which is taking place in the course of this struggle.

In particular, one must not underestimate the conservative role of dogmatic concepts about the nature of socialism, which have become profoundly instilled in the minds of a great variety of population groups. The bearers of these concepts, without denying the fact itself of the major breakdowns which occurred in the functioning of Soviet society, ascribe them exclusively to "non-systemic" (in the sense of operating out of the system) factors such as, for example, the low level of competence or impropriety of officials. When they join in the call for "more socialism!", they assume that it can be a question only of cleansing the current model of socialism from "extraneous" deformations. The model itself is presented by its intellectual prisoners as the direct embodiment of the views of the classics of Marxism-Leninism concerning the new social system.

Under these circumstances the comprehensive critical analysis of the ideological and theoretical foundations of the socioeconomic system which historically developed in our country assumes, in addition to its strictly scientific, an unquestionable practical significance. Understandably, considering the peculiar features of this topic, socialist political economy needs, above all, such an analysis.

From the viewpoint of external characteristics of the mechanism of the functioning of the Soviet economy, which took shape in the mid-1930s, this was similar to the model of the first phase of the communist system as developed by the Marxist-Leninist classics. Directive-based centralized planning assumed a decisive role in regulating public production; a major step was taken toward achieving the class homogeneousness of society; the state sector assumed a leading position in the economy and the exploitation of one class by another was eliminated.

It is true that differences were noted between the society which had appeared and the "standard model" and, above all, the fact that the Soviet national economy had a kolkhoz-cooperative sector which modified the influence of the specific forms of manifestation of the laws governing the first phase of communism in the Soviet economy. The existence of the kolkhoz-cooperative form of ownership was related to preserving in our country conditions for the functioning of "noninherent" laws of socialism, such as the law of value. However, all of these differences were looked upon as temporary, caused by a specific feature in the development of Soviet society and, in any case, leaving no doubt that in terms of its fundamental parameters this society was consistent with the classical concept of socialism.

A theoretical substantiation of this outlook was provided by Stalin in his work "*The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*," which came out in 1952. The basic concepts it contained on the specific laws of socialism—essentially planning and distribution according to labor—are still being applied in political economy.

What were the achievements of this science in the post-Stalinist period? Naturally, it became necessary to abandon a number of specific concepts it included, particularly the interpretation of the reasons for the preservation of commodity-monetary relations as being caused by the existence of the two socioeconomic sectors in the national economy. Fierce debates raged on problems of ownership, basic and essential production relations, the place of commodity output under the conditions of the new social system, cost accounting, contradictions under socialism, etc.

However, these heated arguments left an impression of sterility. It is clear today that nothing else was possible, for the debaters held the same views on the main and essential features: the acknowledgment that all the essential features of socialism (public ownership of means of

production, the basic economic law, and the laws of planning and distribution according to labor) had long become known and that these were not topics for arguments. Differences, therefore, were reduced to a few insignificant differences in the interpretation of individual categories and on how to structure an integral system on the basis of the already known laws in a more elegant fashion.

Science was increasingly plunging deeper into the methodological jungle. Meanwhile, practical experience was questioning one "fundamental" concept after another. Why did the law of planning function while economic development was accompanied by the greatest possible disproportions? Why were we falling ever more tangibly behind the capitalist countries? Why despite the law of distribution according to labor was there equalization in our country? Even during the period of stagnation, under the weight of such arguments the science of economics was criticized "from the very top" for its scholastic theorizing. However, hiding behind this criticism was not the desire to take an objective look at reality but the naive aspiration to force science into finding some kind of magic means which would improve everything without essentially changing anything.

However, political economy did not plunge into methodology for nothing: It was nonetheless accurately said that there is nothing more practical than a good theory. Saluting, as we usually do, and starting a new discussion (such as, for example, on the place of political economy in the system of economic sciences) it clearly let it be understood that the blames addressed at it were actually formulated by amateurs. In fact, was it not clear that the system of production relations and the economic laws which expressed its essence were one thing, while the forms of their manifestation, specific economic activities and the mechanism of the utilization of these laws, something else?!

Nonetheless, it became increasingly harder for traditional political economy to maintain its positions. For example, how to explain the fact that as production forces developed, it was becoming increasingly difficult to control them through mandatory centralized planning? One may say that the reason was quite simple. Production forces were becoming more complex and the number of economic relations was increasing and how could all of this be taken into consideration? The "true political economist" would resort to this argument only in extremis, after becoming totally convinced that the very fact of increasing breakdowns in planning could not be explained by the low skill of the planning workers. He would resort to this not because he does not love the planning workers but because "he would be unwilling to violate the principles, to undermine the foundations." Meanwhile, the foundations (if by this we mean the foundations of Stalinist political economy) were truly beginning to weaken: the objective prerequisite of planning is a high level of socialization of production, which

should increase with the development of production forces; consequently, planning should strengthen. Yet everything here was the opposite....

Naturally, efforts were made to have political economy come down to earth. To this effect, some broadened its subject by adding production forces to production relations. Others, based on economic management practice and realizing the need to make serious changes in it, persistently promoted the idea of the need for making active use of commodity-monetary relations and for systematically applying the principles of cost accounting. However, since this was done without, as a rule, "encroaching on the objects of worship" in official political economy, the results were quite limited. An indicative example is the widespread concept of the planned nature of commodity-monetary relations under socialism. It is frequently presented as the model of dialectical thinking. Actually, however, this is no more than a clever compromise which brings relative satisfaction to both sides. If you are a "market supporter," you can interpret it as follows: "Although planned, these are nonetheless commodity-monetary relations." It is hardly amazing, however, that your "like-minded" opponent from the opposite camp has a "somewhat" different view: "Although they are commodity-monetary, they are special, they are our planned relations."

As a whole, the development of socialist political economy in the post-Stalinist period provided no grounds for optimism. Scientific activities were reduced to an endless manipulation of categories, most of which were either trite or lifeless. It became increasingly obvious that, from the very beginning, official political economy was capable of performing one function only: to defend the model of socialism which had developed in our country. For a while, this pleased everybody but, as the difficulties in the economy began to mount, while political economy kept building castles in the air, the attitude of the public toward it increasingly began to look like the that of a person dealing with a valise without a handle: it would be a pity to throw it away but it would be hard to handle. The time eventually comes when parting with at least part of the content of this "valise" become inevitable.

Under the present conditions, which are favorable for scientific creativity, an understanding of this circumstance is growing. However, does this not confirm the existence of a hidden attack less against the Stalinist than the classical Marxist concept of socialism? Was Stalin the author of the idea of the direct social nature of labor and planning as a universal form of dynamics of socialist production and distribution according to labor and, finally, of the basic economic law of the new social system?

The obviously negative answer to the last question does not mean in the least that the answer to the first is automatically positive. The essence of the problem is not who is the author of said ideas but the objective reality with which they are consistent.

In addressing ourselves to Marx's model of socialism, we must note above all that it lacks even the slightest features inherent in subjects of economic life which are customary to us, such as enterprises, associations, and a variety of territorial and sectorial management authorities. The following question arises: Is this proof of the unwillingness to deal with the details of the production management process in the new society or is it a question of essential features of the socialist structure?

Marx and Engels did not believe that under the conditions of the collective ownership of means of production the enterprise would disappear as the technological unit of the public economy. From their viewpoint, however, the preservation of such a technological unit did not mean in the least that there was also an autonomous socioeconomic unit, a collective subject of socialist production relations. Conversely, the acknowledgment of this subject conflicted with their fundamental idea according to which within the framework of an association of producers, relations among and between them and the association as a whole are direct (as well as the relationship between them and the existing individual micro- and mesocollectives). Strictly speaking, the importance which the classics ascribed to the effect of the law of labor changes under the conditions of the new social system proved that they did not see the need for stable labor collectives. Without this, the establishment of a separate collective subject of production relations is simply impossible.

The classics of the new society did not imagine in the least the existence of a hierarchically subordinated system, in which all intermediary units between the highest and the lowest levels would be both subjects and objects of management. Engels, as we know, wrote about socialism that "instead of management through individuals there develops management through objects and management through production processes" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 20, p 292). Why, nonetheless, was precisely such a hierarchically organized model of socialism developed in our country and not the one which was anticipated by the classics; who is to be blamed for this "counterfeit?"

The role which Stalin played in wrecking the NEP and creating the administrative-command system is well-known. In making this radical change he took into consideration the great adaptability of the new system in the implementation of his personal ambitious plans. However, it is hardly likely that had another leader been in Stalin's place he could have already then implemented in our practice the model of the classics as they had conceived it. The reason would not be any kind of internal discrepancies in the thoughts of Marx and Engels, for they were impeccably logical. In my view, the problem lay elsewhere: the hypothesis according to which almost precisely in mid-19th century production forces had reached the type of level of development which provided the necessary material prerequisites for the organization of direct public production was not

confirmed. Under these circumstances, any effort at developing a kind of socialism as predicted by the classics was doomed to failure. Lenin realized this in 1921 and the result was the NEP. Stalin did not (or was unwilling to understand it) in 1929 and the result was the creation of the command-administrative model of socialism.

The insufficient development of production forces is manifested above all in the impossibility of their comprehensive planned control as a single entity. The establishment of a hierarchical management system, based on a divided public production system into individual "bits," the management of which is given to authorities subordinated to each other, may look like the logical means for the solution of this problem. Since the interest of each lower unit is to implement the assignment of the superior one, it may seem that it is organically part of the interest of the superior unit and, in the final account, it is subordinated to the higher social interest. Alas, this is a mirage.

To begin with, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the indicators of the economic development plan will be entirely consistent with those of the national economy. Had there existed a real possibility of formulating on the highest level an optimal and comprehensive plan for economic development and ensuring its implementation, there would have been no need whatsoever to have ministries or *sovnarkhozes*, and main administrations, associations and enterprises would have simply not existed as subjects of public production management. It is precisely because such was not the case that the participation in the formulation of plans of units which were to implement them becomes inevitable. Consequently, production relations appear among the different organizational levels of public production in the matter of distribution of all types of resources and the establishment of planned assignments. The superior authority is interested in a minimal allocation of resources and maximally high assignment while the subordinate one is interested in obtaining a maximal amount of resources and a minimal planned assignment. Practical experience indicated that the lower units had more purely economic arguments in such "trading" (they have a greater amount of information), but that superior authorities held the administrative power.

It is hardly amazing that under these circumstances they would have to resort to "planning on the basis of achievement," but it would be, to say the least, strange to claim that such planning would accurately reflect the national interests.

Second, even if we assume that the formulated planned assignments are consistent with the supreme interests of the country, even then there is no guarantee whatsoever that the end result will be consistent with what society has hoped for. Having obtained a mandatory assignment, entirely in accordance with the rules governing the rational behavior of any economic subject, the performer

would take steps to achieve his objective at the cost of minimal efforts, which frequently causes serious harm to society. In this case it is not a question of an indicator but a principle: a performer who is issued any indicator by his superiors automatically begins to work not for the sake of the end results but of the accountability report.

Therefore, we should not be particularly amazed by the fact that the aspiration to ensure balancing as a result of directive-based planning in fact leads to the expanded reproduction of disproportions in the economy. The orientation of all organizational units not toward the consumer of the product but the superior authority which has issued the planned assignment and the extreme unreliability of horizontal relations in the economy, based on this fact, triggered a comprehensive aspiration to ensure maximal availability of materials, which distorts the public division and combination of labor. Furthermore, within the framework of the economic management by directive it did not become possible to develop an efficient mechanism for a labor reduction (i.e., reducing labor of different difficulties to a single yardstick) and the assessment of labor outlays.

Under the conditions of a command economy steady deviations from the principle of division according to labor are inevitable. On the one hand, the lack of an efficient mechanism for labor reduction makes the correlation among the wages paid to workers in different professions quite arbitrary. On the other hand, distribution according to labor is extremely hindered by the constant violations of the production process, of material and technical procurements above all. Should the worker pay for a low labor productivity if it is due to reasons independent of his will? A negative answer to this question would be entirely justified. At the same time, however, it would indicate the impossibility of systematically applying the principle of payment according to labor (in this case at best it could be a question of paying in accordance with skill, i.e., the potential possibility of the worker).

Are the activities of an administrative-command economy determined by the law of value? I am convinced that they are not. Under the conditions of the administrative system the objective interest of the enterprise encourages it to subordinate its already limited independence to the implementation of the planned assignment. The economic behavior of such an enterprise is qualitatively different from the actions of the enterprise-commodity producer, oriented toward the signals received from the market and efficiency criteria. The essential difference does not disappear even if a surface similarity is present. For example, both types of enterprises are interested in charging maximally high prices for their output. However, in this case they are guided by entirely different considerations. To commodity producing enterprises this level is of direct significance from the viewpoint of the possibility of maximizing profits; to the

enterprise acting within the framework of a directive it is of importance mainly because a high price facilitates the implementation of planned assignments in their value aspect.

Also questionable is the role of the market in controlling the process of consumer goods turnover. One of the features of retail trade is the fact that one of its participants (the population) has the freedom of choice when it comes to spending (or not spending) its money, which is not directly related to any planned assignments and is governed exclusively by consumer needs.

All of these conditions are found, however, also in the model of socialism developed by the classics. Nonetheless, the classics did not relate to it the existence of a consumer market. Furthermore, Marx especially emphasized that the "worker vouchers," which the members of the association would receive from it as proof of their labor contribution are no more cash than would be a theater ticket (see op. cit., vol 23, p 104). In other words, according to Marx, taking into consideration the needs of the population and the respective structural changes in production should take place through the socio-planned method and not on the basis of the effect of market mechanisms. It is the claim of the administrative-command system that in this respect it precisely follows the classical model. To begin with, however, the socioplanned adaptation of the production process to the needs of the population is replaced by the state-mandatory method which is by no means one and the same; second, the latter takes place formally and is extremely ineffective in practice.

Even such a brief survey allows us to realize how greatly production relations in "real socialism" are different from those described in political economy textbooks. I believe that in this case we have all the proper reasons to conclude that such true production relations are (from the very moment of the birth of the administrative system) obstructions on the way to the harmonious development of production forces. Correspondingly, there are no reasons to consider this model of socialism as objectively inevitable in the process of the establishment and development of the new society; essentially, it is a kind of "zig-zag" in socialist history.

In this connection, we should take a new look at the question of the objective nature of the laws of socialism.

In facing this problem, political economy finds itself in a very difficult position. It may have seemed that Stalin himself put everything in its proper place. "People," he wrote, with a reference to Engels, "could discover these laws, become familiar with them and use them in the interests of society...." (J. Stalin, "*Ekonomicheskiiye Problemy Sotsializma v SSSR*" [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR], Moscow, 1952, p 5). The word "use" apparently seemed insufficiently strong to the leader and, elsewhere, he suggested that economic laws be "bent to one's will" (ibid., p 6). Be that as it may, the

general conclusion looked entirely Marxist: "...The laws of political economy under socialism are objective laws which reflect the laws of the processes of economic life which take place irrespective of our will" (ibid., pp 9-10).

All would seem clear as long as someone would not ask the following: Well, but can economic laws function when society deliberately fails to use them? Such curiosity cost political economy a high price. What obtained was that the only law which allegedly could function "by itself" was that same law of value which although acknowledged by socialist political economy does not consider it "its own" entirely.

A theoretical debate broke out, and is continuing to this day. According to some scientists, the conscious use of the laws is a necessary aspect of the objective mechanism of their action. Others categorically object, believing that this approach does not meet the requirements of the independence of production relations on the will and awareness of the people, and subjective elements are introduced into objective ones. This leads to a closed circle: the law cannot function if it is not known and one cannot know it until it begins to function. The absurdity and hopelessness of this situation is indicated best of all by a thesis which has gained a certain popularity, according to which under the conditions of our system laws may exist without functioning.

I believe that in a socialist society the subjective factor has a direct influence on the shaping of production relations. Describing the economic mechanism as an instrument for the use of existing economic laws is obviously inadequate, for with this interpretation it comes out that any one of its changes affects only the external forms of production relations. By shaping the economic mechanism in accordance with its own understanding of the objectives means of production forces, society thereby creates conditions for the appearance of specific types of production relations.

A law can function only as long as the necessary conditions for such functioning exist. Therefore, changes in the economic mechanism lead to modifying the forms of manifestation of the laws only to a certain extent, for beyond that extent the very grounds for the effect of the respective laws disappear.

It looks as though "in its heart of hearts" our official political economy had always suspected this. For did the command-administrative model appear by itself and not as a result of the arbitrary changes in the system of public production management? Was it necessary to attack the concept of market socialism with such zeal if full confidence prevailed to the effect that "no one can escape the laws?"

However, until very recently political economy was unable to acknowledge this openly, for to do so would have meant to accept the "heretical" thought of the

possibility of the existence of different models of socialism and, consequently, the possibility that the model which was used in our country was not optimal.

Nonetheless, this must be admitted. And, having admitted it, we must undertake the most difficult thing: the solution of a number of exceptionally complex theoretical and practical problems. Their essence can be summed up as follows: if the need for market mechanisms to regulate socialist production has been proved by history itself through the method of "starting from the opposite side," the question of the specific ways of shaping a socialist market and its socioeconomic organization remains unanswered in a number of respects. In the final account, it is based on the search for the optimal model for the practice of social ownership of means of production.

Everything seems to indicate that this search must take two main directions: the first is related to the development of the self-management of labor collectives. However, it would be erroneous not to note the problems which arise in this context. They include, in particular, the need for the regular reproduction of more or less equal conditions for the members of society employed in progressive and lagging enterprises; the elaboration of an efficient mechanism for shifting production factors (manpower and capital assets) among economic sectors. It is important to take into consideration in this case that relying for the solution of such problems on the overinflated development of legal management methods is fraught with adopting a formal approach to the self-management model and converting it into a simple variety of the administrative system.

The other possible option is that of developing the entrepreneurial functions of the socialist state. This model presumes the existence, along with the market for commodities and services, a labor market. At the same time, it is characterized by the state's centralization of the added product created by the enterprise and (at least in terms of its basic part) investing it in accordance with market efficiency criteria. Orienting the enterprises toward responding to the signals of the market could be achieved by closely linking the labor of their management with the actual returns on the national resources which were used.

Be that as it may, one thing is clear: in any case the economic system which is to develop as a result of the radical reform will be different in many of its essential features from the association of producers which was forecast by the classics. These differences will apply to the "composition" of the subjects of production relations (and the corresponding system of interests operating in the society), the socioeconomic forms of relations among producers and, in the final account, the way ownership relations are applied. The aspiration blindly

to follow the letter of Marxism on this matter inevitably clashes with its spirit, for it mercilessly leads to an absolutely unacceptable dilemma: socialism or efficiency.

Under these circumstances, to use here Lenin's familiar expression, "we are forced to acknowledge the radical change in all of our viewpoints on socialism" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 376). The "socialist nature" of one new economic development or another must be based not on the extent to which it is consistent with the former concepts of the new social system but the extent to which it is consistent with the vital requirements of a contemporary economy. The task of political economy is to help and not hinder the search for a socioeconomic optimum.

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'Perestroyka Is a Journey in Search of Things New...'

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[Article by Steven Cohen, Princeton University professor; interview conducted by S. Kolesnikov and Yu. Kudryavtsev]

[Text] Today hardly anyone could deny that perestroyka in the USSR is the most important global event which has drawn the close attention of the foreign public and which is affecting the moods of politicians and ordinary citizens in different countries. Among ourselves as well we argue a great deal about its essence and its pace, its supporters and opponents, and its successes and failures. What is characteristic, however, is the fact that in the course of these arguments about this new revolutionary act we occasionally proceed on the basis of customary concepts and categories and frequently try to gauge the new phenomena with the old customary yardsticks.

This makes all the more interesting a view on our problems looked at from a different angle, in the light of Western political experience. On the request of the editors of KOMMUNIST, here are thoughts about perestroyka in our country by Steven Cohen, a noted American historian and Sovietologist, Princeton University professor, author of the book *"Bukharin. A Political Biography. 1888-1938"* (Progress, Moscow, 1989), *"Reinterpreting the Soviet Experience,"* etc.

[KOMMUNIST] The democratization of society is always a difficult and lengthy process. In the realm of theory difficulties are almost as great as in practice. In the course of discussions on the various aspects of the reform of the political system in the USSR a variety of suggestions have been expressed. One of them has been to borrow from Western experience in this area: the separation of powers, the rule of law state, and so on. What is your view on this question?

[Cohen] I shall begin with one general consideration: I came somewhere across the following sentence: if you want to listen to something stupid ask a foreigner what he thinks about Russia. Naturally, this is a joke. Seriously speaking, many Americans, and not only Sovietologists, have become accustomed to assess events in your country superficially and, furthermore, to teach the Russians what they should do. I prefer to analyze events as a scientist and to avoid giving advice. In precisely the same way you have the right to analyze events in America.

The problem of the specific aspects of Western experience in democratic development is part of a more general question: Does the democratization of your society require, in principle, to borrow foreign experience? My personal view is the following: it is impossible to "borrow" democracy from another country, for two reasons: first, the political system of any country cannot be stable if it has not been created within that country itself, on its own grounds, as a result of the development of its own political culture.

Second, take a look at the world and name a country where a successful and painless transition has taken place from dictatorship to democracy. The clearest example would be Spain. Yet Spain is quite different from the Soviet Union: it is smaller in size; its population is much more homogenous than that of the USSR; and, something I consider quite important, Spain is not a superpower, i.e., it does not have the type of foreign policy problems which could influence to a certain extent any domestic reform. Furthermore, Spain has had a long and deep-seated tradition which I would not describe as "democratic" but, rather, as a Western European cultural tradition, having experienced the strong influence of France and Italy. Therefore, the authoritarian traditions in Spain proved to be weaker than those of Russia, particularly in the final years of Franco's rule. Finally, it has a market-based economy, which plays a major role in the establishment of democracy.

Therefore, my conclusion is that the Soviet Union should choose its own way and find its own type of democracy without borrowing directly anything from anyone.

However, there is yet another aspect of this matter. There are features common to all types of democracy. What do I mean by this? First: for democracy in any country to be stable there must exist the type of political standards within which both the people and the power institutions agree, as they say in America, "to play according to the rules of the political game." Those are rules which must be respected by all. In other words, if your efforts at one stage or another of the "game" have failed, you must accept the result, whatever it may be, hoping for success at the next stage, etc. Let us assume that you personally or your candidate have been defeated at the elections. You say: okay, better luck next time.

You accept the result because you are accepting the rules of the entire political game, rules which must be observed by the other participants as well.

The second necessary condition for democracy is the "rule of law" (i.e., that which you describe as the rule of law state). Naturally, this requires an independent judiciary. The third is a legal standard, a legal awareness.

These three elements are a necessary prerequisite for the stability of any democracy, for democracy can be defined also as a system of rules which everyone accepts and respects. If the rules are not observed, democracy is destroyed. Some Latin American countries provide a typical example of this. If the military refuses to accept the rules of the democratic regime it abolishes it by force and the stability of society is disrupted.

Not a single one of these elements of democracy can be "imported." One cannot go abroad and "purchase," for example, a legal awareness: such an awareness can be exclusively the product of your own development. However, it takes decades for such elements of democracy to be created. America has frequently tried to impose its experience on other countries by sending troops under the banner of the "struggle for democracy." Nowhere has such a means of "making" democracy been successful.

All democracies share something in common yet, at the same time, they are all different. That is precisely why, let me repeat this again, from my viewpoint the main thing is that the Soviet Union must create its own type of democracy and its specific forms. Otherwise it cannot be a stable society. This does not mean, naturally, that one should not borrow something or other from Western practices. Example: elections with several candidates is your first important step on the way to democracy. However, the electoral campaign includes a mass of elements such as raising money, advertising, and so on. On this level the American experience is rich and is entirely worth the study. Obviously, the study of various electoral "tricks" is also worth it.

Unquestionably, in this context the recent elections for People's Deputies of the USSR are a very important step forward and a proof of the fact that the Soviet system, whatever Western skeptics may be saying, is capable of change. The elections were quite instructive to your party apparatus as well. Until 26 March, I believe, by no means did everyone realize the radical nature of such elections. Traditionally, they were considered merely a slightly updated demonstration which would not seriously affect them personally. Now they have had to realize the opposite.

However, unsolved problems remain. One of them is local elections, for local soviets, which will probably develop differently from those of the center. In my view, this will be an even more important battle on the barricades of perestroika. Obviously, the local authorities will try to protect their positions by all means and,

therefore, political manipulations are possible. If you ask me who will win the elections for local soviets, I would answer you with another question: Tell me who will be counting the votes? Americans are well familiar with this aspect of the matter. In other words, the results of the balloting may be predicted, particularly in the peripheral areas, farther from Moscow, where there are less glasnost, journalists, and so on. Something similar to this is already clearly being manifested in the activities of the local authorities toward members of cooperatives who, in order to obtain permits, must occasionally meet inconceivable conditions. It is pertinent to recall former practices in the South of the United States. In order for the blacks to be allowed to vote, the authorities would ask them questions which no normal person would be able to answer such as, for example, to name all American presidents alphabetically.

In some cases the attitude of your local authorities toward members of cooperatives is no better. Both examples are legitimate in the sense that no single local authority will allow its influence to be threatened. Therefore, I repeat, there is something to be "learned" from the Western democracy, including the nature of means of manipulation, which are identical in both systems.

As a whole, I believe that that which you are doing today is unprecedented in contemporary history. A huge country with a great civilization but also with deeply rooted authoritarian traditions is trying peacefully to change its political system. I know of no similar example elsewhere. You have undertaken something like the first trip which Columbus made to America. Perestroika is a kind of traveling in search of the new, the unknown, without an accurate map. Try to understand me correctly: I do not wish to repeat in the least that which was said at the 19th Party Conference by one of the speakers, who compared perestroika to an airplane which has taken off but does not know where to land. No. I merely wish to say that your intent has no clear example to follow. You have chosen your own way. The most interesting part is that should perestroika prove to be successful, perhaps a new, a previously unknown type of democracy will emerge.

This is quite interesting from the scientific viewpoint as well, for one of the basic problems today is how to combine the "state of universal prosperity" (i.e., that which you describe as socialism) with democracy. In America there is more democracy than "universal prosperity." For example, we do not have a unified national health insurance system and medical treatment is tremendously expensive. The situation in your country is different. Perhaps your medicine is not of the best quality but it is free to the entire society! In other words, you have created a huge "state of universal well-being" albeit not the best. But then, if you will forgive me, you do not have all that much democracy. In the West as well various attempts are being made to solve this problem of combining democracy with well-being. The Soviet Union could make a substantial contribution to the

solution of this problem. You may teach the world something new. In any case, I believe that the world should follow what is happening in the USSR with sympathy and interest. I am saddened by all too many influential Americans fearing perestroika. Why? We must study new experience closely and with interest.

[KOMMUNIST] We consider interpreting this experience promptly quite important. The difficult question exists of the attitude toward perestroika and toward political reforms on the part of the various social strata, and the main difficulties and threats to the reforms. The fact that many of them are "skidding" is unquestionable. What matters is to understand the reasons for such "skids."

[Cohen] This cannot be achieved without establishing in advance what perestroika is. Yet this is a rather broad and vast concept. Ask the first person you come across what his attitude toward perestroika is. I am confident that virtually everyone will say that he is "for" it 100 percent. But then when you concretize your question, the picture changes. Ask the worker whether he is willing to work more and the manager whether he would like to have fewer machines. By no means will everyone answer in the positive. In other words, the majority are in favor of perestroika "in general," as a turn to a better life. But then specific "inconveniences" related to it are by no means acceptable to everyone. However, it is precisely perestroika that is the sum total of all such "individual cases!"

What is the most characteristic feature of perestroika? In order to answer this question we must define its main components. At this point I tend to agree with M.S. Gorbachev's viewpoint. Unlike a number of researchers, both in the West and in your country, I consider him the leader of the radical wing in the party (naturally, he is also a national leader, and a national leader must be cautious). Therefore, it seems to me that perestroika includes four basic components: 1. Glasnost; 2. Democratization (including within the party); 3. Decentralization in the state economic sector; 4. Market reform (cooperatives, private enterprise, etc.).

What is here, from my viewpoint, basic? It is limiting the amount of power and interference by the state in each of those four areas of social life. The great Russian historian Klyuchevskiy wrote that in the course of Russian history "the state swelled and the people lost weight." Perestroika is the opposite process: the state somehow shrinks but then the people, the civilian society, "grows." In other words, the essence of perestroika is the destatification of society. However, it is also de-Stalinization, for Stalinism was based on the inflation of the state, the statification of society, statism. In this sense, perestroika essentially began under Khrushchev (condemnation of the cult of personality, an end to terror, release of millions of gulag prisoners, etc.). However, at that time the administrative system as a whole was retained. Now it too is being subjected to a profound reconstruction.

As to the attitude of the people toward perestroika, here we can single out three basic views, three different ways of understanding perestroika, depending on the individual attitude toward its four components. The first is the view held by Gorbachev and his supporters: it is necessary to develop all four components. The second (let us describe it as the "middle course") is "perestroika without excesses," i.e., economic change without political democratization and glasnost. The third variant is "perestroika according to Stalin:" strengthening the state principle, the "strong hand." This is not a product of my imagination. All that it takes is to read your press closely.

The supporters of the third variant are clearly opposed to Gorbachev. They believe that his course is weakening the state in precisely the same way, allegedly, that it was weakened by Khrushchev, who promoted de-Stalinization, and by Brezhnev, who allowed stagnation and corruption in the state apparatus. Incidentally, why is it that so many honest and normal Soviet people sincerely loved and, to this day, love Stalin? It is not terror that they revere! The answer is that they love the state and Stalin, in their view, embodied it.

Therefore, we have three concepts of perestroika: destatification, perestroika "without excesses," and, so to say, "state" perestroika. For I cannot agree with the claim that there are no alternatives to perestroika. History always offers alternatives. In this case, they consist of Nos 2 and 3, and I believe that it is actually on the three concepts that today the struggle in your society is being waged.

[KOMMUNIST] Yet another "alternative" has been suggested, which romanticizes our past until 1917 or, in any case, before the October Revolution....

[Cohen] Such feelings could be explained but, as an alternative, they are unrealistic. The past is the past.

Now, as to the obstacles on the path of perestroika and the threats to it. Speaking of the threats to Gorbachev's course, the main and most general of them is the Russian governmental tradition which existed long before the revolution. Its essence is that the state dominates the society, and the shaping in the social awareness of the stereotypes of "respect" for the state: the state issues orders and we are ready to obey them. This tradition remained after 1917; Stalin not only preserved but also strengthened and developed it. Throughout Russian history this tradition has rarely been affected. Such was, for example, the case during the reform of the 1860s-1880s and in 1917, during the revolution.

Is an opposite and relatively young "social" tradition able to compete with this most ancient governmental tradition which is centuries old? Incidentally, both the crises among nationalities, which are shaking up your country today and international conflicts are only

strengthening it. The moment a crisis breaks out everyone starts looking to the state which, allegedly, will save everyone, will do everything for everyone, and so on. Yet this only leads to the strengthening of the governmental machinery and, therefore, conflicts with democratization.

As to the second concept of perestroika which I mentioned, the so-called "middle course," its supporters, I would think, are unable to solve the problems of the country. This too is quite worrisome, for the problems which are facing your country are indeed quite serious. Whereas in the past one could govern the country by pretending that they do not exist, now, as a result of glasnost, they are known to everyone. Under such circumstances, any perestroika program should offer specific and realistic solutions to problems. Yet the supporters of the "middle course" offer no such solutions.

Meanwhile, the supporters of the "Stalinist-type perestroika" do: the "strong hand," the whip. This "solution," is also a threat to the "Gorbachev-style perestroika." Metaphorically speaking, the Gorbachev variant is the open hand, ready to shake, ready to give and accept; the Stalinist variant is the hand gathered in a fist; the middle variant is shaking one's shoulders, for there is no answer.

Obstacles on the way to perestroika are also related to the fact that progress in one direction is hindered by breakdowns elsewhere. Glasnost has moved the farthest ahead. This is largely the result of the activity of the intelligentsia, which numbers many supporters of the new course. Glasnost dealt a heavy blow at the bureaucracy in its weakest point—control over culture and information. New people have taken over the management of the mass information media.

The worst situation is the one in the economy, where the strongest opposition offered by the administrative apparatus exists. Incidentally, both in the West and in your own press we come across claims that managers, the nomenclatura, are some kind of monolithic group, a new social class against which one must struggle. Let me then ask the following: What about the present leaders of perestroika, the party leaders, are they not members of that same nomenclatura? There is a struggle within the nomenclatura a considerable portion of which hinders that same convergence of the "top" with the "bottom," which Gorbachev described as a decisive factor of success.

[KOMMUNIST] In your view, how can this "merger" be achieved?

[Cohen] At first, glasnost and the press were an excellent means of such convergence. Now, however, this is insufficient. The ordinary citizens must actively participate in the electoral process, thereby influencing the administrative apparatus. It is very important to ensure the more active participation of rank-and-file party members in

internal party elections. In my view, internal party processes are, in general, insufficiently open to the public. For example, I studied quite closely the processes of democratization of the soviets. However, unfortunately I have no possibility to see if such processes are taking place within the party.

According to some American economists, democratization is incompatible with economic reform. They believe that one would "spoil" the other for, allegedly, public opinion opposes higher prices, the use of economic methods, etc. I, however, believe that it is impossible to carry out an economic reform without democratization. Let us recall the fate of the economic reform of 1965, although this is a rather rough analogy.

[KOMMUNIST] Apparently, yet another way of development of events is possible: a so to say spontaneous movement "from below," based, for example, on egalitarian and "populist" slogans. Occasionally meetings and demonstrations occur on this basis. Such requirements could be read even in the electoral programs of some candidates for deputies.

[Cohen] I believe that in principle there is nothing strange in demonstrations and meetings. In your country they take place virtually every day and nothing happens: the Soviet Union goes on living. It is a different matter if spontaneous actions assume a nationwide scale, threatening the entire system. At that point, in all likelihood, the supporters of the "strong hand" will prevail.

Some people in the West, Z. Brzezinski, for example, predict such a development of events in the Eastern European countries, and are pleased by it. However, they do not bother to ask the following: What will then happen to the Soviet Union? People who do not like Gorbachev should ask themselves whether such a Soviet Union, guided by a "strong hand" would be better for them than the present.

I proceed from the fact that the USSR will continue to exist but the question is how? Some historians are drawing an analogy between the present situation in the country and 1928, on the basis that now, as was the case then, there is a choice between two actual options: a radical reform or the policy of the "strong hand."

Perestroika is a lengthy historical process and its final results cannot be predicted today. It is a process in the course of which turns and even retreats in some areas are inevitable. In that connection, I consider quite important M.S. Gorbachev's concept of the need to make perestroika irreversible. This is a profoundly meaningful formula. Essentially, its author thinks like a scientist, like a historian. He realizes perfectly well that a reform cannot be carried out quickly and that the leadership as well is not eternal. Consequently, it is necessary to start up the mechanism of change which would make reform irreversible, so that the descendants could make use of

such mechanisms and continue the work. Metaphorically speaking, today the "second chapter" in the history of perestroika is being written. The first was the Khrushchev decade.

It is being said that nothing was written between these two chapters, that there was stagnation. However, this is not true. A variety of processes took place under Brezhnev as well, above all a kind of "de-Stalinization from below." The population has changed greatly. It has become better educated, the urban population has increased, and so on. Stagnation affected more the administrative structures than the entire society. Otherwise where would the present leadership, the scientists, journalists and progressive economic managers come from?

The way perestroika will develop further can be projected only in most general features. There is an apt comparison in Anglo-American political tradition between the historical process and a swinging pendulum: the time comes when people become tired of the abundance of reforms, at which point stagnation develops or else conservative forces assume the upper hand in society. However, stagnation also tires the people out and the pendulum begins to swing once again, and again there are reforms. This includes a very important political question: How many reforms can the people accept in one fell swoop, so to say? I believe that in its time both the nomenclatura and society became tired of Khrushchev's endless reforms. Obviously, the same will occur with perestroika. This is a historical process with all of its patterns.

[KOMMUNIST] One of the key problems of the political reform is that of the party's leadership of society and of the potential of a one-party system. Very briefly, all that is being said in our country on this subject can be reduced to two questions. The first is the following: Is a multiple-party system a mandatory prerequisite for a democratic society? The second: If it is not, is real democracy possible under the conditions of a one-party system?

[Cohen] Before I answer these questions, let us establish what is a political party. In my view, there are at least four different types of parties. The first is the party as a political vanguard (Lenin's concept). The second is the party whose purpose is, above all, to participate in an electoral campaign. Such are the parties in the United States. Their main task is to organize the electoral campaign of the candidates (to raise money, to promote the candidates, etc.). They exist as parties essentially during the elections although you must bear in mind that elections for different bodies take place virtually every year, so they function almost all the time. They have no permanent membership. An American will not say "I am a member of the Democratic Party." He would say "I vote for the democrats."

The third type is the "parliamentary" type party, which is characteristic of European countries—Great Britain, France and others. Such parties perform two basic functions: preparations for elections and control of the parliament. The positions of prime minister and the composition of the cabinet depend on the parliamentary majority.

Finally, the fourth type is the "party-community," or "party-club," a mass party which rallies the people less through their attachment to any specific political line than common views, interests, cultural requirements, and aspirations to address themselves to and to discuss vital problems (it is self-evident that they too participate in elections, etc.). Naturally, in all countries with a real multiple party system they play an important role both as legal opposition and real alternative to the ruling party.

If the vanguard party comes to power it rapidly becomes the administration, the nomenclatura. And when I hear appeals for the creation of a second, third, and so on, party in the USSR, I would like to ask: What type precisely? If it is a question of the fourth type, it has already existed in your country essentially: debate clubs, "people's fronts," and other autonomous social groups which perform all the functions of such a party. Being Union-wide, they can nominate their candidates for soviet deputies. If it is a question of the third type, a "parliamentary party," for the time being you do not have a true parliament.

All that is left is the second type—a "party for elections." The only use of such a multiple-party system would be to organize elections and to support various candidates. Under the present conditions of the electoral campaign, however, everything would be controlled by the communists in any case. The ruling party controls finances, transportation, printing presses, meeting halls, etc.

I would turn this question around in a somewhat unusual way: that which is currently taking place in your country could be described as a "multiple-party situation under the circumstances of a one-party political system." What do I mean by this? The first and general consideration is the following: pluralism is real only when the views held by different social groups are legally expressed in the society. In the past this was taking place in the USSR clandestinely. Now clubs, "people's fronts" and so on, which held different opinions, speak out openly. That is precisely why I am speaking of the existence of a multiple-party policy without a multiparty system. I do not know whether this is sufficient, nor do I wish to discuss it. This is your internal affair.

However, there also is another consideration. For example, you have editors of journals who have different social viewpoints, and you have N. Andreyeva and her opponents. All of them are members of a single communist party. I am currently studying a more recent historical period. One could say that I am studying the period

"from one perestroyka to another." Many people in the West say that Khrushchev was defeated. I do not believe so. One cannot judge of a political leader by the way he left his position. What matters is what he was able to accomplish. Khrushchev was able to accomplish a great deal: he put an end to the terror, millions of people were released, the pensions system was improved, and reforms were made in agriculture. The main thing was that an anti-Stalinist nucleus developed within the CPSU. The 20th Congress was the "constituent congress" of that "party within the party." In this sense today's leaders are the "children" of the 20th Congress.

Under Khrushchev a kind of three nuclei developed within the party's structure: anti-Stalinist (represented by the current leadership); conservative (which was in power under Brezhnev); and Stalinist (removed from power). A struggle was waged among them and is continuing to this day. You asked me whether real democracy is possible under a one-party system. Anything is possible. It is obvious, however, that in such a case the party must radically reorganize its internal life in order to be able to achieve, above all, internal party democracy.

But then again, when we speak of a "one-party democracy" we must specify the precise type of party we are discussing. One could speak of a "party for elections." At that point the main thing is to see to it that the largest possible number of people vote and to "drag" the voters to the voting places, as is the practice in the United States. This is one thing.

If we speak of democracy as such, in terms of a party this means that all "parties within the party" which I mentioned should be given the right openly to speak out, to defend their views. This gives politics dynamism and leads to the best possible solutions. You may recall the differences on the question of the Brest Peace. Lenin favored the signing of a peace treaty whereas Bukharin was in favor of pursuing the "revolutionary struggle." Trotsky favored neither. All three visited plants and party organizations to defend their viewpoints. Why did Lenin win? He won thanks to the power of his arguments alone. In terms of internal party democracy, this is normal, in precisely the same way as are elections in choosing among several candidates who have different platforms and have their own supporters, and so on. I see no other way for democratization within the CPSU. To this effect, perhaps, one could revise the resolution passed at the 10th Party Congress which, in particular, forbids the existence of factions.

The main but also the most difficult thing is democratization within the CPSU itself. Without it anything else you may have considered may not work. In no case do I wish to give advice. This is simply my personal impression of the situation.

Regular and more complete information on Central Committee plenums, the publication of speeches in the press, as took place in the 1920s, would be a major step. Incidentally, the publication of the results of the vote on the election of people's deputies representing the CPSU was such a step. A parliament could work properly only when the communist deputies are given the right to speak out about anything they deem necessary, according to their conscience, and not according to instructions from above.

[KOMMUNIST] But how can this be combined with concepts, such as democratic centralism and party discipline?

[Cohen] Under Lenin a party member was most frequently a person who held independent views and was able to defend them. In your case, it is the Bolshevik Party as it was until 1917 and in the 1920s that could be considered a true political party. If a person wanted to engage in politics he joined the party. At that time people did not join the party to make a career. It is true that in the mid-1920s the situation began to change. Perhaps the essence of the question is what is a communist party? Is it a political party? Is it an army? Is it an elite? If, nonetheless, it is a political party, there must necessarily be a pluralism of views within it.

Naturally, party discipline may be based on a combination of fear and privilege. Usually people defend fiercely their privileges wherever there is a shortage of goods and services, for which reason usually it is easier for democracy to prevail under conditions of sufficiency and abundance. In your case, one of the ways to surmount scarcity and, at the same time, to develop pluralism is the market which, in the broad sense, could become a kind of "buffer" between the state and society.

An important element of the democratic political mechanism is created whenever the state and society become equal partners in purchase and sale relations. On this level, the most important social phenomenon of recent years has been the development of cooperatives. Wherever cooperatives exist so does the market. With a one-party system this is extremely important. In speaking of destatization as the essence of perestroyka, I have in mind also the market as protecting society from the "whims" and arbitrariness of the state....

I visited Naberezhniyye Chelny last April. What I saw there made a tremendous impression on me, particularly bearing in mind that the fate of perestroyka, in my view, is most closely linked to the fate of the cooperative movement. As we know, several years ago Komsomol activists in that city created the N.I. Bukharin Political Club. Now the city Komsomol is actively supporting the members of cooperatives. Furthermore, V. Pisigin, the

founder of the club, was elected president of the Inter-regional Federation of Cooperatives. This may be a proof of the birth of a real Union-wide cooperative movement, which will make perestroika in the economy real.

[KOMMUNIST] Sometimes the idea that, allegedly, a second, third or any other party would perform the role of "opponent" of the CPSU, which is so necessary today, of a "controller" of its actions, a kind of balance, is expressed as a main argument in favor of a multiparty system. What is your attitude toward this?

[Cohen] Generally speaking, opposition is useful in principle as a guarantee against power abuses. However, possibly the functions you have enumerated are already beginning to be performed by the "people's fronts," particularly in the Baltic areas, although officially they are not classified as political parties. In the various areas of your huge country the mass social movements assume different significance: in some places they make policy; elsewhere they do not go beyond meetings and general discussions. The question is, what are the real functions of an organization?

Let us consider "Memorial." This is an all-Union organization. By law it has the right to nominate its candidates for deputies. Should this occur, and should meetings in support of such candidates be organized, posters be put up and funds collected, you could consider this a party or an "embryo" of a party in the American sense. Let us now consider the parliamentary situation (based on the scheme we have adopted in the course of this talk): if all deputies in the Supreme Soviet have the possibility honestly to defend their viewpoints and to join forces in voting, according to their views, one could consider the functions inherent in a "parliamentary party" exist. Finally, take the administration, the "nomenclatura." If it is structured on a "nonparty" basis, as a body of professional governmental officials as in the West, this is a different matter. Furthermore, the administration, the "nomenclatura" must be strictly controlled by the elective authorities. Also important is the mechanism of relations between the party and the soviets. It is too early to determine the type of mechanism that this will be.

Therefore, there are three most important elements of democratic processes in the USSR: democratization within the CPSU; the cooperative movement; and reform in the agrarian sector and a developing market. This is not as yet democracy but could become a tremendous step toward it.

[KOMMUNIST] Finally, Professor Cohen. In speaking of the end objectives of the current perestroika, today we make increasing use of the expression "the new image of socialism." How does it appear to you?

[Cohen] I am following with tremendous interest debates on this topic in your press. What does socialism mean? Under Stalin and Brezhnev it was said that we know what it is. It is what was built in our country. Now it is difficult to say this and, in any case, different journalists and scientists have expressed different viewpoints. Perhaps the most valuable thing is precisely the search for a new, a humane face of socialism. We cannot fail to recall the debates of the 1920s on this topic. Socialism was imagined, and still is, as a "good society," and a "humane state," in which, with every passing year, everyone would live better and better and with every passing year there would be more clothing and shoes, food and housing, happiness and culture, greater freedoms and democracy, etc. Yet it was in precisely the same way that we define "good" capitalism: to live better and better.

Seriously speaking, let me repeat that in itself the search for a new image of Soviet socialism, its concept, is very important. It does not allow society and thinking to stop. It provides food for discussion. Someone in your country recently said something like, if socialism does not make the people happy why do we need such a socialism? Perhaps this is its most accurate definition.

In conclusion, let me say what I already wrote in the preface to my book on N.I. Bukharin, which was recently published in the USSR. I believe that both the reforms and the political struggle which you describe in your country as perestroika are the most important and dramatic and the most crucial events occurring in the contemporary world. This applies not only to you but to all of us. Secondly, the debates which are taking place in your country in the press, in front of audiences and on the streets are the most interesting political debates I have ever had the opportunity to observe.

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Human Rights: Time of New Decisions

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[Article by Tatyana Vitalyevna Sinyukova, senior teacher, Saratov Polytechnical Institute, candidate of juridical sciences, and Vladimir Nikolayevich Sinyukov, docent, Higher Juridical School by Correspondence, USSR MVD, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The question of human rights is fundamental in the theory of the socialist rule of law state. Unlike many other problems of politics and law, which are experiencing a period of stagnation in research, the legal status of the individual has been discussed in Soviet philosophical, legal and political publications quite extensively. However, our theory of human rights has been presented as some kind of gloss on the facade of socialism, against the background of which one could hear, as a rule,

accurate general postulates on the harmony among society, the state and the individual, with carefully dosed out problem aspects. The fact that human rights became a permanent battlefield in clashes with bourgeois propaganda has also left a clear mark, as a result of which the open analysis of unsolved problems, it was thought, could have weakened our foreign policy positions.

The concept on which our humanitarian legislation is based is related, above all, to the theoretical simplification and the vulgarized "adaptation" of many familiar Marxian and Leninist concepts of man, the law and the state. Thus, we are familiar with Marx's idea that the essence of the individual is defined by the sum total of social relations within the system in which the individual finds itself, thus extending the view that changes in and the development of this essence are entirely determined by the revolutionary changes occurring in the socioeconomic, political and spiritual areas of life. In accordance with this understanding, "areas of legal control" assumed the center of attention, to which "production" assignments were issued to the detriment of the development of legal procedures which would guarantee the rights of the individual, while the legal system turned into an array of "objects of regulation," which encompassed the economy, politics, culture, ideology, health care, and others, which were somehow expected to run ahead of the train in which were riding the people. This actually eliminated the policy of the rights of man as an independent and leading factor of legal control and removed the most important "human" elements from economic and political programs.

There was also the idea that the socialist state acts as a decisive means of the reorganization of the entire area of public production, the perfecting of social relations and their gradual conversion into communist social relations. The consequence of such an exaggerated role of the state was that individuals were pushed out of the political system and replaced by unrealistic statements, such as "the state ensures the growth of labor productivity," "the state... organizes the application of results of scientific research in the national economy" (Articles 15 and 26 of the USSR Constitution) and others. In other words, the state became the only employer and distributor of material and spiritual goods.

Such an interpretation of the socialist state leads to major disproportions in the legal status of the individual. Democracy begins to be conceived as the state, and the individual, the person and society as being identical, which leads to the disappearance of individuality and the loss of variety which nurtures culture. In its bureaucratic formulation, the question of human rights is actually reduced to the division of rights and obligations between the state and the individual, which becomes even more puzzling and unrealistic under the conditions of the statification of basic human relations and the proclamation of the virtually exclusive state responsibility for their development. Incidentally, it is not astounding that officially in our country the individual is not considered

an independent subject of the political system. He is used only for purposes of describing governmental functions. Although the individual is proclaimed to be the object of state activities, in fact he is not responsible for events nor does he determine them. Consequently, the erosion of the constitutional status of the individual becomes inevitable. Departmental rule making and the legal (and frequently illegal) institution of numerous benefits, privileges, restrictions, prohibitions, and so on, only narrowed this status. The constitutional status was actually divided among departments, regions, groups, and clans based on the unofficial rungs of the social ladder: "nomenclatura worker," "trade worker," "simple engineer," etc. By the mid-1980s such actually existing "statuses" began to have greater influence on the actual social and legal status of the individual than his constitutional status.

The basic question of guarantees gradually lost its juridical value. The proclaimed course of "steady increase" of rights was not followed by the development of the juridical mechanisms for their exercise. "The social system itself" was considered as the main and "objective" guarantee. Essentially any indirect policy of legal guarantees of the social system and the individual were excluded. The legal aspect of the problem was gradually reduced to a widespread system of prohibitions and restrictions which provided the main nourishment to "law enforcement" departmental activities. Such activities, carried out on the basis of uncontrolled arbitrariness, actually eliminated or left in an embryonic state the individual legal mechanisms for the defense of human rights.

All of this could not fail to have a most adverse influence on the institution of juridical responsibility. On the theoretical level the reality of rights was based on the implementation of obligations which, with the domination of the command system, turned the familiar profound Marxist thesis upside down: it is only the real freedom of the individual that creates conditions for relations of informal responsibility and not the opposite. On the practical level this led to the "autonomizing" of the individual from social responsibility, expressed either in numerous cases of innocent assumption of responsibility or the blossoming of various forms of irresponsibility.

As a result of all this, the legal status of the Soviet person has retained the following basic deformations: 1. Disproportions in the structure of the legal status of the individual, including in correlation with socioeconomic, cultural, civil and political rights; 2. Inefficiency or lack of guarantees for a number of social, personal and political rights, overassessment of state coercion and underdevelopment of the legal system of individual legal defense mechanisms; 3. Unsecured legal obligations relative to social and legal possibilities for engaging in creative work and initiative, insignificant role of true responsibility, a bias toward its "objective" form, crowned in the area of punishment with the death

penalty; 4. A steady trend toward lowering the standard of real protection through the laws, despite the steadily increasing "turnover" of law enforcement output (let us recall the latest sensational cases involving transportation and ecological catastrophes, in which the entire serious problem of safety and the abnormal work of entire sectors was reduced to a judicial investigation of the guilt of the immediate culprits); 5. Exaggeration of the penal function of juridical obligations and minimizing procedural activities on the part of the individual himself in the defense of his rights, against the background of a simplified form of jurisdictional activities by the state.

Such deformations are the harsh legacy of the past, the distant yet powerful echo of the earlier distortions which developed in social relations. When and how did this occur?

The socialist revolution was made under the slogan of freedom for the working people and elimination of formalism and the declarative nature of rights. Above all, it firmly destroyed the feudal chains which restrained society, concentrating its prime attention on the liberation of classes and social groups: peasants, from the power of landowners; soldiers, from the power of "independent" generals; workers, from the arbitrary behavior of the capitalists; and nations, from national oppression and discrimination. The initial legal acts of the Soviet system codified broad political freedoms: freedom of conscience, religious and antireligious propaganda, freedom of opinions, assembly, associations, right to comprehensive and free education, and the obligation to work and to defend the socialist fatherland and the equality of all citizens regardless of sex and racial and national origin. For the first time the right to recall deputies by voters was introduced in widespread practices.

At the same time, the RSFSR acted as a true innovator in the area of the political and economic approaches to human progress and introduced features and achievements considered unique from the viewpoint of the development of civilization, compared with all previous political standards. It would be no exaggeration to say that despite the conflicting nature of the situation with prevailed at that time and of errors and even crimes, the RSFSR and its allied sovereign Soviet republics were able to assume leading positions in the world in the field of human rights and to seize the initiative, which was totally untraditional in the Western democracies, in this key area of social relations. It is not astounding that at that time the Soviet Republic became the internationally acknowledged place of refuge for people who were being persecuted in their own countries for political dissidence.

This novel approach to human rights was confirmed by the stipulations contained in the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, which was adopted at the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The

emphasis apparent in the title of this declaration, which was drafted by Lenin, as a development and perpetuation of the bourgeois revolutionary manifestoes of 1776 and 1789, was noteworthy. The declaration and the policy which it proclaimed were an attempt to eliminate formalism in the "purely" individual view of the problem, which drew the individual into the millstone of social inequality, and to adopt an approach to man through the social organization of society and establish the status of its "macroelements" by changing the nature of political power. Such a formulation of the problem of human rights was both revolutionary and profoundly traditional and humanistic.

However, reality proved that the steps which had been taken were by no means sufficient to ensure the implementation of the tasks. Qualitatively new problems and difficulties arose in the solution of specific problems of activities of already liberated people and in the formulation of the practical aspects of a human rights policy. It became clear that the purpose would not be achieved through revolutionary pressure alone and that lengthy and practically unknown work remained to be done, in the course of which ever new obstacles would appear, related both to clashes within the movement itself (struggle for power, cult of personality) as well as external ones, based on pathological social processes in other countries (fascism, anticommunism).

Certain disproportions began to be noticed in problems of human rights. Gradually, the class approach changed from revolutionary to inertial, frequently merely hindering the solution of the difficult arising problems. Social policy toward classes (alliance, neutralization, liquidation) became "stuck" on this level and found no outlet in the development of human individuality. Social and legal policies should have led to the development of a firm legal status for every individual. However, this project dragged on for decades and, in this sense, the revolution failed to complete its sociolegal program.

The extreme nature (frequently exaggerated) of the situation relative to the survival of the new social system, the low level of sociocultural development of the people, the intervention and counterrevolution became the grounds for justifying the uniqueness and even the "alternative" historical development of our path in terms of universal human values. This was a path in the course of which the global traditions of human rights not only found it difficult to adapt to the system but, conversely, encouraged the preservation of the repressive forms in the exercise of rights. The legal nihilism of the 1920s degenerated in the 1930s in an understanding of rights and behavior as copies of official orders. In both cases there was a noteworthy abandonment of the integral, the "social" man in his entire complexity. Such vulgarizing approaches were preserved until recently.

We are only now beginning to gain an overall idea of the distortion of human rights, which began at the end of the 1920s and continued until recently. Despite the legislative break with the principles of Stalinism, in the legal

area of life the old model and the old legal system, adapted less to defending the rights of the individual than to serving the administrative machinery, are being largely reproduced and duplicated. Such a system reacts to the democratic tasks with tremendous difficulty, regardless of shakeups in personnel, and political declarations.

This pause in the development of human rights cannot fail to influence the pace of social progress. The characteristic feature in this case is that without taking the second step toward the individual, it is difficult to protect the gains of the first, which is the elimination of class exploitation, and even more difficult to extract from it any positive results. It is thus that a distorted mechanism of social activities developed: in the area of socioeconomic rights, the struggle for economic progress, unsupported by a "transfusion" consistent with its nature gradually turned into the vague and intangible task of "laying the material and technical foundations." Structural distortions in the legal and social systems, increasingly affecting "personal" aspects, brought about major internal restrictions in the development of the economy itself. For that reason, the growth of the economic potential, related to restrictions and all sorts of privations to which the people deliberately committed themselves for the sake of a future "better life," led not only to the growth of specific indicators applicable to construction projects, enterprises and output but also to an objective lowering of the intellectual and spiritual saturation of this growth, which had far-reaching negative consequences. It is not astounding, in this sense, that we managed to lose here even some bourgeois-democratic values, i.e., despite the obvious socioeconomic achievements, the legal system, deprived of human system-forming principles, was unable to "convert" them into real well-being and into the moral and psychological balance and happiness of the people.

In order to conceal this fact, many of the inevitable products of an inefficient economy were proclaimed to be "advantages" of socialist practice. Thus, equalization was frequently viewed as secured social equality; low labor and technological discipline was hidden behind "guaranteed" labor rights; and unsatisfactory labor productivity was interpreted as guaranteed earnings and social assistance. This was the typical cost of economic and political distortions, which were destructive to the personality.

Therefore, the political and legal reforms became a vital requirement. It is on this basis that we must begin with a reform in the institution of human rights and with the reorganization of the entire legal system.

Politics in the area of human rights must be granted the status of a fundamental principle in the formulation of the economic, political-legal, social and international course. Substituting for it a policy of loose formulas and socioeconomic measures aimed at the "further improvement and expansion" leads to a loss of internal ties

among the efforts of the state in economic, social and legal problems. In that case human rights turn in the public awareness and, particularly, in the awareness of technocratically raised managers on different levels, into a characteristic ideological fetish to which everyone seems to pay respect without, however, taking it into consideration as a serious factor in making specific decisions.

Policy in the field of human rights must lead to a new quality of legal protection of the people. The constitutional practices in a number of countries encourage the drafting of special laws on the rights of citizens. A list of rights and obligations (largely obsolete) is included in the present USSR Constitution. Taking into consideration the subsequent stages in the reform of the political system, we should discuss the question of including in the Constitution, as a separate act, a declaration of the rights of citizens and peoples of the USSR, remembering that the Leninist Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People was the first title of the RSFSR Constitution of 1918.

Under contemporary conditions, such an act should constitute the conceptual extension of the line of the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People; it should restore the socialist traditions of human rights and include the accumulated foreign experience in their guarantee. It would be expedient for such a declaration to include direct guarantees of personal and political rights and to formulate the principles governing the legal status of man under the conditions of scientific and technical progress, the new situation in the habitat and in international intercourse. The declaration is needed as a pivot for the new institution of human rights, codifying its priority and giving the necessary dynamism to all sectors of legal regulation applicable to man. The double emphasis in the title—the rights of man and the rights of nations—would make it possible to combine the rights of the individual with those of self-determining nations, which would introduce in contemporary constitutional use the experience of the 1917 Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia and the 1924 USSR Constitution, which included the Union Treaty.

Such a declaration would require, possibly, a certain organizational and meaningful restructuring of the Soviet legal system. In this connection, the institution of human rights could be developed in the following areas:

A new structural policy in the field of human rights—giving priority to personal defense and protection of the most vulnerable areas of human life and specifying the limits of the previous subjects of control;

Juridical diversification of certain traditional human rights (the rights to work, education, personal property, and so on), taking into consideration the new economic and social strategy and adverse technological and natural factors;

Elaboration of the contemporary concept of socio-legal guarantees, which would eliminate the formal nature of guarantees and would exclude dependency and parasitism;

The creation of a juridical concept of glasnost: information support of human existence, not only from the viewpoint of the freedom of opinion but also the protection of the honor and morality, and protection from manipulating the mind; ensuring access to power and management agencies and to information concerning their work;

Refining the institution of legal responsibility on the basis of its humanizing and truly individual approach;

Restoration of the legal forms of class protection and development of the rights of classes—workers, peasants and intellectuals—on the basis of the codification of the corresponding prerogatives and the formulation of guarantees protecting social groups;

Implementation of a new international policy of defense and cooperation in the field of human rights.

Within the framework of these and other areas, the elaboration of specific programs for the development of human rights seems desirable, such as: "Civil and Political Human Rights;" "Social Rights and Social Guarantees;" "Defense of the Family and the Rights of Children;" "Ecological Rights," etc. Let us emphasize that it is a question of "related" legal programs of supradepartmental nature, the development of which could be coordinated by the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Human rights and development of the political system. The democratization of the political system would yield socially valuable results if, at the same time, a number of relatively new aspects of human rights are secured. The enhancement of political institutions is possible with the faster development of civil and political rights and freedoms and abandoning the principle that the individual has second priority in terms of political power and the image of the "state-benefactor."

The main shortcoming of the existing political system is that man is actually not the subject of the sociopolitical process but the object of "concern" on the part of the state and the social organizations closely related to the state. Such protection cannot be a foundation for the freedom and responsibility of the individual and, consequently, for his true progress. Today a qualitatively different correlation is needed among the individual, the state and the economic system.

Also today the basic trend in the development of the political system is that of ensuring the participation of the citizens in management which, unquestionably, is quite important. Such participation presumes the development of traditional political structures. In the political system, however, social relations of the purely human

and informal nature with which the individual feels affiliated above all and which are mainly related to the concepts of class and region (the "small homeland") remain undeveloped and poorly represented.

Gradually, trends toward a conversion to a new level of regulation of human rights are maturing in the world, in which the legal status of the "abstract" individual and the related "psychological aspect" of legal phenomena are replaced by regulations based on the true social features of the individual as a member of a given class or social or territorial (European, for instance) community and the world. It is symbolic that it is precisely now that concepts such as socioeconomic rights, civic freedoms, class guarantees, national sovereignty, and humanism, i.e., all that without which any real protection of the individual is inconceivable, are being restored to active life. All of these are the true advantages of the socialist system, on the revival of which we should concentrate our efforts.

We must restore the practice of protecting the people as representatives of specific toiling classes, something which has been largely lost in contemporary legislation. In our country the status of the worker and, particularly, the peasant, became strongly depersonalized. This had a catastrophic impact on production relations. For centuries the peasantry struggled for its class rights. However, does our legislation include standards protecting such rights? Taking into consideration the kolkhoz system, we must guarantee to the peasants the type of rights which would exclude the separation of the working person from the means of production, and in which the production process itself would not only lead to the creation of products but would also reproduce human relations and a specific stratum of culture, which has always been related to this area of social life.

The rights of the individual and the rights of the nation must be coordinated. Without their properly considered connection the exercise of the rights of the nation, to self-determination for instance, cannot "reach" the individual and could even damage him. The right to self-determination of the entire nation should be supplemented with a similar right of the individual. The absence of such a balance on the level of the individual, as practical experience has indicated, is fraught with the danger of violating the freedom of opinion, the choice of language and profession, and so on. In other words, in the final account, it leads to undermining national sovereignty itself. The rights of nations exist for the sake of the fullest possible guaranteeing of the rights of the people of which they consist and not vice-versa. It is characteristic that nationalism and religious fanaticism find their most nutritive soil precisely in countries where human rights problems remain unsolved.

Some economic aspects of human rights. The dialectical complexity of the interaction between the production and legal areas is that to a certain extent the economy itself determined the volume and nature of the rights of

its subjects, including consumers. The greatest array of crises phenomena in the economy and the social area is found in the structure of human relations. The most important among them is relations of ownership.

The involvement of the individual in ownership relations followed a "private" and a kind of "administrative" way, within which the restoration of the status of the individual as the master of the production process began to be directly related to his participation in the solving of production problems, enterprise autonomy, electiveness of leadership, and so on. Unquestionably, these are important aspects of industrial democracy. However, other ways exist as well for ensuring such participation. One of them is that of strengthening the legal status of consumers and the creation of a respective juridical institution. Another is broadening its ties to individual production interests. The institutes of inheritance, gifts, purchase and sale, leasing and credit must be given a corresponding legal and economic content.

The array of the rights of man as a participant in public production must be improved. A legal diversification of the subjective right to work is necessary, taking into consideration personal interests, such as the use of more "humane" technologies, elimination of exhausting and stupefying labor, ecological protection, and so on. In this case the law should set certain production standards. We must refine the right to vocational training and retraining in accordance with the policy of anticipation of future jobs. Wherever new technologies will be paralleled by the release of workers, the law should serve the combination of economic efficiency with social protection, based on the absence of private property antagonisms. It is time to draw up the juridical means for the adaptation of the people to possible by-products of a new and efficient economy and corresponding social programs which, however, should not hinder the effect of economic labor incentives.

Rights of the person and the family. Problems of support and development of the family are of basic importance in the legislative agenda of perestroyka. We must go back to the status of its members and the protection of women. We must virtually recreate the institution of children's rights. Furthermore, under the conditions of a tempestuous development of science, we must provide legal protection for "human nature," for the genetic stock and its normal development. Possibly, we may need to create on this level new "branched-out" rights.

The guarantees of human rights concentrate, as in a focal point, both the achievements and the major shortcomings of the current legal system. Despite the constant emphasis on the role of guarantees as the most important advantage of socialism, it is precisely in this area, which is indeed of essential importance to our system, that the consequences of its deformation proved to be the most destructive. We must recognize that the existing guarantees of human rights were unable to fulfill their social function fully, leaving the individual largely defenseless

in the face of the distortions of bureaucratism, social injustice, favoritism, illegality, boorishness and the harming of honor and dignity.

The widespread concept of guarantees was their vision as some kind of means of protection and defense, outside of man but given to the state for the purpose of securing human rights. It is precisely along this line that discussions are frequently held on ways of strengthening legal protection: what type of state authorities should have the right (the obligation) to protect the individual, and how will such rights be assigned. Therefore, the question is reduced to changing the organizational structure of law enforcement departments.

Without questioning in any way the need for such work, let us note that the "organizational" policy of improving legal guarantees, which has been monotonously pursued for many decades, not only failed to achieve any visible success in ensuring the legal protection of the individual but even triggered a stable trend toward the alienation of the people from legal institutions. The "apparatus" bias in the policy of guarantees gradually led to the bureaucratizing of this classical legal institution. We believe that its crisis is manifested most clearly in the following: 1. Excessive dependence of the legal status of the individual on political campaigns (sometimes governed by circumstances), which frequently clash with the law and with which legal guarantees are unable to "compete;" 2. Excessive statification of the mechanisms for the defense of the rights of the individual, separating themselves from the individual and allowing such mechanisms to avoid social control; 3. A tendency to increase repressive (criminal) and procedurally simplified forms of securing the observance of rights and obligations; 4. Weak protection of the individual in daily life (in stores, in dry-cleaning establishments, on the street, and so on) with the help of "small" democratically organized legal forms such as, for example, the institution of the justice of the peace; 5. Legal favoritism in protecting officials compared to ordinary citizens (now, it is true, the opposite extremes have appeared as well): the press versus readers, teachers versus students, penal administrations versus inmates, and so on; 6. A certain alienation from the international infrastructure of the defense of human rights.

Under circumstances governed by a half-hearted legal policy, it has become customary to ascribe a "guaranteeing" effect to virtually all phenomena without exception which have been granted some legal status, such as laws, legal resolutions and prosecutor's supervision. What was ignored here is that in themselves these institutions, unless they form a coordinated mechanism for securing the rights, could trigger through their existence nothing but futile hopes in the citizens, thus encouraging the legal nihilism of the latter. Furthermore, the weakness of the existing mechanism of guarantees triggered a variety of social surrogates such as, for example,

complaints addressed to the central authorities, bypassing the organizations whose task it is to solve them; mandatory gifts; use of anonymous complaint channels, etc.

The inadequacies of this mechanism are explained both by the imperfections in the legislation, including procedural, as well as errors in the organization of legal activities. However, to some extent all of this is the consequence of a deeper reason: the still preserved concept of guarantees, developed in the 1930s, on the basis of which the legal system continues to function. The traditions of Stalinism are still strong in matters of guarantees. The phenomenon of Stalinism, the amazing durability of which can be explained in a variety of ways, is most closely linked to the problems of human rights. Despite the repressions, it was precisely this problem which experienced a fantastic aberration in the social consciousness, having actually ascribed to Stalin the image of the creator of the social ("prices dropped") and even "legal" ("there was order") status. Indeed, his regime embodied a certain permanently noncontradictory concept of ensuring daily activities: sociopolice protection which the state provided the individual at the expense of depriving him of his rights. This model of guarantees is trying, to this day, to adapt our legislation to the new situation and extremely fear any expansion of the rights of the individual in criminal law, upgrading the role of the bar, etc. We find here the real contradiction within the existing process of guaranteeing human rights and nutritive grounds for a dependent nostalgia for the repressive mechanisms of the "strong hand" variety.

For the time being, the problem of sociolegal protection is seen in a rather mechanical aspect: the more society develops the broader the realm of action of human rights will become. However, in this area not everything is all that simple. Legal protection has its laws and limits and it does not tolerate a stereotypical approach. Whereas in the realm of protecting individual freedoms and civil, political and many social rights it is indeed necessary to increase the number of juridical means for the protection of the individual and for strengthening his status in criminal and civil jurisprudence, in a number of areas of social and labor relations legal protection must not be turned into its opposite, into a reactionary factor which hinders the development of man. Such trends, which encourage social infantilism, loss of activeness, equalization and dependency can be clearly seen, unfortunately, in the development of some areas of the law. The type of legal support which has developed is oriented toward the gross approach to guarantees as a kind of objective increase in the flood of benefits, improvements and aid. A certain segment of the social consciousness has begun to identify guarantees with irresponsibility and slovenliness. Paradoxical though it may sound, it is precisely the institution of guarantees (or, rather, its unconsidered development) that has become the "official" source of the mentality of social equalization.

Obviously, a new meaningful and organizational infrastructure will be necessary to ensure the legal protection of the individual, ranging from the introduction of standards for the compensation of moral damage to the creation of a governmental and nongovernmental system of controlling, appeal and research institutes which would be independent of the executive powers and which man himself could activate in accordance with his social and legal requirements.

Along with the state-centralized guaranteeing of the rights of man the role of which, after the democratic reorganization will remain quite important, regional, professional, individual, national and other mechanisms for legal defense must be developed, without which it will be impossible to develop the stratum of juridical standards, needed in the rule of law state, and to ensure a civilized working system for the law enforcement authorities.

Furthermore, in addition to socialist and specifically national, we also need international standards of human rights, which should be not the final ideal but the starting point of our economic and legal process. This can be accomplished not through class isolationism and persistent repetition of the "essential differences," but through the adoption of all that is the most valuable and humane in the international community. It is a question of eliminating the negative attitude toward the theory of the international legal responsibility of the individual and return to the question of ratifying the optional protocol to the Pact on Civil and Political Rights which, like the Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should be given the status of internal governmental law in the USSR and, finally, introduce as rapidly as possible as standards of governmental law a wide range of new human rights and their guarantees, included in the final document of the Vienna Meeting.

Socialism has not as yet encompassed in its work its main advantage—humaneness. Furthermore, even the solution of isolated topical problems of the rights of the individual in socialist society will by no means lead to the automatic, "overnight" economic and sociocultural progress. This is a necessary prerequisite and the final target of the movement which, in turn, requires a correct application and must be combined with other parts of the social entity. This should be the final word of the internal nature of the system and the talent of the people and their aspiration to a better life and our ability to convert the rights included in the laws into real well-being and real happiness. Human rights are a long-term investment of legal capital which can yield political, social and cultural profits, naturally not immediately but without fail.

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Authority of Culture

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[Article by Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Nedoshivin, deputy head, department of socialist culture, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] In the past few years or, rather decades, I have increasingly asked myself: Where do the honor and dignity of the individual disappear? Who deprives man of his pride and independence? Why is there a depreciation of intelligence and delicacy, replaced by high-handedness, lack of ceremony and arrogance? Finally, why is it that the genuine standards of the individual are becoming a real anachronism, although this is the only thing with which, in my view, a developing civilization can pride itself?

I read the Decembrists and I love them precisely because they had everything that we consider important today: not an apartment or a dacha but palaces; not a miserable wage but fortunes; not a month of leave but a life which resembled a never-ending party. Nonetheless, they rejected all of this and chose instead the struggle for the liberation of the people, which led them to chains, mines and the gallows. They chose this for the sake of others, for you and me, if you wish. Try to imagine any one of them, any true revolutionary who would profess the popular principle of today: "No worse than others?"

How then did it happen, when did it happen, that the unwritten rule of "living no worse than others" easily pierced through our proclaimed morality, pushed aside the sterile norms of the "code of the builder of communism," and scornfully laughed in the face of all kinds of pious appeals and aesthetic demands and most authoritative resolutions and decrees? Why is it that the opposite of "living no better than others" became, initially, the lot of a small segment of the society and, subsequently, of isolated—relic—individuals? These were people who, whatever they may have been thinking about themselves, and however they may have lulled themselves with the concept of personal nobility, remained in the eyes of those around them either as people who have fallen behind "progress," or else simpletons or total failures?

No, I am not a pessimist. I believe in man. Furthermore, I am convinced that our people, who live according to the principle of "no worse than others," secretly, in their hearts, would like to live according to the opposite rule: "No better than others." For if the first principle presumes some kind of mechanical equality from the material viewpoint (there is, obviously, nothing bad in that), professing the latter, which is something immeasurably greater (!) means equality in terms of decency, honesty, nobility, firmness of principles, which do not fluctuate as

a result of clashes and situations in life. This is a profound moral feeling sharpened by the education of the heart, a measure of the dignity of man.

I came across a semiforgotten novel which was written in 1939. Among others, and among extensive and speculative views about our future, I also read in it the following maxim: "If you can build a good plant or power station or if you design a machine, socialism does not give a damn that you do not know how to play the violin, have not read *War and Peace*," or cannot blab in English...."

So what, I thought. It was an aphorism of the "Stalinist age," a concept of the person who had to be made to work at all cost but whom it was difficult, bothersome and expensive to raise and educate. The objectives of this approach to man are both explainable and even understandable. What bothered me in this sentence was the word "socialism." Socialism, a scientific theory, the peak of human thought, was ascribed precisely an indifference toward human thought and culture. At best, such "indifference" could be conceived as a deliberate, a planned rejection of spiritual values and the wealth acquired by mankind. It was a logic and a feeling simply rejected by the mind, for the objectives of socialism were the precise opposite.

But that is how it was. It was even worse, for in another novel which, by strange coincidence, was also written in 1939 and also dealt with the future, not simply certain feelings of a certain period of time were being reflected but there were theoretical errors about socialism, errors the results of which are saying "hello" to us to this day.

The book had a beautiful title: "*A Trip to the Country of Communism*." It was an unfinished novel by Ye. Petrov, that same person who, together with I. Ilf had already written "*The Twelve Chairs*." Communism, as it seemed then to the author of that novel, was to arrive in our country, while socialism came to France and Germany, by 1963.

Ah, what a country was painted by Ye. Petrov: Everywhere joy, happiness, laughter. The only unhappy person in that society of the future was a playwright whose play had failed. He even wanted to shoot himself.

"Yes, we dream," admits in the novel one of his characters, the chairman of the 1963 Gosplan. "Our dreams, however, are invariably based on real life. The 5-year period of comfort has now ended and the 5-year period of luxury has begun.... The most important thing is to put people on equal material conditions (which is possible only when there is abundance) and later give individuality full freedom...."

Let us set aside predictions about the "5-year period of luxury," which was to begin in 1963. We do recall that year. We had already launched Sputnik, Gagarin had already flown in space but in life, speaking of material standards, we were far from luxury or even comfort. Let

us set this aside, for it is much more interesting, for purposes of our discussion, to consider the thought by the chairman of the 1963 Gosplan about "equal material conditions" and "full freedom to individuality." Naturally, the writer did not explain what he understood by "abundance" and "freedom." Today, I believe, practical experience has already proved that one is impossible without the other. In other words, without the maximal development of human possibilities, a prerequisite for which is the freedom of individuality, abundance cannot be achieved; without abundance (even most relative ones) the maximal development of human possibilities is inconceivable.

This does not mean replacing one stage with another or switching their places. We must first solve one problem and then the next.... No! Such theoretical "delusions," brought us real harm. They penetrated human continuity in the main thing—traditions. For it is not possible for one generation to "tighten up its belt" for the sake of the emancipation and freedom of the next generation. For freedom, in order to become a natural condition of man, must be imbued with the mother's milk. One cannot deliberately "postpone" the mastering of culture so that children, secured by us materially, could calmly master it and become educated many-sided people. For taste for culture is developed in the person also when he is young and, incidentally, by those who themselves are its bearers.

Freedom and culture must have traditions in society. They must firmly be based on the past. If we take into consideration that freedom and culture are, furthermore, inseparable concepts and that freedom is the air of culture and culture, in turn, is the soil of freedom, one can easily imagine what was the result for our society of the theoretical "delusions" of Stalinism and the harm which it caused all of us, and how much time was lost. Were such delusions accidental? For the mastery of culture means to broaden the possibility of choice, to develop a personal opinion and to improve one's personality. Such a person would not follow slogans blindly. It would be more difficult to enslave him spiritually. It would not be simple to manipulate his mind. Was this not the reason for which the Leninist plan of gradually promoting culture among the peasant masses was "forgotten," and that literature and art were subject to vivisection and that not a single time, to the best of my recollection, did a single CPSU Central Committee Plenum deal with problems of the development of culture, although there were many resolutions and directive-promulgating speeches on this account.

Do not exaggerate, do not darken the colors, I can hear the voice of my opponents, not everything is all that terrible!

Not terrible?! Yes, it may seem to us that everything is in order, Osip Mandelstam said smiling in the mid-1930s, because the streetcars are running....

The streetcars may be running but in terms of the number of seats in theaters and concert halls and the number of museums today our country is almost in 30th place in the world. Furthermore, even these seats in the theaters, with the exception of a dozen cities, remain most of them vacant....

The streetcars are running but, according to data provided by a ministry, in this "country with the most readers in the world" there is no more than 29 kilograms of paper per capita, compared with some 300 in the United States. Although something else is more terrible: in a period of no more than 2 years, according to a newspaper, the population failed to purchase books worth 45 million rubles. This is the equivalent of closing down for a full year publishing houses such as *Sovremennik* or *Moskovskiy Rabochiy*....

The streetcars are running but, although for years we were proud of the fact that we have 151,000 motion picture facilities, it was only after the trip which M.S. Gorbachev made to Tyumen that we found out that there is a city in Siberia in which there is only one movie theater, to which the workers are taken as an incentive.

How many more such facts could be cited! Yes, the streetcars are running and today rockets regularly go into space. To this day, however, we do not have the complete collected works of T. Tasso, Servantes, Goethe and even Dante, not to mention Joyce, Proust, Lawrence, Eliott and others; we have not seen even one-third of the motion pictures of superb directors, such as Fellini, Antonioni, Bertolucci, Truffeau, Chabrol, Bunuel, Kubrick, and Penn (of the 30 pictures made by Jean-Luck Goddard our viewers have not seen a single one); we have not heard about many classics of the stage, ballet and music, who, as it were, died totally "unknown" in our country; and, naturally, we have read virtually nothing in Soviet editions of the works of philosophers such as Freud, Spengler, Danilevskiy, Berdyayev, Fromm and Toynbee, and many others....

Yet these are the consequences, the reasons for which cannot be reduced merely to the "residual approach," with which we could put an end by transferring cash from one pocket to another.

We smile condescendingly recalling the way, in the 1920s, we scoffed at the ties, hats and glasses of the intellectuals. Yet this denigrating attitude toward the intelligentsia and toward serious knowledge was already then cultivated deliberately. The repressions of the men of culture which followed, as well as the noisy condemnation of many talented things in art and culture made this as yet subconscious mistrust of the people both conscious and firm. Today the ordinary person easily agrees with the view that he is not "allowed" to read something, to see or to know something, while unconsciously the "prohibitors" referred precisely to that ordinary person, saying that he did not want, he did not understand.... Is this not a tradition which was promoted

both in kindergarten and in the administration of culture? For in art and literature, in philosophy all that it takes is to skip a layer and anything which develops after it becomes unnecessary....

But let us go on. Starting with the 1930s, a deliberate "emphasis" was initiated in the attacks on culture: everything that was easy, accessible and entertaining was proclaimed ours: proletarian, peasant. This approach—a preference for what was simple compared to the complex, what was one-dimensional as opposed to multidimensional—which pleased the underdeveloped taste and "diluted" serious art, was tightened up occasionally with "condemnation campaigns," which existed until very recently. It is only today that, although not entirely clearly as yet, we are beginning to understand that the truth was precisely the opposite. The complicated people like Shostakovich, Platonov, Abuladze, Tarkovskiy, Bitov and Akhmadulina were what was our Soviet art, progressive on the scale of mankind, while the primitive hits in music, motion pictures and literature with which we were fed daily, were "theirs." It was the yesterday of art if not the day before....

The essentially noble principle of "equality," which was easily violated from the material viewpoint (and still is!), was strictly pedantically observed despite Marxism, incidentally, in terms of talent, ability and human gift. Was this not tradition?

What about falsely practiced collectivism of feelings instead of a natural variety of tastes and human emotions? Singing "Volga-Volga," we line up against Tairov, Meyerhold, Bulgakov and Akhmatova. What is this? What about the real terror of personal biases on the part of one or another commander of such a line, stemming from this: "I liked it and do you not agree?" This, incidentally, was despite the Leninist approach of not turning one's esthetic sympathies and antipathies into guidelines.... What about fear, the apprehension of being singled out, insincerity, loss of the value of one's own thoughts compared with thoughts which could be described as "signed" and "approved," which, in turn, devalued independence, originality and the uniqueness of every individual? What about the life of any person in which, strange though it might seem, there was always something more than simply living, something which made usual human objectives somehow secondary: love, family, the education of the children, everything which makes life what it is and not an existence for the sake of objectives which were either "alienated" from man or speculative?

And if today perestroika is developing more slowly than we would like it to be, and if changes are insufficient and obstructions significant, I, in any case, see the reasons for this in those same traditions, for because of lack of culture and inner freedom not everyone is as yet aware of the profound objectives of perestroika.

That is where, if we are to answer the question, the honor and dignity of the individual go, in those same traditions. They take away from man his pride and independence. They depreciate intelligence and refinement. That is why we need so much the true, the most profound culture of the individual which is the only thing, as I already pointed out, with which a developing civilization can be truly proud of.

"Ignorance is a demonic force," Marx wrote. "...It will be the cause of many more tragedies."

This is true. But here is a question: Is there today such a thing as absolute ignorance? And if there is not, to the extent to which television, radio and thousands of newspapers and journals or universal secondary education have done their work, semi-ignorance and semiculture are they not worse than absolute ignorance? Are we not sacrificing to extensive culture not simply intensive culture but culture in general? Culture as such?

As I think of this, I frequently recall the film "Features of a Portrait." I remember parts showing the discussion of the project and the implementation of the Leninist plan for monument propaganda. Do you recall it? One of the characters, obviously a "high official," turns to Lenin and somehow simply and naively waving his arms, says: "Vladimir Ilich we may not know to whom to build monuments but we firmly know to whom we should not." Unlike Lenin's suggestion, he speaks against a monument to Mikhaylovskiy. "You yourself," he turns to Lenin, "brilliantly criticized him in one of your earlier works...."

This is an excellent example of "learned ignorance." In terms of today's facts, things did not develop the Leninist way, for to this day there is no monument to Mikhaylovskiy. This naive simplistic "high official" defeated Lenin. Let me say something more about Mikhaylovskiy: quite recently, before perestroika, one of the publishing houses "stumbled" by publishing a book on utopian socialism. The publishing house came to grief, badly at that, and why do you think? Yes, because it had included an excerpt from a work by Mikhaylovskiy, although Lenin himself had criticized him....

Oh slumbering semiculture and ignorant barracks approach to names where we should penetrate into the thought, the meaning, the novelty or consistency of a thought! No, in this ancient argument in the Kremlin it was not simply two views that clashed on a question which was of little significance at that time: to build or not to build a monument? What clashed were two basic positions: a person with the highest possible cultural standard, a truly educated individual—Lenin—who understood the value of this philosopher in terms of science and history, and the value of the scientist as a "rung" in the development of theoretical thinking, and the position of the semi-educated, the pseudointellectual, who had read Lenin and, perhaps, had memorized him but did not go so far as Mikhaylovskiy or, rather,

whose virginal mind could not understand him. The underdeveloped nature of this mind was replaced so easily and confidently by an amazing activeness of another variety, by the position of the ideologue of any kind of "stagnation:" we do not need to know our "enemies," not to mention to build monuments to them!

However, this is not the position of the true communist, a position which, as we know, does not exclude but, conversely, makes it an obligation to know "all the wealth developed by mankind." It is the position of a person given power and who, referring to his knowledge of the "crown," thoughtlessly pulled out the "roots" of culture from our soil. Therefore, nothing more can grow on that field over which this "demonic force" has passed....

Someone may say: well, it is fashionable today to abuse the leaders in the realm of culture: ministerial workers, chiefs of culture administration, and party functionaries. I am not one of those "abusers." On the contrary, I am pleased by the changes which are being made in this matter as well. But let us think of something else: How did incompetent managers appear and why is it that sometimes their incompetence was totally "suitable" for their appointment? Was the cultural "baggage" of those who promoted them "optimal?" Would you agree that had there been more knowledge, culture and intelligence, the contrast with their immediate superiors would have been more striking, which is not easy to tolerate? Had there been less knowledge, the superiors themselves would have had to deal more frequently with such difficult and, frequently, confused matters.... Yet it seemed that everything was as simple as possible: choose people to work in this most refined area of spiritual life on the basis of the only accurate principle of the consistency between the culture of the candidate not with the "culture" of his superior but with the most profound culture developed by mankind.

If we want to be realistic, we must expand, we must restructure the high road of culture. We must basically change our attitude toward it. We must change it since youth, with the enhanced authority of culture and cultured people and the establishment of a differentiated payment for their labor, based on their knowledge and high human (yes, yes, human precisely) qualities, and the real and not the "time-serving" organization (both for cultural workers and their wards) of recreation, involving total instruction and retraining of the entire population. I have not misspoken: precisely the entire population.

Culture does not come easily; what comes easily is only the "petty culture," of which all of us have had enough. Culture, for the individual and, even more so, for society, demands tremendous efforts, time, thought and funds. On the other hand, however, it is something which brings returns much greater than one could imagine.

Do you know that senior executives of IBM are forced to study the plays of Shakespeare? "It is precisely people of such an intellectual scope," comments Bruno Lussato, a professor at the Center of Arts and Crafts (United States), in his discussion with a French journalist, "that are needed to a decentralized enterprise, an enterprise of the future, and not robot individuals with their black attache cases and a set of stereotypes acquired in schools for executives.... How else can it be, if by learning how to understand Bach a person acquires a taste for a well performed work and harmonious working relations and organization.... Those who upgrade their standards also acquire demands concerning quality and can no longer tolerate mediocrity and fraud."

The plays of Shakespeare, and Bach's most difficult works. I do not know what you may have felt, reading this, I felt pain for my country! IBM executives must study Shakespeare whereas in our country, to the best of my knowledge, Shakespeare is not seriously studied even in art VUZs. And what can one say about the thousands of enterprise directors in our country and the tens of thousands of chairmen of kolkhozes and millions of managers? What do they know about preludes for organ or the rules of play writing?

Unquestionably, we need a universal aesthetic training. We need an all-Union aesthetic program, which is being formulated now. Most of all, however, today we need for the leading officials to master culture. How can one understand Shostakovich's 13th Symphony, how to understand the paintings of Vrubel or Filonov, or the meaning of Platonov's or Zamyatin's philosophical writings? Alas, this is not studied either in the higher party schools or in the diplomatic and national economic academies or the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences where, although there is a department of culture, there is not—can you imagine—even a 100 hour course in esthetics and culture for all students and graduate students of the Academy of Social Sciences, as is offered in the higher party school.

The problem of the most radical enhancement of culture throughout the country and of total aesthetic universal training and educating competent managers was not simply raised for us by life itself a long time ago (in my view, at the 27th Party Congress it was a question not only of the Food Program, economics and social development but also of the culture of labor in agriculture, in the development of the economy at the present stage and social relations and of their depth, level of civilization and genuineness); however, they are now more tightly, tighter than ever before, blending with perestroyka. If we do not reorganize our approach to them we shall be unable to restructure anything else in our lives.

That is why if I, a rank-and-file communist, am allowed, I would suggest that one of the CPSU Central Committee plenums be dedicated precisely to problems of culture. The "crossroads" of culture are too stressed today. Too many of our paths of development end here, ranging

from labor productivity to educating the man of the future, from the acceleration of the economy to the principles of democratization and from national relations to the new political thinking. Such "crossroads" demand very urgently a change today!

"The world is advancing to its objective not as rapidly as we think or as we would like to," Goethe said. "...However long human life may be, it will always encounter a sufficient number of obstacles against which we must struggle and a sufficient number of needs which will develop its forces. Naturally, mankind will become more intelligent and perspicacious. However, this will not make it any better, happier or more active. This can be accomplished only during specific periods of time."

Here is another thought expressed by a personality of equal worth:

"If only man would learn not to judge and think sharply and positively and not answer questions which are asked of him only for the sake of remaining questions forever!" L.N. Tolstoy wrote in 1857. "If man could only understand that any idea could be both false and true! What is false is one-sidedness, because of man's impossibility of encompassing the entire truth but it is true when it comes to expressing one side of human aspirations. The people have made subdivisions within this eternally moving, infinite and infinitely mixed chaos of good and evil. They have drawn up imaginary lines on this sea and expect that the sea will part. However, there are millions of other subdivisions based on an entirely different viewpoint and on another level.... And who will tell me what is freedom, what is despotism, what is civilization and what is barbarism? And where are the limits separating one from the other? Who has in his heart such an inflexible yardstick of good and evil as to be able to measure fleeting and confused facts? Who has such a great mind that, although dealing with the immovable past, he would be able to encompass all facts and consider them? And who has seen a condition in which there has been no good and evil together?... And who is able so perfectly to separate his mind from life even for a second in order to look at life independently, from above?"

Writers asked questions about the most profound, the essential problems. They asked about the eternal values, historical truths and great ideals. They asked expecting no answer, understanding and admitting that, frequently, no answers were possible. Incidentally, they asked at a time when reasons for raising such questions were, at least so it seems to me, significantly fewer than they are now. During a time when the world had not experienced two more world wars, unparalleled in terms of casualties and destruction, and when there had been no Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when there had been no real threat of the thermonuclear suicide of mankind or the monstrous fascist experiments and when the "cult of personality" had not turned human logic, common sense and awareness upside-down.

Why is it that today, as we revise a great deal of our theory and practice, we by no means ask ourselves such profound questions of life as to the meaning of human life and its purposes and means?

Yes, culture is the soil of freedom and freedom is the air of culture. But what does freedom mean in a socialist society already 70 years old? How are today such classical concepts of "freedom" and "necessity" correlated? Today, in the age of glasnost and democratization, who has developed and considered this old yet eternal question which, in the words of G.V. Plekhanov "faced the idealists of the 19th century as it had the metaphysicists of the previous century and, most firmly, all philosophers who had asked questions relative to the **correlation between life and thinking.**" It is "like the Sphinx, telling all those philosophers: solve my riddle or I will set your system afire."

We could, as in the past, juggle such concepts without burdening ourselves with considerations as to what is "necessity" in the period of "war communism" and the NEP, the age of collectivization and the so-called "thaw," which remained unchanged and, consequently, so did our attitude toward "freedom." But in that case we cannot advance in our perestroika and we will be unable to solve the broad tasks which we are setting to ourselves. At that point all that is left is to believe in the "miracle," that everything will change by itself in culture as well.

No, no miracle will happen. To go back to the problems of culture and to the wealth of work and the words of M.S. Gorbachev, heard at the 19th Party Conference, to the effect that "we see socialism as a system of high culture and morality," it seems to me that the decisive link in the chain with which we must begin should be the acknowledgment and dissemination, on all levels of our society, of the authority of true, of the highest possible culture.

I believe that there is no other authority on earth which would need less any kind of support from the side or additional explanations, a respected position or a high pedestal. The authority of culture is culture itself. It either exists in the person or does not.

Do we not begin by looking up to the educator and the teacher, to the one who knows more and more profoundly and more extensively, who thinks more intelligently and who acts as we personally would like to act? Do we not carry this attitude throughout our lives, however our own authority may develop? For we can always find someone who will be more authoritative even in the eyes of a gray-haired academician or the smartest writer or profound and fine artist, i.e., someone who will be the best. This, in my view, is the authority of culture. Not developed by order, not developed by duty and not traditional but true!

People who have such an authority and who are subject of immeasurable respect and to whom we indeed bow (and any among us could name dozens, hundreds of such names both throughout the country and in our own area), who do not have to be elected, as was done at the recent elections for peoples deputies, but boldly promoted to leading positions. This is consistent with the spirit of the time, the spirit of democratization. The authority of their culture must, finally, coincide with that of their position. Has our society not matured enough for this?

We say that perestroika means a return to the Leninist standards of life, to socialism. However, if we indeed wish such a return, we must urgently learn Lenin's attitude toward culture, talent, education and profound knowledge, and learn his burning hatred of ignorance, boastfulness and incompetence. Obviously, this also means to try to reach the standards of his personality and the authority of true culture.

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Sober Look at Sobriety

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[Text] It so happened that the starting point of perestroika and of the new anti-alcohol policy coincided and, in terms of a number of problems which face our society today, drunkenness proved to be one of the social ills most serious and difficult to cure. Today V.I. Lenin's words are particularly relevant: "We must realize as soberly and clearly as possible what precisely we have 'completed' and what we have not: At that point our mind will remain fresh and there will be neither sickness nor illusions nor depression" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* " [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 417). It is in this key (although, naturally, the analogies here are conventional) that we would like to analyze the present condition of anti-alcohol work in the country.

The steps taken by the party in struggling against drunkenness and alcoholism enabled us to shed a broader light on the tasks of social policy. This is entirely natural, for perestroika opened the gates to the problems which had accumulated and which are blocking today our social

awareness, science, politics and culture: it is as though no single little island has been left in life in which the vestiges of the former tolerance could remain and endure.

We already see behind the face of the problems—individual, collective, regional, national and global—the effect of the obstruction mechanism, which must be taken into consideration. This is an entire stratum of social ontology, "bottom deposits" of all ages of social dilettantism in the development of our society and a huge "cultural stratum" of awareness and way of life of different population groups. The past left us as its legacy a characteristic legal-regulatory complex of social vices which surreptitiously led the human masses along the path of degradation and self-destruction of the personality. This includes, in addition to drunkenness and alcoholism, phenomena which are destructive in terms of the social status and health of man, such as drug addiction, prostitution and suicide. The healing of those social ills is a task of tremendous difficulty and long-term efforts. In the area of social health, man must assert for himself an ideology of social renovation and new approaches and organizational forms. This has been written and is being written about a great deal in the press, including KOMMUNIST (see No 12, 1985; No 12, 1986; and No 11, 1987).

In particular, the situation is changing also in the anti-alcohol policy. The fact that the latest effort to solve the "alcohol problem" in one fell swoop with extremely decisive measures "from above" failed is, today, obviously, clear to everyone. This was acknowledged on the highest levels as well. However, such a timely acknowledgment proves not the abandonment of the course toward a sober way of life but the aspiration to achieve it through other means, consistent with the present state of our society. What is the most important feature here?

Last year, on the initiative of the Arkhangelsk CPSU Obkom, an all-Union seminar on problems of drug addiction was held, in the course of which its participants were surveyed. The results of the survey are, in our view, quite indicative: 5.2 percent rated the anti-alcohol policy of the past 3 years efficient; 88.9 percent rated it insufficient and ineffective; and 5.9 percent rated it ineffective. A good assessment of the activities of the All-Union Voluntary Society for the Struggle for Sobriety was given by only 0.6 percent; 9 percent considered it satisfactory while the remaining 90.4 percent considered it poor or even very poor. The main reasons for the failures of that society were the hastily formulated and inadequately defined tasks and forms of work, the lack of priority areas and the declarative nature of objectives, the bureaucratization of the structure and the defiling of functions, formalism and ostentation.

Characteristically, such expert evaluations were given by specialists to whom, by virtue of their profession or position, the obligation to struggle against this "green

dragon" was assigned. Their view, the view of professionals, convincingly proves that the steps which were taken to eliminate drunkenness and alcoholism, despite many positive changes, as a whole failed to yield the desired results. Virtually all that could be done by reducing the production and limiting the sales of alcoholic beverages and increasing the prices of alcohol was done. The quantitatively increase in efforts in these directions in the activities of the drug addiction services and internal affairs organs virtually exhausted their possibilities. There were some positive results but also some negative ones which, occasionally, raised the question of the very efficiency of the steps which were taken.

According to our studies, today there are five to seven unregistered alcoholics for each registered one (4.6 million in the country), which includes inveterate drunks. It is even more difficult to determine accurately the amount of moonshine produced, although the fact that this is being done on a huge scale is obvious. Essentially, this has become the most important obstruction on the way to the elimination of drunkenness and alcoholism. Expert assessments indicate that in 1987 a total of 180 million decaliters of moonshine were distilled (which is almost 10 liters per adult!), i.e., the moonshiners have generously compensated for the reduced production of alcohol by state enterprises. Even without any attempt at dramatizing the situation, we can say that this greatly reminds us of the 1920s, when a powerful wave of moonshine production overwhelmed the anti-alcohol policy of the Soviet state. The time has come to interpret the parallels and to draw lessons.

The most important prerequisite for an efficient struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism is its support by the popular masses, the public. Our anti-alcoholic practice could quite suitably use the advice given by Lenin as early as the 1920s on the occasion of another social disease—bribery: "What is hindering the struggle against this phenomenon? Our laws? Our propaganda? On the contrary! There are as many laws as one may wish! Why is there no success in this struggle? Because we cannot wage it through propaganda alone but only if the people's mass helps" (op. cit., vol 44, p 171). For the time being, the population is obviously not adequately helping the state in the struggle against alcoholism. This struggle is only beginning to acquire the experience of popular initiatives in the discussion of the most important laws and plans.

The Society for the Struggle for Sobriety, which was created "from above," primarily through the command-administrative method, immediately acquired many of the attributes of a formal-bureaucratic body. Incidentally, in this connection the following question arises: Can a directive issued on any level trigger a social movement? The answer, as practical experience indicates, is obvious: it can but the viability of such a movement, unless it is based on an inner general-social need for it, would soon disappear. The times when a simulation of activities, even most enthusiastic, could

suit us, is past. Although with difficulty and not so rapidly, a social movement must be generated naturally: on a democratic basis and, above all, with the help of popular initiative. For even before 1985 there were numerous sobriety clubs, societies of former alcoholics, and psychotherapeutic groups in our country.

A most interesting experience of this type of initiative "from below" has been acquired abroad as well, the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) Fellowship in particular, which was founded in the United States in 1935. Today the AA method has been acknowledged by virtually everyone as being the most effective. The effectiveness of treatment using AA increases by at least a factor of 2-2.5. Essentially it is that physicians should deal with the physiological desintoxication while the fellowship and the individual himself undertake the psychological desintoxication and the social reconstruction of the individual. Today Alcoholics Anonymous rallies more than 1 million members in more than 62,000 groups in 115 countries throughout the world. AA does not cost a single cent to the state. The method is also virtually free of charge to its users. This is an interesting experience and we would have welcomed a trip to the United States of a VDOBT Delegation, in 1987, had we been able to establish productive contacts. However, both this and other trips failed to preserve in the central apparatus of the society even a trace of information.

The struggle against drunkenness which developed in our country in recent years bore the clear marks of the latest campaign (as confirmed also by the speed with which it declined). The entire burden of this difficult work was assigned "wholesale" to the social, soviet and party agencies. On all levels, the commissions for the struggle against drunkenness excelled in issuing declarative resolutions consisting of stereotyped appeals to "intensify," "enhance," "involve," "instruct," and so on. Their return was minimal. Furthermore, could one discuss any real implementation of the "plan for measures" consisting of dozens of items, each one of which requires extensive organizational work and substantial material facilities.

It was pointed out at the latest plenum of the VDOBT Central Council that the society has been as yet unable to establish itself as an organization of active supporters of a healthy way of life and that many of its local branches were actually idle. The split within the sobriety movement after the creation of the alternative "Union of the Struggle for People's Sobriety," which was created in December of last year in Novosibirsk, proved that the society had lost a great deal of trust.

Increasingly, today voices are being heard about the need to maneuver and redeploy forces in the anti-alcoholism struggle. For the sake of what? Should we retreat for the sake of finding the most vulnerable area in alcoholic habits or for the sake of learning to live with this ill as is the case of some other developed countries, including socialist ones? Scientific studies in the area of public

health should protect us from formulating problems which, in principle, cannot be solved. We cannot hope to rescue the country's population from all social ills immediately and within a certain limited period of time at that, or even from one major ill entirely and once and for all. A healing strategy based, above all, not on prohibitions but on the radical democratization of the sobriety movement and the stimulation of self-preserving behavior by the population and the creation of objective conditions in which, given the freedom of choice, the majority of people would consciously and independently prefer a healthy way of life, would be a realistic one.

The weak spot of our anti-alcoholic policy is its empiricism, its lower science-intensiveness and switching the emphasis in the study of social diseases from a rational attitude to emotional reaction. As a result of a major structural distortion in culture and insufficient glasnost about the reality of our social health, we frequently realized ills not in terms of full knowledge but of hypothetical images and partial and nonobjective data, through our imagination.

Following are two indicative facts. In 1977 the book by Professor A.A. Gabiani "*Narkotizm (Konkretno-Sotsiologicheskoye Issledovaniye po Materialam Gruzinskoy SSR)*" [Drug Addiction (Specific Sociological Study Based on Materials From the Georgian SSR)] was published in Tbilisi in a miserably small edition "for official use." This was one of the very first scientific studies conducted in our country of a severe sociomedical illness, such as drug addiction. Eight years later a work of fiction dealing with the same phenomenon, Ch. Aytmatov's novel "*Plakha*" [The Executioner's Block] came out in an edition of several million copies. A scientific study which provided an idea of the real scale of this illness and of the conditions, prerequisites and forms of its manifestation proved to be "embarrassing" to many. It "took the skeleton out of the closet," accused the state authorities of inaction and connivance with this vice and social deviations. In the second case, together with the writer (or allegedly together with him) one could express horror at the moral fall of some of our citizens and be impressed by the fine mastery of the writer in describing the moral searches of some characters, or the spiritual impasse of other.... and forget all of this by the time the next novel was published.

Naturally, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of fiction and political journalism in drawing the attention of society to social diseases. Furthermore, writers and journalists today have far outstripped scientists in the study of the most pressing and relevant problems of our life and their passionate voice not only awakens the social conscience but also leads the people to action. However, this alone is insufficient. In order for socialist culture to become truly sober and for sobriety to become a cultural standard, we must have as a minimum a truly scientific feature of society so that we do not have to fight blindly with the diseases. The role of science is

irreplaceable in the solution of such a difficult problem. It is important to formulate the needs for scientific interpretation on all levels of social and individual life.

We can deflect the wave of unconstructive criticism of the sobriety movement only by offering a scientifically and socially substantiated plan for work with a realistic vision of its objectives, deadlines and material costs. Incidentally, the belief that a tremendous shift in the way of life of millions of people can be achieved without respective capital investments is a major shortcoming in present anti-alcohol policy. The experience of other countries indicates that success in the struggle against the "green dragon" is directly proportional to the funds invested in culture, sports, improved quality of nutrition and improvements the organization of the leisure time (particularly of young people), the building of treatment and rehabilitation centers, advertising a sober way of life, engaging in sociological research and publishing the necessary works and encouraging activists in this difficult and noble project.

The draft all-Union comprehensive program for the prevention and elimination of drunkenness and alcoholism through the year 2000 which, incidentally, has still not been adopted, was already described in KOMMUNIST (No 11, 1987). In our view, in that program priority should be given to the primary areas for the prevention of alcoholism: educational, psychohygienic and medical-social.

The task of educational prevention is to engage in a systematic anti-alcohol upbringing of school students and developing in the growing generation a sober and healthy way of life. Unfortunately, in education VUZs the future teacher is not trained at all for such activities and school curricula virtually do not presume such studies. Meanwhile, new forms of interdepartmental interaction have already appeared in this area. Thus, the Leningrad Institute for the Advancement of Physicians recently opened the first department in the country for teaching a healthy way of life, which quickly gained popularity among practical physicians. It is of essential importance that it can provide training on the basis of 12 programs (ranging from rational nutrition to self-monitoring) not only of physicians but also educators, psychologists and VDOBT activists.

The psychohygienic trend in early prevention of alcoholism is achieved through forecasting, identifying and correcting mental anomalies and functional deviations in children although the latter, despite the anti-alcohol measures which are taken, continue to increase: whereas in 1984 in the RSFSR alone there were 238,000 children suffering from congenital mental illness, by 1987 the number had already reached 277,000. According to our data, 66 percent of the so-called "problem" students, grades 1 to 8, suffer from borderline nervous-mental deviations and retardation. An efficient way of correcting such anomalies is the creation of "equalization classes," not for 30 or 40 but for 10-15 students, based

on individual medical-educational curriculums, which also include treatment with drugs and which accelerate mental and intellectual maturity. Another tried practice is that of earliest possible prognosis of hereditary tendency toward alcoholism. "Risk groups" can become identified as early as kindergarten, so that the children may be under the constant control of medical and educational personnel.

Medicosocial prevention presumes work with adolescents who have already become accustomed to the use of alcohol but have not as yet become alcoholics. This required a "staggered" interdepartmental system of institutions, which would include adolescent drug addiction rooms and outpatient hospitals and rehabilitation and specialized training centers. In short, what we need is an efficient medical hygiene therapy.

The sobriety movement can successfully develop only through real democracy. Democratization, however, as we understand it, requires shifting the question from the level of confrontation between the state and the population on the problem of drunkenness (when the "uppers" issue prohibitions, limiting access to alcohol, while the "lower strata" procure for themselves alcohol by all possible means, which leads to the degradation of social relations and forces them into playing the "who whom" game) to the level of the free and responsible self-determination by society.

Determining the time needed for implementation is a traditionally sensitive problem in many areas of our social policy. The "enthusiasm" shown at the stage of the adoption of obligations, tirelessly exploited and frequently successfully simulated, calls for the shortest possible deadlines and the strict overimplementation of the programs. This is followed by the frequent amendment of the plans under the pressure of objective circumstances.

If we speak of the full elimination of drunkenness and alcoholism, clearly we should correlate it with the new qualitative stage in the intellectual and moral evolution of mankind. This is a truly revolutionary-historical task. We are dealing with at least several generations. Let us recall as an example the U.S. experience where "anti-alcohol training" became mandatory in the schools, starting with the 1870s, which made it possible to have by the 1920s a generation which passed prohibition. The moral manifestation (although failed!) alone of the aspiration of the nation for sobriety demanded an entire generation.

Realistically assessing the ability of the socialist society to eliminate contradictions between the need of the individual for comprehensive development and the possibility of achieving it, we must admit the erroneous demand for total halt in the production of alcoholic beverages and the absolute prohibition of their use at the present stage. Long years of practice in the struggle against drunkenness confirms the inefficiency of this

approach. The great social experiment of introducing a "dry law" in a number of countries in the first decades of the 20th century proved that such prohibitions or restrictions, unsupported by measures to replace alcohol with nonalcoholic beverages and, above all, to create conditions for meeting the variety of needs of the population lead to opposite results and the very process gets out of hand.

The main objective of the anti-alcohol policy under the present circumstances could be the gradual removal of alcohol from the realm of human needs. As of now reducing the amount of mass use of alcohol, on the one hand, and raising active habits of sobriety in the growing generation, on the other, can be realistically achieved. The suggested approach would eliminate the confrontation between supporters of various policies in surmounting drunkenness and alcoholism. Society could reach a sober way of life only gradually, from excessive needs to minimal and, subsequently, to their total elimination by an increasing number of people.

This is a joint project in the solution of which the state machinery, medicine, public education, the family and society must find their place. The concept of intensive technology has already become customary in the age of perestroika and acceleration. We believe that we should learn how to apply the same type of "technology" in promoting the moral and hygienic upbringing of children: actively and exigently, firmly eliminating routine and dogmatism and asserting creativity and initiative. It is precisely in this that we see a guarantee for sobriety and for acquiring moral immunity to anything that is immoral and harmful.

Today the importance of unity and continuity of efforts among all governmental and social institutions practicing a social policy in the area of population health care becomes greater than ever. It is only in such a case that perestroika could become a mechanism for strengthening the moral, political and economic health of our society and an instrument for the decisive uprooting of social ills.

If a physician would try to treat a pneumonia patient for cough, headache or other individual symptoms of the disease, unable to see the overall picture and the causal interrelationship among symptoms, his patient could die despite his best efforts. Such a symptomatic therapy can only conceal the disease by eliminating its individual features but accelerating the sad outcome. By analogy, the same approach could be applied to social ills.

No offense can be mounted against drunkenness and crime without also taking other negative phenomena into consideration. Social evil has many faces and, above all, such faces are interrelated. Let us recall that in the first year of its existence the implementation of the resolution on the elimination of drunkenness and alcoholism had a substantial impact in terms of lowering the level of "drunken crime," improvements in production

indicators and increased life span. At the same time, however, there was an increase in addiction to drugs and other toxic substances, and the production of moonshine, which required additional funds and administrative-legal measures of struggle. That is why a unified policy for the elimination of this social ill is necessary.

Let us especially single out glasnost among the leading principles of such policy, which requires knowledge of the full and objective picture of the prevalence of social diseases. Of late many data which were hidden "behind seven seals" have become accessible to the broad public and we can only welcome this process of lifting of secrecy. Also valuable is the classification of alcohol consumers, mentioned in KOMMUNIST (No 11, 1987). According to it, the entire adult population of the country may be classified into five groups: alcoholics, 3-4 percent; drunks, 9-11 percent; "moderate drinkers," 70-75 percent, occasional drinkers, 6-7 percent; and teetotalers, 3-4 percent. This approach is important because it enables us, albeit on a general level, to have a statistically visible picture of the alcohol situation and to follow its development.

The experience of the past decades has indicated that concealing the "moral statistics," including "alcohol," leads to the immoral unrealistic vision of social ills, triggering moral formalism, cynicism and hypocrisy. During the period of stagnation our press regularly reported increases in drug and alcohol addiction in the West but there was virtually no analysis of such phenomena within the country or even any information about them. An entire generation was raised in the concept of the "illusion of contrast," according to which life (over there) was depicted exclusively in dark colors whereas our internal problems appeared, against such a background, both insignificant and easy to solve. However, they did exist and ignoring them became increasingly difficult and ever greater quantities of alcohol "drugging" were needed to maintain this illusory-compensatory vision of well-being.

Here is a characteristic example. Ten years ago KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published a letter by the secretary of the Arkhangelsk Komsomol Obkom on an effort to develop a drug addiction service for adolescents and the anti-alcohol upbringing of young people. He quoted figures from our study of the feeling toward alcohol among secondary school students. This publication triggered a feeling of indignation in the leadership of the Komsomol Obkom and the secretary who had dared to write this in the paper was issued a "strict warning." A party committee meeting was held at the medical institute with the following agenda: "On errors and violations allowed in making the scientific study." The drug addiction office for adolescents, the first of its kind in the country, which was opened at the medical institute in 1974, was accused of "irresponsibility, political immaturity, immodesty and carelessness." The very idea that in our country youth alcoholism could exist was considered seditious and apolitical.

It was only the support of the party obkom and the Komsomol Central Committee that made it possible to continue to work on the problem and to rescue the specific workers from "organizational conclusions." Today the Arkhangelsk experience in the creation of a drug addiction service for adolescents is reflected in numerous methodical recommendations on the republic and Union levels and in many monographs. By order of the RSFSR Ministry of Health, last year Arkhangelsk Oblast was named base territory for the development of a model of drug addiction service for adolescents and the use of new ways and means of alcohol prevention.

We believe that it would be right at this point to make a small aside and to mention questions the accurate understanding of which, in our view, would also largely determine the efficiency of an anti-alcoholic policy. It is a question of "alcohol" myths. We have not found special publications dealing with the study of this phenomenon. Partial views about it and, above all, historical proof may be found in ethnographic, philological and historical publications.

The "alcohol" myths, which originated in deep antiquity, have become today one of the most important types of uncontrolled ideology which hinders the healing of society and justifies social ills. They have experienced their ages of savagery and barbarism, adapted to slavery, feudalism and capitalism, and found no difficulty in adapting to socialism as well.

Let us immediately make a stipulation, however: we must not, as is being done, by old habit, by some opponents of drunkenness, blame for everything the vestiges of the "accursed past." The reasons for the durability of "alcohol" myths are found in the specific living conditions and in the gap between words and actions.

The universal adaptability of "alcohol" myths is found in the fact that for them each social and cultural and other situations in life is "one of their own," i.e., allowing intoxication, perhaps not with wine but with grief or joy, hope or despair, reason or insanity.... Such a comparison appears entirely admissible: for example, in economics we gave preference to the intoxicating pace of a self-sufficient development which was exceptionally ruinous to the country. Stormy emotions on the subject of some illusory accomplishments replaced and compensated for the absence of tangible practical results. That is why today we are speaking of the need to "sober up" our economic thinking. That is why we now trust economists who stand on the position of common sense.

A similar situation prevailed in the realm of ideology, the task of which was frequently seen in triggering great hopes and the greatest possible enthusiasm, and to formulate tremendous objectives and programs which intoxicated the mind and, in particular, those related to the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism. In our

innovative thoughts we frequently ignored the end objective, which was the good of the individual and which must be ensured here and now, by creating a social protection of all of us together and everyone separately. Instead, attention was frequently focused on objectives which, in themselves, seem worthy, such as absolute justice, absolute sobriety, and absolute social health. Demythologized ideology, which is developing under the conditions of perestroika, is called upon to be consistent with the objectives of the individuals and to be humanistic.

The "alcohol" myths are affecting even more deeply propaganda, as a result of which it could present to the mass awareness ideals and models of the perfect society and the perfect man, from which mass awareness loses its ability for a healthy perception of both the individual and surrounding reality. Shall we be able to understand, in such a situation, that sobering up does not mean healing but is merely one of its prerequisites?

The demythologizing of ideology and other areas of social life also depends on the steps taken and consistency in the democratization of social life. It depends, in the final account, on the extent to which the population could become active and independent in its social and cultural self-determination. This process is gathering strength but has a considerable sociopsychological range.

In their typical and mass form the "alcohol" myths are, above all, the myths of daily life. On the level of the ordinary awareness their influence is manifested as a powerful bastion of psychological defense which only few can breach. Traditionally, private life was considered an area of free manifestation of the will and recreation, a time for unrestrained self-expression and restoration of forces expended in labor and social activities. Here as well "alcohol" myths accompanied man throughout his life, serviceably offering the "marking" of any whatsoever significant event. It is difficult to understand their insidious nature precisely because, despite our will and awareness, we are truly included in an alcoholized picture of family life and of our immediate surroundings, our entire circle of daily contacts. The most intimate feelings and experience, whims, attractions and passions, illusions and fantasies are all part of our private lives. How not to conceal within it that which is publicly condemned? It is not astounding, therefore, that the attitude toward alcohol and, naturally, toward the steps in fighting drunkenness today, trigger in the people a most interested and sharply emotional reaction.

Finally, about the susceptibility to contamination with "alcohol" myths. Their degree of influence on the individual frequently exceeds other familiar means of legal and administrative and value and ideological influence on the minds and mentalities of the people, familiar and open to society and culture. Such myths are more contagious than fashion and do not suffer, as the latter, from fluctuations and do not have to "shout" to be heard. The use of alcohol or drugs is a behavior barometer of the

health of the economy, politics and ideology of society. It is, above all, a consequence and only after that the secondary reason for many difficulties and misfortunes. It is no accident that at the recently held Soviet-American symposium on new approaches to problems of alcoholism, for the first time particular attention was paid to the need to broaden the arsenal of social (and not only strictly medical) means of improving the way of life and freeing mass behavior from alcohol addiction.

Improving the health of the entire social organism is a task of tremendous difficulty, the purpose of which is to surmount inertia in the way of life and behavior of large masses of people, an inertia which "provokes" anti-alcohol activities into using straight bureaucratic administration, formalism or duplicity. In the course of reassessing the previous values, we have taken the right path of moral and social cleansing. However, this is merely the beginning of the way and it is only thus that we shall be able accurately to formulate also the task of healing the people from the ill of alcohol. If this task is not included in the general social humanistic context of a society which is radically democratizing itself, it could once again lead into the old channel the struggle not with the vice itself but with its individual carriers and become merely the latest campaign doomed to failure in advance.

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On the Legal Foundations of Economic Sovereignty

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[Text] One of the problems which, unquestionably, will be discussed at the forthcoming plenum is that of strengthening the autonomy of Union republics and ensuring not only their legal but also their actual sovereignty. Related problems are already being extensively discussed in the press, including KOMMUNIST. For the time being, however, such discussions are being held within the framework of the elaboration of an economic concept of reform of relations between the USSR and the Union republics and, in particular, the published draft "General Principles of Restructuring the Management of the Economy and the Social Area in Union Republics on the Basis of Expanding their Sovereign Rights, Self-Management and Self-Financing." However, there have been major distortions in the legal regulations in this area. Thus, there is virtually no legal protection of the sovereignty of Union republics from the arbitrary behavior of central ministries and departments in matters of locating production capacities, and overall economic management. Of late faults in our legislation have become obvious, including in the Constitution, which have allowed the central departments of the USSR, in

violation of Leninist national policy, to dictate their will on Union republics in the economic area and to ignore the interests of these republics or the threat to the environment.

All of this turns into priority work to improve the legal and, above all, the constitutional foundations of the country's economic management in the interests of the USSR as a whole and of the Union republics, and to ensure their sovereignty on the level of national economic development. On the eve of the forthcoming major decisions in the area of relations among nationalities and within the federation, already now it has become necessary to read closely the text of the USSR Constitution in the part relative to the competences of the USSR and the Union republics, in order to eliminate the shortcomings existing in this area.

Let us take as an example Article 73 of the Fundamental Law, which determined the competence of the USSR. In reading it, we keep coming across the term "management:" "Management of the Country's Economy" (Point 5); "Management of the National Economic Sectors, Associations and Enterprises Under Union Administration" (Point 7); "Management of the Unified Monetary and Credit System" (Point 6) and "Management of the Armed Forces of the USSR" (Point 8). However, the extent of the rights of the USSR in these areas is not identical. Thus, the federation provides management of the Armed Forces of the USSR absolutely independently, for this is not within the competence of Union republics. In terms of enterprises under Union jurisdiction, the republic authorities have some, albeit insignificant, rights, which are also codified in the USSR Constitution (see Title 3 Article 79). Finally, every member of the federation directly manages sectors under republic administration and some enterprises in sectors which are under Union-republic jurisdiction. Yet these sectors and enterprises are also an inseparable component of the country's economy. In short, the term "management" is given different contents in the separate points of Article 73; in this case there is a clear violation of the requirement of uniform terminology, which is one of the basic requirements in juridical techniques.

In my view, a shortcoming of the existing constitutional stipulation is also the fact that the Fundamental Law does not clearly demarcate between the competences of the USSR and its members by area of activity (including the most important economic sectors). As we know, such demarcation was found in the previous constitutions, which listed the individual Union and joint (Union-republic) people's commissariats. Yet, as historical experience proves, all essential reforms in demarcating the competences of the USSR and of Union republics, made between 1928 and 1932 (centralization of economic management), 1954-1957 (expanding the rights of Union republics), and 1965 (establishing relations as they currently exist between the Union and its members) were carried out by changes in the structure of Union and Union-republic sectorial departments.

In my view, the existence of Point 12 of Article 73 of the USSR Constitution is a major shortcoming in the constitutional settlement of this matter. The USSR has been given the competence of "resolving other problems of all-Union significance." This creates prerequisites for high level centralization of decision-making, for it provides a wide scope for Union authorities in interpreting the concept of "all-Union significance." It is hardly possible to give to this concept a legal definition or an official interpretation.

Constitutional legislation dealing with economic management suffers from other shortcomings which bring uncertainty in the area of the competence of Union and republic management authorities and, consequently, which allow the upper echelons of these authorities to dictate their will on Union republics, ignoring their sovereignty, and the lower authorities to avoid making decisions in the economic area. It fetters initiative from below or, conversely, yields to local influences which conflict with the real interests of a Union republic or of the USSR as a whole.

A major fault of legal regulation of the economy is the low amount of laws within it. Suffice it to say that out of 638 legal acts included in the section "Legislation on the National Economy," of the USSR Code of Laws, only 22 (slightly over 3 percent!) are in the form of laws. Furthermore, only one of them directly deals with regulating relations between the federation and its members.

Most of the legal acts in economic management are resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers. Officially, they do not regulate the competence of the members of the federation. Naturally, the government has no right to solve problems which are the prerogative of constituent and legislative authorities. However, given the existing situation, which makes possible the very active lawmaking activities of the USSR Council of Ministers, the latter cannot avoid to invade the area of federative relations. The legal settling of any problem, whether the organization of planning or price setting, standardization or material and technical procurements, inevitably requires a determination of the range of competence of the republic management authorities and, in each specific case, solving the problem of demarcating between the competence of the USSR and that of Union republics. The same applies to establishing the legal foundations of activities of many industrial sectors and all of agriculture.

Unable directly to influence the range of competence of the members of the federation, or their supreme representative authorities, the Council of Ministers can do this indirectly, by defining the rights and obligations of republic management authorities. This right is based on Article 6 of the Law on the USSR Council of Ministers, which stipulates that the supreme executive and management authority of the state power of the USSR "defines the tasks and functions, and the procedure for the organization and activities of the state management

authorities; takes steps to improve the system of the state management authorities and the style and methods of their work." As the text shows, this right applies to the entire system of management authorities and by no means only to all-Union ministries and departments or other authorities under Union jurisdiction.

Also noteworthy is the fact that in the resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers the republic councils of ministers are considered essentially territorial economic management authorities under Union administration; the fact that they are governments of sovereign members of the Soviet Federation is totally ignored. Furthermore, also ignored is the accountability of such authorities to the supreme soviets of Union republics. It would be no exaggeration to say that characteristic of the USSR Council of Ministers in issuing regulatory acts in the area of economic management is an approach to our state as a unitary and not a federative state. It is not astounding, therefore, that the precisely identical approach is inherent in the activities of all-Union ministries in charge of economic management.

All of these legislative shortcomings may not have had such an adverse effect on state building and the management of the unified national economic complex of the country had there been an efficient and widespread system of representation of the interests of Union republics on the federal level, which could oppose the pressure of excessive centralization and departmental influences. Such a system was created in 1922-1924. It included several interesting forms of interaction between the federation and its members. The only one used today is the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, which traces its "origins" to the chamber of the USSR Central Executive Committee, bearing the same name. The other forms were eliminated in the course of the establishment of the administrative-command management system.

Based on the present situation, the procedure for settling differences between Union republics and USSR people's commissariats and the role of the authorized central people's commissariats in the federative management system are of the greatest interest. According to the 1924 USSR Constitution, the central executive committee of a Union republic and its presidium could invalidate the orders of USSR people's commissariats "in cases of clear disparity between the Union Constitution and the legislation of the Union or the legislation of the Union republic" (author's emphasis). Subsequently, the dispute would be submitted for resolution by the USSR Central Executive Committee. Equally interesting is the institution of the authorized all-Union people's commissariat in a Union republic. The authorized representative was automatically a member of the republic sovnarkom. The functions, rights and obligations of this official were formulated in such a way that he could not be considered merely the "long hand of the center" in the republic. Equally important was another aspect of his activities—

to represent republic interests in dealing with the respective all-Union authority. This is confirmed by the fact that the republic's central executive committee had the right to reject the appointment of this representative before he was appointed to his position; he was accountable not only vertically but also to the central executive committee and the sovnarkom of the republic.

The current mechanisms of interaction between the managing authorities of the USSR and its members are inadequately efficient, for they are essentially reduced to the participation of representatives of Union republics to the rarely convened meetings of Union authorities (the Council of Ministers, Gosplan and Gosstroy).

It is self-evident that all of this substantially limits the rights of the supreme representatives of the authorities of the members of the federation, harms the sovereignty of Union republics, lowers their responsibility for the development of the economy and, in the final account, adversely affects the condition of the economy of each one of them and of the country as a whole. It is natural, therefore, that of late the idea of granting Union republics real sovereignty, economic above all, is becoming increasingly popular. It is my conviction that the idea of granting Union republics greater independence in managing the national economy should be included in all legislation in economic management, including the Constitution.

Certain steps in this direction have already been taken within the framework of the current restructuring of economic management. As we know, the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) was passed in 1987, along with 10 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decrees, which were ratified by the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. They include the decree "On Perfecting the Activities of Republic Management Authorities," which earmarks steps to enhance the work of executive-management authorities of the members of the federation in economic management and broadens the rights of the councils of ministers of Union republics in their relations with USSR ministries and departments and enterprises under Union jurisdiction, with a view to strengthening their role in ensuring the comprehensive development of the territory of a Union republic. A number of regulations governing the status of the councils of ministers of Union republics may be found in other resolutions within this packet. However, even these documents suffer from a number of shortcomings inherent in previous legislation and other legal acts regulating the competence of the USSR and of Union republics in the economic area.

National economic legislation needs a radical restructuring. We believe that in the next stage of the reform of the political system the range of competence of the USSR and of Union republics should be clearly defined in the

area of the national economy; the legal guarantees for securing the sovereign rights and independence of the members of the federation in this area must be strengthened.

Economic publications have legitimately raised the question of the need to strengthen true centralism in the country's economic management, in the course of which the economic processes are in fact systematically under the jurisdiction of a single economic center regardless of the specific means through which this can be achieved in each individual case. The solution of this problem, naturally, is in the area of the law. It is not a question in the least of reducing "local" rights in relations with the "center," but, conversely, of defining the rights of the USSR and of Union republics on the basis of the new concept of centralism which is currently being formulated and based, as was pointed out in the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "on the activeness of the working people and the autonomy of enterprises, i.e., it is a case of truly democratic centralism in its Leninist understanding, which is immeasurably more powerful than centralism which has become polluted in efforts to regulate one and all."

The new understanding of democratic centralism also requires a new approach to the legal regulation of relations between the USSR and Union republics, the competences of the federation and its members, including in economic management. It is precisely this that must constitute the foundation of the material standards which regulate this aspect of social relations. As to procedural standards and forms of legal control, in this case the current concepts which are being drafted on the socialist rule of law state, the practical creation of which is also on the agenda, should play a determining role.

The concept of the socialist state of law, which presumes that the law is supreme in all areas of social life, determines the need for priority legislative control. Nor can we tolerate any longer the low share of laws in the formulation of rules. The rule of law requires the precise and uniform understanding of the latter as an act of the supreme representative authorities. Governmental (and even more so departmental) lawmaking should assume its proper subordinate place.

Some suggestions relative to the development of legislation on the Soviet Federation as a whole and on separating the competences of the USSR and those of Union republics in the economic area could be formulated on the basis of the new concept of democratic centralism and the concept of the socialist rule of law state. I believe it expedient to define the status of the federation and to solve the question of direct relations among its members, initially not within the USSR Constitution but in a document such as a Union treaty. Such an act, which would function alongside the USSR Constitution (or would be totally or partially included in it) would be consistent with the place held by the federation in the country's life and the legal nature of the USSR and

would logically stem from the history of the founding of the Union (incidentally, many specialists consider the Treaty on the Founding of the USSR a functional law. If such is the case, it should be a question of giving it a new draft). The form of a Union treaty presumes also a proper procedure for its formulation and adoption. It could be drafted by the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities or by a specially convened forum of representatives of the members of the federation and, subsequent to its ratification at congresses of people's deputies of Union republics, ratified by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies or by a nationwide referendum. In my view, the formulation and adoption of a Union treaty is entirely consistent with the course of democratization of all aspects of social life and the increased role of Union republics. As to the status of autonomous republics, it could be defined in the USSR Constitution and in the all-Union Law on the ASSR.

Naturally, the USSR Constitution alone or even a Union treaty could not regulate in detail the entire variety of relations which appear between the federation and its members in the realm of economics. Therefore, this range of problems should be properly reflected also in economic legislative acts, the drafting of which is currently taking place as part of the legal reform.

Some specialists have questioned the expediency of adopting a USSR Economic Code. The suggestion itself of creating a uniform act which would comprehensively regulate relations in the country's national economy, regardless of sectorial or territorial division or divisions by form of ownership, and so on, is worthy of support. However, under the conditions of strengthening the sovereignty of Union republics and broadening their economic autonomy, bearing in mind the possible prospect of the conversion of republics to the principles of cost accounting (in one aspect or another), it seems more logical to adopt not a code but foundations of economic legislation of the USSR and Union republics. This form would take better into consideration the federative nature of our state.

Finally, securing the rights of Union republics in the area of law-making activities of the USSR Council of Ministers is a serious problem. The point is that it is hardly possible (or expedient) to deprive the government of the Union of its respective prerogatives. The USSR Supreme Soviet cannot assume the legal regulation of life in the country to the full extent of the range of competences of the USSR. As a whole, the problem of governmental rules is solved with the creation of the USSR Committee of Constitutional Supervision. In my view, however, the principles of the federation call for securing additional guarantees that the USSR Council of Ministers will respect the rights of Union republics. In particular, such guarantees must include the creation of an efficient system for the representation of Union republics in the USSR government and the central ministries and departments. On this level we could apply the experience of legal control of federative relations as stipulated in the

1924 USSR Constitution and other legal acts adopted at that time, which we mentioned briefly. Other forms of interaction between the USSR and Union republics could be found as well. Thus, I believe it expedient to restructure the current permanent missions of the councils of ministers of Union republics to the government of the USSR into missions representing them in the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the course of which they would rely on the USSR people's deputies elected by the respective Union republics. Obviously, the chairman of the republic councils of ministers could become members of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium.

Finally, democratization under the conditions of a federative state should mean, in particular, also the fact that the members of the Union participate most actively in the formulation of resolutions concerning the legal status of the federation and its members and in demarcating their confidences. "There is no question," V.I. Lenin wrote, "that under the pretext of the unification of the railroad service and of fiscal affairs, and so on, under our current apparatus, a mass of abuses of a truly Russian quality may occur. In order to struggle against such abuses, those who will undertake to wage this struggle must be particularly inventive, not to mention sincere. This will require a detailed code which could be formulated successfully only by the native populations of the republics" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 361). It would be particularly advisable today to listen to this Leninist advice.

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Letters to the Editors

18020013i Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7,
May 89 (signed to press 21 Apr 89) pp 61-69

[Text] P. Yesakov, Neshcheryakovskiy Village, Rostov Oblast: The Right to Choose

In one of the central publications my attention was drawn to a note describing the following case: a link working in a sovkhoz livestock farm was asked by the administration to convert to leasing. The members of the link were interested and asked to be shown computed prices for the sale of fodder and the purchasing of finished products. The answer was as follows: you must accept without any discussions, for we, the "servants," can compute things in such a way as to eventually ruin you. Understandably, nothing came out or could come out of such a lease. If matters everywhere are the same, the author of the note feared, leasing would wither on the vine. I share this opinion.

Let us take a look at a kolkhoz I am familiar with. It employs 650 people. Of these, 93 are in management and accounting; 36 are guards and 6 are passenger car drivers. This means a total 135 people out of 515 employees [sic]. Add to them part of the rayon, oblast and even central leadership which "supervises" us one way or

another, along with other farms, and multiply this on the scale of the entire country, and you could have difficulty in imagining even the approximate number of such "servants."

Here is what I think: Few people deny the positive significance of leasing and virtually everyone agrees that leasing would give us a breath of fresh air. The question, however, is what type of leasing? Once the peasant realized that he was supporting through his hard toil these 135 people, his labor impetus began to diminish. In turn, they are unwilling to make the lessee independent, and are trying by manipulating prices to force him to continue to work for them. Even if the plan remains unfulfilled the state helps with subsidies while the agroprom system (by whatever name), by supporting such farms, extends their trouble-free life. That is why the people reluctantly agree to such leases. It is painful to look at the way well-rested specialists from the city surround the lessee engaged in his hard work, as they ask him to confirm the promising nature of intrakolkhoz leasing.

Everyone claims to understand that productivity can only increase as a result of adopting the approach of ownership and that in that case the farmer would hardly waste or even drink his way through the income from fodder, seeds or processed produce. They claim to understand this but are afraid to give the lessee freedom and independence. Could I be wrong? But if I am, why do we not hear that the land is being leased through the village soviets and not through the farms or that the lessee is not given firm tax rates which would take into consideration the fertility of the land and not the financial status of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz?

I am in favor of having good kolkhozes. Many of them exist but, unfortunately, not enough to feed the country adequately. Considering the system which exists in our country, they developed well largely thanks to the fact that they were headed by outstanding and original personalities. How frequently it happens that the moment such a person leaves the farm quickly begins to decline. The point is that a system cannot be based on an individual. I think as follows: If a good kolkhoz develops and if it begins to work efficiently, let it go on. But can we follow this road only? It was accurately said at the past plenum that different ways must be used. I hope that with the new approach kolkhozes, sovkhozes and independent lessees will be able to prove their possibilities for development (and, consequently, their rights!). Let there be a choice. Let them compete against each other in terms of yields per hectare, use of fodder and production costs. This, in my opinion, can only benefit the project.

S. Grabovskiy, teacher, Kiev Trade and Economics Institute: Against Self-Disparagement

When I read or hear categorical assertions (many of which are made today) to the effect that in recent decades the social sciences have not developed in the least, I think (naturally, above all, in reference to an area I know) of how to "look" at works which shaped an age in the development of world psychology, written by L.S. Vygotskiy, S.L. Rubinshteyn, B.N. Uznadze and their students and followers? How not to see the profound Marxist pedagogical concepts of A.S. Makarenko and V.A. Sukhomlinskiy (education in the contemporary world is today one of the most important social sciences)? How not to assess properly the value of historical and cultural works by N.I. Konrad, A.Z. Manfred and M.I. Steblin-Kamenskiy? Finally, how not to give proper credit to the truly heroic efforts of Soviet philosophers who were able to revive their science, cleansing it (the science specifically but not, unfortunately, the teaching of philosophy) from the mythology of the "*Short Course*?" They were able to cleanse it despite the "Suslov-Trapeznikov" pressure or the vigilance of the "man in the tower"—M.B. Mitin. Yes, naturally, there still remain many of the old as well as some "new" dogmatists. Nonetheless, the level of achievements in philosophy could be assessed properly on the basis of any global criteria one may choose. In this connection we must not ignore A.F. Losev, B.M. Kedrov, P.V. Kopnin and E.V. Ilyenkov and their contribution to the struggle against dogmatism and the lack of spirituality of "militant provincialism."

Let me make particular mention of Ilyenkov's personality and fate, not only because this year we could have been celebrating his 65th birthday, instead of speaking of decades since the tragic end of this philosopher's life. Above all, we must respect and pay attention to Ilyenkov's legacy: his dialectical-materialistic theory of thinking, his works which brilliantly embody the Leninist requirement of combining "maximum scientific approach with maximum popularity," and, finally, his work with blind, deaf and mute children: for it is precisely through this experiment that mankind was able to glimpse at one of the greatest secrets of the universe: the secret of the human spirit, its roots and ways of development. The eternal puzzle of the human "I" was provided with one possible solution without, naturally, losing its entire mystery but no longer being a still unraveled secret.

It is not the fault but the trouble or even the tragedy of Ilyenkov's life which predetermined, I believe, many of the "minuses" of his latter works and the fact that the theoretical and practical significance of his experiment in the Zagorsk Children's Home for Blind, Deaf and Dumb Children was underestimated and still is; but the fact that "certified Marxists" prevented the true development of Ilyenkov's school and that many of his works still remain unpublished.

Finally, yet another aspect: It is also greatly thanks to the support of our best social scientists that a level has been reached in the general and scientific standards of the

people, which alone made it possible to develop and accept the idea of the radical renovation of society, the idea of creating a democratic and humane socialism.

Concealed complacency is dangerous. However, is not self-disparagement equally dangerous? We are not all that poor theoretically not to have a backup for the very difficult work of providing theoretical support to the practice of perestroika.

A. Krasovskiy, senior scientific associate, Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogy, Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, candidate of philosophical sciences, Minsk: Sociopedagogical Forecast

The difficulties encountered by the school reform can be explained not only by the fact that organizational-pedagogical steps aimed at perfecting the public education system have been insufficiently developed and expanded. Obviously, the school must also bear the entire burden of the unsolved problems which are inherent in our society at its present development stage.

I believe that the substantiation, determination, future development and pedagogical consequences of existing social conditions and the development of socioeconomic phenomena and their influence on shaping the personality should become the most important task of a new and needed trend in scientific research: sociopedagogical forecasting. In turn, this would make it possible to see the prospects for the development of social awareness, to predict problems which may arise in the area of education and to take measures to solve them ahead of time rather than merely refer to shortcomings in school work.

Such a trend of research could include also the development of the conditions and principles governing the creation of sociopedagogical complexes. Today the mass school (and not only the general education one) works on a basis which is practically isolated from real social conditions. Naturally, education separated from social relations and ties cannot yield proper results. It is becoming increasingly obvious that improving the educational work of the schools is inconceivable without seeking the optimal ways of reciprocal cooperation between the schools and the social institutions around them, and upgrading their pedagogical potential.

In our view, studies related to sociopedagogical forecasting should assume a noteworthy position in the topics dealt with by the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Naturally, we must take into consideration the regional conditions in our country, features and differences—socioeconomic, demographic, national and cultural. That is why it would be expedient to set up scientific subdivisions dealing with sociopedagogical forecasting not only in the head institutes of the academy but also in the now reformed republic public education institutes.

L. Kateryushin, CPSU member since 1966, 44 years old, lieutenant colonel, member of the unit's party committee: Loyalty to Formalism?

I would like to discuss three questions. Question 1. I am a military serviceman and am working on my dissertation. Our scientific secretary demands that we include in the text of the introduction a quotation from the materials of the 19th Party Conference and to include it in the list of publications used. This, allegedly, is a mandatory requirement of the Higher Certification Commission.... I, naturally, made a close study of these materials and repeatedly so. However, I have not used a single one of their lines in my dissertation, for its topic is quite specific. I wrote it over a period of 4 years, before the opening of the conference, and added to and worked on it for another year before the conference opened. In my view, such a "coerced" quotation would be a profanation, a fee to stagnation.... Why do we have to be guided not by the content of a party document or its spirit, but by its form? Why is it necessary for the author to begin by bowing in all four directions and only then get into the substance? Why such formalism and rituals inherited from the past?

Second question. The members of the department received the instruction to draw up a methodical recommendation on the use of the materials of the 19th Party Conference in the training process (let me point out that our department teaches specialized military subjects). Each one of us must find and extract a set of the most suitable quotations (as was done previously, from the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress), after which all of this will be put together, printed, bound and sent to the special library for eternal storage, for no one would ever use such "files." Why are they necessary, if everyone has the original available? Obviously, this "work" is for the sake of examiners, whatever their rank. Here again we have formalism. There is nothing useful in this work but its harm is unquestionable. How to make the formalists understand that if a person has earned his diploma as candidate of sciences, this does not mean as yet that he is a scientist; that if he has a party card in his pocket this is not in itself an indication of his convictions; and that if he has written a petty little method and quoted some of it to an audience, it would be naive to believe that at that point everything will fall into place in the minds of the audience.... Why do we have this and how to struggle against it? I refused to act formally, and in different circumstances some kind of label may have been attached to me. To this day, however, many are those willing to raise the banner of perestroika and hit with its staff on the head those who sincerely believe in perestroika and are silently doing their work....

Third question. Our department has a political informant. The department consists of eight members, all of them with higher training. There are four candidates of sciences. Everyone subscribes to and reads newspapers and journals, looks at the Time television program and

others, we have a blackboard with clippings from newspapers, we sponsor unified policy days and invite noted lecturers in international affairs.... What is the role of the political informant in such a collective, under contemporary conditions, when everyone reads the press from first to last page, and when people share their impressions with each other? Are there any kind of nontraditional methods? What do they consist of? How to avoid formalism, since the reports which are filed are based on the number of political information lectures given?

These questions may sound like "isolated cases," but it is they that make life. We must not live on the basis of form rather than content, for our hearts are against this. This applies to all three of my questions. Furthermore, we must not ignore the fact that among the military sluggish thinking is by no means eliminated but is nurtured from many sources. Might it not be expedient to publish an article on this problem and to interpret it in your journal?

'Do Not Take My Letter As a Complaint...'

I work in a newspaper and I shall discuss the newspaper. I would like to present everything briefly in order not to take too much of your time. But to whatever I may address myself, everything seems to have a background....

Sometime ago a joint session of the party buro and editorial collegium was held in our oblast newspaper. The topic under discussion was the deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper. There was a statement by an associate complaining that he was being mistreated, his materials were being returned and, in general, that one could not work with this editor. It is true that even before that the party committee secretary had said, in a private talk, that there would soon be vacancies in the editorial board, that a few people would "fly off," including the deputy editor. Everyone understands that this was simply a pretext (proper, according to the party committee and the editor). It was painful to see that he was "different," that this person was saying what he thought (and his thoughts were quite independent). Above all, he was holding a specific job, receiving a salary and not appreciating it! He should have appreciated it, according to the editor, and he should have been grateful and kept silent, the way many other editors are keeping silent in the hope of obtaining an apartment, an raise, a promotion, anything.... They keep silent and wait to see how things will end. This, probably, is the case everywhere.

But here is a formulation that gives me no rest: "Inconsistent with the position held." Everyone knows that such is not the case. There are extensive searches for such a type of worker. Such a worker knows the newspaper business from top to bottom. He can do everything. And wherever he may have worked, he has done his work exceptionally conscientiously, accurately to the point of pedantry and, above all, with pleasure. He loves the work and the newspaper. Yes, not everyone finds it easy to

work with him. If the material must be submitted by 3:00, it is precisely at 3:00 that he wants to see it on his desk. He does everything possible for this material to be good. For those who observe the same standard, working with him is exceptionally easy. Even our unfortunate printing press, which is forever in trouble with timing, worked on schedule (just try and violate it!). Everyone was pleased, above all the printing press personnel.

The previous editor of the oblast newspaper retired 2 years ago. A number of people assumed that it was his deputy who would become editor-in-chief although, naturally, not everyone was in favor of it. The party obkom was not in favor. This was a strange type of cadre policy: they assigned a person who had previously worked as chairman of the oblast radio committee but, in general, had nothing in common with journalism (he was a former official of the party apparat), who had not written a single line throughout his life and had not even seen the printing press (it is true that he was taken there, after his appointment). Initially we were sorry for him: the man did not know the work and did not understand even the basics.... Later, however, he realized that he had the right to edit articles submitted to him. And he began to make corrections: thus and such should not go through, for it may affect a manager of a more or less important rank; our apparat should not be criticized. And if something of the kind should be nonetheless printed (usually after extensive coverage in the central press), he would go five times to the obkom to seek advice as to the kind of draft such a text should have. A number of examples, even anecdotal could be cited. And if the deputy editor-in-chief, a professional journalist, has his own opinion and if he stands up in defense of one author or material or another, he is defending, above all, the newspaper.... Unfortunately, he himself remains defenseless.

I sometimes think: Do the people read the Soviet press? Or is it aimed at people who are as naive as I am? Is it written for people who believe it and try to act or simply wait calmly for the local authorities to start acting. They know better what, when and how to do things. There already is a "tried person" to take the place of the deputy editor.... What is horrible is the way they act with people who, in the past as well, did not remain silent but have now totally "exposed" themselves. What they do with the newspaper, however, is even worse. Do we have to wait yet another 7 years until the editor retires along with those who promoted him? Within that time, however, those who are now drawing the proper lessons will grow up, learning how important it is to keep silent. It is they who will replace the retirees. And they will call themselves journalists!...

Do not consider my letter a complaint. I simply sought advice as to what can one do under such a situation. How to act in order to protect human dignity? For it is possible to fire someone by fabricating a case but not for the fact that a person is stupid, indecent or unfamiliar with the work. It is as though some people are doomed to be editors and as such they cannot tolerate next to them

a person who is freer, more intelligent and knows his work incomparably better, so that it is he and someone like him who should leave.... One cannot look at this yet be unable to defend what is right. It is ridiculous to appeal to the conscience in this case, for we would be simply discussing different things. I nonetheless hope that a solution does exist.

From the editors: The letter lists specific names and facts. The facts, however, require an objective consideration and a separate discussion. In this case we decided to quote excerpts from the letter (without mentioning specifics) to draw attention to the professional aspect of the problem which, in our view, is of social significance, for the situation this describes is, unfortunately, no exception.

Excerpts from Letters

I. Lanshchev, Perm:

More than 3 years have passed since the 27th CPSU Congress. Within that time several decrees have been passed by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. I believe that we should begin to check on their implementation, so that the comrades who were given specific assignments and department heads would report to the entire country (including on television, so that anyone could ask them questions). I suggest that such a procedure for accountability to the party and the people become a regular feature.

A. Polnarev, worker, Lipetsk:

I believe that the development of cost accounting makes it necessary to take a different look also at our usual practice of sponsorship aid to the countryside. In my view, the emphasis should be switched to providing this type of help to small labor collectives and even to individual families and lessees. Obviously, it would be expedient not for the enterprise to provide sponsorship assistance but for its structural subdivisions (shops, sections or, possibly, even brigades) which have their own production-technical facilities. For example, a shop numbering up to 250 people could sponsor five contracting families. They could be helped, on a cost accounting basis, in building production premises and communications facilities (including telephone lines) and in installing and repairing mechanization facilities.

N. Zhendarova, Borets Kolkhoz, Khislavichskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast:

I have never written to Moscow but I read in KOMMUNIST, in issue No 1, "Public Opinion," excerpts from letters and I too would like to write to you, and please excuse my illiteracy. I live in Khislavichskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast and have worked in the kolkhoz for 43 years. I am now retired but I continue to work. For 20 years I was head of a comprehensive brigade, which is a difficult work. But look at the lot of the chairmen. They work a great deal with people, dedicate a great deal of

effort and nerves. Everyone goes to them, young and old, each one with his own type of character and each one requiring a different approach. It is particularly difficult now, for in the past the people were simpler, today they are more nervous, people in the kolkhozes are few yet the work must be done, for farming cannot be abandoned. Here is my opinion: A better attitude should be shown toward them and more good words should be said to them instead of abusing them. Perhaps they should be allowed to retire earlier because of their hard work providing, naturally, that they have worked 20 to 25 years. But here is what happens: in our kolkhoz, for example, in 43 years there have been eight chairmen. We would like them to keep their jobs longer.

A. Nimirovskiy, Pskov:

During the electoral campaign we suggested that a loudspeaker be installed in the lobby of the Political Education Club (where the electoral district meeting had to be held) so that those who wanted to, either before going to work or at lunch time or after work, could listen to the speakers. We were first told that the lobby would be occupied but that they could do it on the street. As a result, however, they did nothing. The explanation was that the chairman of the district commission had not given his permission.

As a party member with 30-year seniority and secretary of the party organization of the technical service of the plant, I am ashamed by such actions on the part of ideological workers. All that we wanted was to increase the possibility of glasnost and hear the live words coming from the heart of the candidates. I was told that in Moscow this was permitted. Could it be that what we asked was too much and that our demand could not be met?

S. Grokhovetskiy, Kiev:

One of the factors which, in my view, played an unseemly role in the history of our state has been the attitude toward the intelligentsia. This attitude was one of watchfulness or even hostility. Yet it is precisely from the intelligentsia that came innovative and nonstandard ideas. I do not idealize this category of people, but it seems to me that, having heard attentively their arguments, we would not have had such sad consequences in Armenia and Chernobyl or there would have been no need for so much talk on turning the flow of the Northern rivers. It is gratifying that today common sense has won and that in this area as well there are changes. However, they are taking place slowly, all too slowly.

N. Sumenkov, Kemerovo:

Why are we so slow in noticing phenomena and beginning to react to them not at their embryonic stage but when they are already shrieking at us? We mounted a struggle against alcoholism. Everywhere huge lines formed. I have written to all sorts of authorities that lines

are hotbeds of discontent and a way of consolidating anti-perestroika forces. No one has paid any attention. At one point I was even reprimanded: "Why is it that you, as a party member, do not approach such lines and talk the people into dispersing, why are you not talking to them about the harmful effect of vodka?" I turned out to be the guilty party. Now, yet one more resolution has been passed....

N. Dmitriyev, labor veteran, Rtishchevo, Saratov Oblast:

Obviously, you must be receiving a great deal of mail. There is the need to speak out and to hear a confirmation or refutation of one's ideas. A great deal of new information has been thrown at the people along with unusual solutions. Currently the physicians are describing the condition of many people as being a "sociodepressive psychopathic." Why is it so? Because the stereotypes have broken down and, for the time being, the expected improvement in the life of a normal working person has not come about. Availability of items of prime necessity has even worsened. The protection of the individual from robbery and crime has even weakened. In any case, we lack the former confidence in the reliability and power of governmental protection. The soviets are still not playing their role and there is no one to turn to locally. Our defenselessness hides behind general discussions.

Reaction to Our Publications

B. Troyanovskiy, doctor of technical sciences, professor, Moscow Power Industry Institute, laureate of the USSR State Prize:

"Incompetence," by G. Medvedev, KOMMUNIST No 4, 1989.

The problem of the competence of economic managers, raised by G. Medvedev, far exceeds the framework of the nuclear power industry. What is the meaning of incompetence? Is it possible for a director of a power plant, for example, to be a profound specialist in the entire variety of equipment at the plant? This is quite doubtful! And could the minister of power industry be a specialist in boilers, in hydraulic, steam and gas turbines, in electrical systems and in construction? At the same time, he must be a top organizer, an economist, political leader and ecologist? This would be unrealistic, and also, I think, unnecessary. The same applies, to a certain extent, to his deputies. How to find the right, the best scientific and technical decisions? To this effect each industrial ministry has a scientific and technical council (NTS). Having been a member of a number of ministries' NTS I would like to share my view on their role and activities.

The NTS, its sections and expert commissions, should be set up not on the basis of official position, perquisites or even titles (including academic). What are needed are leading specialists noted for their principle-mindedness, whose names would be familiar to the scientific and

technical public. Many of them, including the heads of expert commissions, should not work for a specific ministry for, usually, such an affiliation would psychologically lead them to adopt the departmental viewpoint.

The main feature in NTS activities is to formulate strategy and tactics in the basic areas of the sector. In the power industry it would be what type of power plants to select, what should be their reciprocal correlation, what priority to give to investments and scientific and production efforts, and what should be the policy concerning the technical retooling of power plants which have exhausted their resources?

The history of our power industry and power industry science is familiar with many major errors committed precisely because a number of decisions were made to serve the interests of a narrow group of scientists, departments, scientific institutes or even a single individual. In my view, that is what happened with the allocation of funds for the installation of MGD-generators and the Tokamak system. This triggered a euphoria concerning solar and wind power plants which are expensive and whose contribution to the solution of the most important problems of compensating for the shortage of electric power in the country was microscopic.

That is why expert evaluations (expert evaluations precisely and not simply discussions) of specific projects are exceptionally important. At that point a decision is made of whether they should or should not exist and also one concerning the developing (alas, for the time being very weakly) system of competitive projects, and the choice to be made.

However, the NTS merely recommends. It is its chairman, the minister, who makes the decision. I remember a case in which the NTS of the former USSR Minenergomash unanimously rejected the recommendation of the then minister V.V. Krotov concerning turbines with a generating capacity of 500,000 kilowatts. The minister did not agree with the view of his council. The result was the breakdown at the Ekibastuz GRES and huge losses. There have been other examples as well: The turbine section of the NTS of the USSR Minenergo, chaired by Professor A.G. Kostyuk, disagreed with an already signed decision of the USSR Council of Ministers and was able to amend it.

I believe that if the leadership of the ministry disagrees with the recommendations of the NTS, they must meet once again and try to convince the other side; in the final account, the question should be submitted to a joint session of the collegium and the council or else the State Committee for Science and Technology should resolve the problem.

Another important problem is that of paid expert opinions. It is not a question only of cost accounting. Paid expert evaluations mean increased responsibility and the personal involvement of the expert and not shifting the

expert evaluation to his assistants, who are not all that competent. Frequently the choice of one variant or another may mean a difference in terms of millions of tons of fuel or tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of tons of metal. This year, for the first time, an official expert in turbine systems for electric power plants—the Moscow Power Industry Institute—was paid to provide expert evaluation for the USSR Minatomen-ergo and the USSR Minenergo and we, the experts (by this I mean both customers and designers) have already felt the difference.

There is an area in which today, to the best of my knowledge, there is no expertise and, in general, the influence of competent nondepartmental specialists is not felt: foreign economic relations. I do not recall (in areas with which I have had something to do) submitting in advance for discussion by the scientific and technical public plans for the purchasing of equipment abroad. I do not doubt that this is one of the reasons for which many items purchased with foreign currency have remained unused for years or have been used inefficiently which, in frequent cases, has had an indirect restraining effect on the development of our own equipment.

What about exports? How are they being prepared today? One or two specialists (essentially plant personnel) and a group of foreign trade officials would go to the purchasing country. How are foreign companies doing it? It is at their expense that allegedly impartial university professors are sent to the potential purchaser, where they read lectures and submit papers: they prepare the ground. This is followed by the arrival of a large group of specialists from the company, dozens of people who are quite competent, both managers and their assistants. The companies finance and organize numerous international conferences, for this is an indirect advertising of their products. Special consulting companies exist abroad, which provide expert evaluations, help in bids and in drafting contracts. They employ specialists in their specific areas and not in marketing.

I have not heard of Soviet companies of this kind. Could it be a question of huge expenses in foreign currency? No. Let us consider power machine building equipment, which is one of the most science-intensive and, correspondingly, a very profitable export items for us. A single power turbine costs dozens or hundreds of millions of dollars while an expert evaluation and group travels by specialists and participation in conferences could lead to "savings" of no more than a few thousand.

Finally, competence means requirements facing the rank-and-file engineer as well. How is such competence developed? Let me not discuss the higher school, for this would be a separate topic. The steam and gas turbine department of the MEI (with 10 doctors of sciences and the only training thermal electric power plant in the world and a volume of cost accounting work in excess of 1 million rubles per year) tried to organize courses for

upgrading the skills of electric power plant engineers based on a 9-month full-time course. This is because technology today is not what it was 10 years ago and the power plants employ a number of graduates of correspondence and evening schools or weak departments.

What type of answer did we hear to our suggestions? Nine months is too long, who will give up a good specialist, for this may mean losing him; where would those people live in Moscow? Generally speaking, we want competence cheaply. In the final account, the engineer falls behind the contemporary standards of science and technology. Hence overexpenditures of fuel, accidents and other unpleasantnesses.

The problem of competence, raised by the journal, is exceptionally topical. Serious steps must be taken to ensure it on all levels, from the minister to the young beginning engineer.

Correspondence with the Readers

Letter from Lev Alekseyevich Zhdanov: Let Us Not Live with Illusions

Dear editors:

After a long break in party membership, I subscribed to your journal. For the time being I am disappointed. You seem to be aiming not at an objective attitude but at criticizing everything that is old and turning to a new (what kind?) interpretation of Marxism and V.I. Lenin.

Please explain the following:

Why is the "Marxist" Bukharin given a green light for pluralism while Stalin the "dogmatist" is filed away. J.V. Stalin was a "criminal" but not only in terms of the worker but the peasantry;

Why (for the sake of the broad public) is there a plan to publish the "works" of Denikin and the other fierce opponents of socialism (I agree!), while anathemizing the works of people who lived with the concerns of their people, such as Molotov, Malenkov and Zhdanov?

How does the journal rate today's both secret and legal millionaires? Why were there no such millionaires in the 1930s and 1940s (except for Utesov and Sholokhov)?

Why is there an increase in negative phenomena in society every year: waste, theft on a particularly large scale, etc.? To whose benefit is it for smart operators, swindlers, double-dealers and toadies to remain within the party?

By printing and analyzing such materials, the journal would be consistent with its title and gain prestige among the rank-and-file party members, through strengthening its monolithic nature and purity of its ranks!

Respectfully, Lev Alekseyevich Zhdanov, CPSU member since 1946, Voroshilovgrad

P.S. You will probably not print a single one of my questions.

If not, why? Please, explain!

Department of History of the CPSU, the USSR and World History:

As you can see, dear Lev Alekseyevich, we are printing your questions and will try to answer them.

Between 1918 and 1954 17 billion copies of books were published in our country; 706 million of them consisted of Stalin's works (for the sake of comparison: Lenin's works were printed in 279 million copies while those of Marx and Engels, in 65 million). Stalin's works were published particularly frequently in the last years of his life. At that time, for example, 13 volumes of his works totaling more than 16 million copies came out. The flood of publications reflecting Stalin's concepts on the theory and history of socialism came out in millions of copies. The "Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)," alone came out in 40 million copies, in the languages of the peoples of the USSR, between October 1938 and October 1952. Collections of the works by Stalin's closest retinue were published in quite large editions.

Generally speaking, stocks of such books, which would have sufficed for decades were so large that when the new times came and the number of such books somewhat diminished, there was no shortage, the more so since anyone who so desired could keep such books without any risk to life and freedom. Any one of Stalin's books can be obtained without difficulty in a state library as well.

The fate of works by other authors was quite different: they were removed (like their authors). A few copies of such books were left in the locked sections of the largest libraries of the country by order of the Stalinist leadership. It is virtually impossible to come across them in private libraries, for until recently it was simply dangerous to keep such publications.

Has the current imbalance changed all that greatly? Not in the least. A few collections of Bukharin's works were published in small editions and a few dozen of his hundreds of works have become accessible to the readers. Actually, for the time being Bukharin's works are a rare exception. Rykov, Tomskiy, Zinov'ev, Kamen'ev, Preobrazhenskiy, Sokolnikov and many other leaders of the party and the Soviet state, the interest in whom has greatly increased of late, have not been all that lucky. Therefore, objectively speaking, what kind of "green light" are we talking about! The small path which was laid should be widened.

Incidentally, no one opposes the publication of unknown works and documents by Stalin, Malenkov, Molotov and Zhdanov. Many such manuscripts have been preserved and they will be gradually published. In particular, the decision to prepare for publication a series of minutes of party congresses and Central Committee plenums is of major importance.

Honestly speaking, the publication of all such documents would hardly please Stalin's supporters. For the texts which had been thoroughly selected and brushed up were merely the facade behind which there were all too many lies, cruelty and hypocrisy. The real facts reveal neither love "for the working class and the poor peasantry," nor the concerns of the people.

The new and "old" works which have now been published have merely raised the curtain which concealed facts which every unprejudiced person knew as it were: A number of state crimes were committed in the 1930s and 1940s. We hear the voices of the victims but know very little of the organizers of the terror and the system as a whole. This, however, triggers illusions: Perhaps such was not the case, perhaps the victims are too biased, perhaps there was order and there were no shortages and corruption with which all of us have become fed up? People, and even more so people in a socialist society, have an inherent sharper sense of social justice. Legends about former blossoming hinder the realistic perception of the past and the present.

Naturally, a most decisive struggle must be fought against bureaucracy and crime and more should be written about it. But why should we pretend that this struggle would make it possible to solve all of our problems and that if these culprits are eliminated from our society it will begin to live in clover? This has already happened. All the time we were hindered by the "enemies" and realizing the simple thought that no single "enemy" can harm us as we can be harmed by our own socioeconomic system—inefficient, wasteful and essentially tending to figure padding and abuses—cost us a great deal. We must not go back to the old "order" but leave this past behind us faster in order to assert true order of a socialist rule of law state, based on the supremacy of the law and respect for the dignity of the individual.

Let us speak frankly: It is only now that the first generation of leaders not personally linked to Stalin or trained in the school of governmental life under his leadership has come to power.

To a large extent we have retained the economic mechanism which developed during the period of industrialization and collectivization. Already then it was wasteful and ineffective and already then commonsensical people criticized the "gross output" and figure padding, seeing how reluctantly the economy accepted anything new while it developed essentially extensively. However, the

Stalinist leadership categorically rejected serious reforms, limiting itself to halfway measures. What do our readers know about this today? Very little.

Another myth—that under Stalin there was no crime or abuse—is based on that same ignorance and lack of objective information. In fact, however, it was precisely the Stalinist political system, which was infinitely centralized and uncontrolled that placed the simple person in a previously unheard of dependence on the official or, simply, even the informer and the slanderer.

We already know a great deal about the millions of people in the Stalinist camps. However, we do not know anything about the crime constantly nourished by the destruction of traditional social structures and the mass terror practiced against huge population strata. Nor do we know about the thievery of officials which, in the sources of that time, were shyly described as "self-supplying." We do not know about the smart operators, about whom, as the VKP(b) Central Committee journal *POD ZNAMENEM MARKSIZMA* wrote in 1941 "are making huge amounts of money from alcohol," or others who, "stealing from governmental stocks, are building their own dachas," "or purchasing as a saint's name day 'gift' to their daughters antique furniture...." "Such people, predators, people who live not through labor but by plundering the people's good, are frequent in our country," the journal concluded. How many were they? At that time this was considered a state secret.

Today such secrets are increasingly few. The statistics of crime have been made public. This fact creates a variety of feelings, including concern. Nonetheless, if we truly wish to strike at the foundations of abuse and crime, full glasnost is necessary on such matters. Also necessary is a clear realization that the currently existing corruption is a derivative phenomenon, for which reason the efficient struggle against it is possible only under the conditions of a radical restructuring of social life. We must not return to the old model of state organization but more rapidly restructure this difficult legacy. To live with the illusions concerning the Stalinist "order," and the efficiency of cruelty and lack of democracy means to walk in circles and to deprive our children and grandchildren of a normal future. Is this honest?

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'Confession' of A Social Science Teacher
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[Article by G. Khvatkov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, Moscow State Historical-Archive Institute, chairman of the bureau of the Moscow City Association of Social Science Teachers]

[Text] I have worked with young people for more than 40 years. At the age of 17 and a half I fought in the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, I represent the senior generation. We are affected today by all that is taking place in

our native fatherland, perhaps even more than others. One of the many reasons for this is that the present young generation is holding us responsible for the fact that a great deal of what we did was wrong and that we did not create the type of social organism which would be able to answer all questions. Furthermore we, social scientists of that generation, are being blamed for not having taught the right things and for having developed certain stereotypes. I would like to express a few thoughts on all of this and to "repent," so that we could define the line which we must follow.

Let me frankly say that today social science teachers are seriously concerned with how to restructure the teaching of social sciences as a whole, and of Marxism-Leninism in particular. This is by no means an easy task. Its solution, I believe, is related to a number of problems. The most important of them, in my view, is that of cleansing Marxism-Leninism from the pollution of the cult which, essentially turned our science into a collection of dogmas and quotations which "served" the needs of the authorities and structured the state pyramid with a single personality on top and the conversion of our party from a leading and guiding force into an administrative organization with all anti-democratic consequences. The Marxist-Leninist concept of socialism in all of its aspects—economic, social, political and spiritual—became distorted and falsified to its extreme; it was deprived of its basic humanistic essence.

Today most of us clearly realize that Stalin knew what he was doing. He crushed Marxism-Leninism, converting it into his own "model" which, as it became obvious, had little in common with true Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev tried to modernize a few things and somehow to restore the creative nature of revolutionary science. Efforts were made at updating a number of concepts, such as on the nature and content of our age, and the full and definitive victory of socialism in the USSR; a certain reorganization of our social relations was undertaken, and so on. However, in the final account, Khrushchev himself found himself trapped by the Stalinist concept of socialism. This concept remained intact and was even "perfected" during the times of Brezhnev, the period of so-called stagnation.

Let us not forget that throughout this time the idea of the "supreme individual" assumed a hateful interpretation. Whatever such an individual may have said became the alpha and omega, the peak of "scientific" conclusions. God forbid that anyone should express a different opinion! I recall the way in 1974, on the request of IZDA-TELSTVO ZNANIYE I was writing the pamphlet *"The Ideological Myths of Anti-Communism: Evolution and New Trends."* It included the part on "peaceful coexistence and anti-communism." The single viewpoint was hammered-in in all of Brezhnev's speeches and, therefore, in our entire propaganda: the idea of peaceful coexistence was first expressed by Lenin. Nonetheless, Marx had written as early as in 1864 in his *"Constituent Manifesto of the International Association of Workers"*

about this principle of relations among countries with different social systems (it is true, without using the term "peaceful coexistence"). For that reason I presented my considerations that peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems has been a humanistic tradition throughout the existence of Marxism-Leninism. The editors demanded that all of this be deleted. I told them: Look at volume 16 of the works of Marx and Engels, page 11. What does it matter, they answered.... The fact that such a situation existed must be understood.

Today we, social science teachers, are being accused, probably justly, of the fact that at best we were popularizers of quotations (precisely quotations) of those who held the power. Did I, for example, realize this? Yes, I did, and I even saw that we were going into some kind of ideological-political impasse from which I saw no way out. Could one struggle? One could and, obviously, one had to. But let me merely point out the following: With whom to fight and who would understand you? Was this cowardice? Possibly. I tried to make sense of this: We went through the hell of the Great Patriotic War and we saw everything; we had in front of us an open enemy and we defeated him and we thought that we had won. Actually, we found ourselves facing our "own" wall which no attack could surmount. This was the wall of the "great personality" whose ideas were unquestionable. The young generations may not believe me but we found ourselves approximately in the same situation as our distant predecessors who had won the Patriotic War of 1812. They believed that they would lay the beginning of a new stage in the development of Russia on a democratic basis. They saw a civilian society in Europe and wished the same for themselves, for which reason they openly confronted tsarism. We too believed that our victory would lead to substantial changes, and that serious democratic changes will begin to be made in the country of the winners. However, nothing of the sort occurred and we did not give open battle, for all problems were being solved in the name of a single person backed by the authority of the party and the state. Such was our terrible tragedy which the present generation could hardly understand fully.

I believe that most of us honestly assumed that they were disseminating in the schools, VUZs, and so on, the (then) contemporary Marxism-Leninism. Let me frankly say, however, that when Brezhnev was made general secretary, we no longer believed everything that was claimed and presented as "creative Marxism-Leninism." We were generally familiar with the level of his theoretical training and his ability independently to think and write.... Nonetheless, everything was being done in the name of the party and presented as the party's views and position, and as Marxism-Leninism! This made our situation even more difficult, affected as it was by our upbringing under Stalinist times and blind faith in the "infallibility" of everything coming from the top.

Therefore, when perestroika began, the question of our spiritual legacy, our spiritual wealth arose most sharply.

The "emancipated" people, the young in particular, began bluntly to raise the question of the fact that Marxism-Leninism had not provided an accurate policy, had not "rescued" socialism from most severe deformations and tragic situations related to mass repressions. I personally find it very painful to hear all of this, for essentially it is a question not of Marxism-Leninism but of its extremely distorted Stalinist "model." Unfortunately, this process has spread even to some social scientists and we can hear from them statements about the "obsolescence" precisely of Marxism-Leninism. They cite as proof the fact that of late this term has disappeared from the press. Matters have gone so far that some VUZs are drafting curricula for the cycle of social sciences in which the very concept "Marxism-Leninism" is absent. All of this once again proves that today one of the basic tasks of perestroika is to purge Marxism-Leninism from any kind of doctrinairism and dogmatism and to present it to our entire society as a science, as a theory and methodology of knowledge, as a sum of steadily developing ideas on the reorganization of society on a humane basis, as a dialectical method for the study of reality in all of its contradictions and, perhaps, the adoption of a variety of approaches to its interpretation.

The task of purging is exceptionally difficult. In this area all of us—scientists and educators—must do a great deal of intensive work. However, purging alone will not solve the problem. Another important question arises as well: What is the place of Marxism-Leninism within the system of universal human knowledge? So far, in their majority the social science teachers have answered it (and still do) as simply as possible, and even primitively. For example, from the very first day that a student enters a VUZ we open with him a discussion on the history of the CPSU and then teach him philosophy (i.e., dialectical and historical materialism), political economy and scientific communism and... take the student to his state examinations. It is true that in the first lecture we told the student that Marxism appeared not outside the high road of development of world civilization. However, this, as a rule, ended the study of this "high road." Some fragments about the predecessors of Marxism and small excursions into the past, in the course of the teaching of philosophy, did not solve the problem. Essentially, the student could not feel the profound ties linking Marxism to world civilization.

How could our student determine what precisely had Marxism adopted from the history of social thought and what universal human culture it had inherited and what was its place within this culture, given our previous (and even present) way of teaching? For example, lectures were read and seminars given on philosophy. The laws of dialectics were explained and the "mechanism" of their action was memorized. Proof was given that this was a Marxist discovery. But was the question raised of what were the origins of dialectics, what had the philosophers of antiquity, of other ages and, finally, what had Hegel

and other philosophers thought about this? This question was not asked. Perhaps it was only in departments of philosophy that it was and in a certain mind set at that. The result was that the entire understanding of dialectics was reduced to noting and memorizing the three laws and paired categories. It was precisely thus that our student saw the "peak" of philosophical thinking. If he memorized a set of dogmas he would be given a proper grade. If he could apply these dogmas to reality or, in other words, if he was able to "squeeze" reality within these dogmas, he was considered a qualified Marxist. Such was precisely the method used in writing a number of textbooks, monographs, articles and dissertations.

In this connection, not for the sake of rhetoric but of the practical interpretation of the problem it is important, in my view, to raise the following question: Why did Stalin present historical materialism in a way different from that of Lenin? He had little interest in the dialectics of the history of human society. Historical materialism was presented as the exclusive theory of the class struggle, for without it it was not possible to formulate the idea of the aggravation of the class struggle as socialism became more successful. Actually, as early as the July 1928 Plenum he instilled this concept in practical circulation. The high cost of this Stalinist "enrichment" of Marxist philosophy is well-known. Limiting the historical area of knowledge has led (and always will lead) also to limiting thinking, and to its standardization and uniformity.

An almost identical rule applies to other subjects. For example, what was scientific communism reduced to? For the past quarter of a century it has been studied in VUZs, and for one-quarter of a century people have been arguing about its specific subject and content. The fact that essentially scientific communism was taught without teaching the history of sociopolitical thinking was also no accident. The moment the question would be seriously raised of the nature of the new society as conceived by the progressive philosophers of the past, the obvious inconsistency between the Stalinist "model" of socialism and its Brezhnevian extension in the guise of "developed socialism" became obvious. Furthermore, essentially, in the study of the problems of scientific communism the most interesting views of Marx and Engels concerning the new society were ignored. A number of considerations on this account, however, may be found in their *"German Ideology," "Anti-Duhring,"* their works on the Paris Commune and their abundant correspondence! It is true that the "necessary" little quotations were always found but that was all. And what about Lenin's views on socialism? The methodology of their use was extremely simple. Corresponding statements could be found in Lenin and Marxism (scientific communism) was "enriched" with the "theory" of the growth of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat into the state of the whole nation. Few people were interested in the type of role that the people played in it, and the way the political institutions of society had to be changed in order to establish real rule by the people.

Words were found in Lenin on the developed socialist society, which meant that the conclusion could be drawn that such a society actually existed.

The situation was no better, if not worse, in the case of political economy, a topic which is now extensively discussed. Obviously, it was no accident that it was divided into two parts: the political economy of capitalism and that of socialism. In my view, such a division was drawn for purposes of adaptation. It made it possible to ascribe Marx's views only to the age of capitalism and to invest in the political economy of socialism anything one wished, only as long as one would "refer" to a few thoughts expressed by Marx. It was precisely this that made it possible to firmly establish Stalin's ideas in socialist political economy. Conversely, the historical approach to economic theory as a whole and to political economy in particular did not allow the "possibility" of including the Stalinist concept in that science, for it did not fit general historical knowledge in the least.

Consequently, a profound understanding of Marxism-Leninism is inconceivable without the study of the history of social thinking. Marxism-Leninism itself is the product of historical development, and in order to evaluate this product properly we must know history (how can we understand the nature of the Renaissance, for example, without knowing its prehistory?). It is only by profoundly studying the history of philosophical, economic, social and political thinking that one could truly understand and not accept a priori the nature of the change which Marxism had promoted in social science. Any other way inevitably leads to dogmatism, to freezing a steadily developing theory and to belittling its significance.

Unquestionably, Marxism-Leninism nonetheless became the most influential ideological-theoretical force. At this point a very serious question arises of its interconnection with other ideological trends. What is the nature of relations and interconnections in this case?

We know that ever since its appearance, Marxism has struggled against a variety of doctrines and concepts on problems of social development, and general theoretical problems of the social sciences. But how? It always exposed their theoretical-methodological foundations and specific sociopolitical trend. Never, however, did it ignore anything positive which the various views carried within themselves. Let us recall the way Marx and Engels valued all of their predecessors and how highly they referred to the humanists and enlighteners of the past. Let us take as an example Engels' work *"The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State."* Was this a simple reproduction of the thoughts expressed by Morgan in the book *"The Ancient Society?"* No, this was a new quality of analysis leading to entirely new conclusions. Nonetheless, Engels deemed it necessary to say that his work was based on Morgan's thoughts. Let us not mention the brilliant assessments which Marx and Engels provided of Hegel, Feuerbach, Smith, Ricardo,

Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen and others. This was the highest manifestation of the cultural standards of Marx and Engels and a sensible attitude toward history and its heritage.

Let us recall how highly Lenin valued anything achieved by Russian social philosophy. He had a deep understanding of the views of Herten, Chernyshevskiy and Tolstoy. He could see the strong and "weak" aspects of their world outlook and, as we know, called Tolstoy a mirror of the Russian Revolution. And how did he treat his opponents before and after the October Revolution—Bukharin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Rykov and Zinoviev? He disagreed with them in quite a number of aspects. Nonetheless, he always found something positive in their views. The very fact that a given view questioned any one of his own conclusions, made it necessary for Lenin to reassess it in order to reach an optimal solution.

Here as well, unfortunately, ever since Stalin's time everything has changed radically. The Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism asserted its fatal approach: anyone who is not with us is against us!

Speaking frankly, many among us, if not the majority, dealt less with the analysis and the substantiated criticism of the views of foreign social scientists than with their vulgar-sociological exposure. It is no accident that in our curricula on the social sciences a single approach was established: at the end of each topic, in one subject or another, we derived, in one program or another, as late as 1988, formulas, such as the criticism of the anti-Leninist views on problems of the party's organizational structure (history of the CPSU); the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism (philosophy), the Keynesian Theory (political economy), the nature and content of the contemporary age (scientific communism), and so on. Pamphlets and books were published under titles of the same nature, such as "Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Concepts in the Course of Scientific Communism," "Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Economic Theories," "Critique" and nothing but "Critique" but, essentially, "exposure." The most curious thing here was that many of the authors had never read the works they criticized. They collected quotations from INION survey publications to prove the extent to which one view or another was anticommunist. The same quotations traveled from one school aid to another, from one monograph to another, and from one dissertation to another. Rarely did we see in this type of works, for many long years, the view that one of these theories includes considerations which are worthy of attention....

I am saying all of this with first-hand knowledge, for I was an active participant in this process and author and co-author of the monographs *"Ideological Struggle in our Time," "Anticommunism in the Service of Reaction and War," "On the Fronts of Ideological Battles," "Real Socialism in the USSR and Its Bourgeois Falsifiers,"* and many pamphlets and articles. I too, guided by the old

methodology, did not "detect" anything positive in the views of Western social scientists, although I studied their works most closely and not on the basis of INION surveys. My mind was suppressed by the dogmatic concept that if it did not agree with Marxism-Leninism (the point is, what kind?), it meant that it was unscientific; if it contained any kind of critical arguments against the USSR, it meant that it was hostile.

I do not wish to say in the least that openly anti-Soviet and slanderous publications were not published or are not published today, based on the principle that the "evil empire" must be destroyed. Unfortunately, there are such publications and we not only should but must analyze them critically. The ideological struggle existed, exists and will exist in the foreseeable future. I am discussing something else, a basic approach: analysis or bare "exposure;" interpretation or mindless "rejection." Another major demarcation is what we are dealing with: Are we dealing with serious works by foreign social scientists or heavy-handed anticommunist forgeries.

By reinterpreting today everything, one can see how many sensible things were ignored and, therefore, lost. Let me mention no more than a few examples. A number of major Western social scientists came up in their time with the idea of the convergence (rapprochement) between the two opposite social systems as being the leading trend of contemporary progress. We, including myself, soon answered with articles, pamphlets and monographs. Our approach was one: this was an anti-communist and groundless idea (for in reality, we claimed, it is world socialism that would triumph); it was politically aimed at penetrating into the socialist countries for the sake of corrupting them from within. However, something essentially different remained unnoticed in this "energetic" criticism: the fact that a process was taking place in the world through the development of a qualitatively new situation, that the need for interaction among different countries was increasing and, hence, the need to shape a new "cosmopolitan way of thinking," as those scientists said. I keep thinking now that had we seen at that time this "kernel," and comprehensively analyzed it on the basis of dialectical materialism, had we most pointedly raised this problem with the politicians, perhaps the new political thinking would have come up sooner. Marxism-Leninism would only have benefited from this. Its reputation in the eyes of world public opinion would have increased, as it did in our time.

Let us recall how much effort was wasted in debunking the doctrine of "deideologizing." Meanwhile, we ourselves simplified the understanding of ideological confrontation and we tried to ideologize all social relations and realms of human activities, which led to sectarianism and which strengthened dogmatism. In the final account, however, reality itself made it necessary to go deeper into the essence of Marxism-Leninism and to

realize that in the contemporary world one cannot convert class into ideological struggle, including in the area of relations between countries with different social systems.

Many of our social scientists, including myself, rejected in their entirety the theories found in Bell's "Postindustrial Society," Etzioni's "Active Society," Ruyes's "Society People at Play," etc. However, these concepts included interesting observations on the role of the scientific and technical revolution, the social processes related to it, the need for a faster shaping of the human component in production forces, an analysis of new sources of its own development, "discovered" by capitalism, etc.

I would like to point out one more aspect. In 1976 R. Garaudy published his book "*A Plan for Hope*," which became very popular in a number of countries. I, among others, also expressed my attitude toward this book and its author. He was and remains a "renegade," we claimed. Could one equate the actions of capitalism with those of socialism in the creation of an exceptional ecological situation in the world? Socialism was solving all ecological problems on a planned basis and we had no problems whatsoever in this area. How could Garaudy criticize the CPSU for bureaucratic distortions and for weakening ties with the masses. This was a lie!

If only the voice of reason could have been heard at that time....

I could extend the list of such examples. It is clear today that our attitude toward different viewpoints cannot remain what it was. It must be returned to the channel of relations which were inherent in the founders of our science. The experience of the initiated perestroika convincingly proves that Marxism-Leninism becomes even stronger when we engage in comprehensive analysis and not reject for no reason other views with which the world is full today. With such an approach there is something to compare and, therefore, to shape firmer convictions among the people. Here as well the shroud must be lifted.

In my view, the restructuring in the teaching of Marxism-Leninism requires the comprehensive solution of at least three crucial problems: first, the restoration of Marxism-Leninism as a science, as a constantly developing theory, cleansing it from the cult, dogmatism, and callousness and restoring it as a methodology of knowledge, distinct from its use as a "prescription manual;" second, a historical approach to the study of Marxism-Leninism and defining its place in universal human culture; third, the profound study of sociopolitical and ideological views and trends which exist in the contemporary world, a study and analysis conducted in the spirit of the traditions laid down by Marx and Lenin.

Understandably, this is an extremely complex matter. It requires the joint efforts of scientists, educators and ideological workers and the mass information media. Bearing this in mind, an initiative group was set up as the All-Russian Association of Social Science Educators. Its purpose is to rally social science teachers in schools, PTU, technical colleges, VUZs, writers and journalists, i.e., anyone working with young people. The purpose of the association is to contribute to a restructuring in the teaching of the social disciplines on all levels, making these disciplines truly scientific and contributing to the study of unknown pages in the history of socialist, developing and capitalist countries.

The Moscow City section of this association has already been established and has begun work. We are working in close cooperation with the ideological department of the Moscow City Party Committee and the Council of Moscow VUZ Rectors. The establishment of rayon organizations of the association has been undertaken, on the basis of the pedagogical society, in such a way that in each rayon the social science departments of a VUZ would assume sponsorship over history and social science teachers in schools, PTU and technical colleges, and jointly solve problems related to perestroika in teaching. Such work has been started in the Dzerzhinskiy, Frunzenskiy and Pervomayskiy rayons in the capital. Practical contacts have been established with the urban Institute for the Advancement of Teachers. Here as well activists of the association are working directly with social scientists. We are still far from the point when the plan of the State Committee for Public Education on introducing a uniform subject entitled "Man and Society" has been implemented. For the time being, the topics "Social Science," "Foundations of the Soviet State and Law," and "Ethics and Psychology of Family Life" are studied on the "middle level." It is simply impossible to make use of the current textbooks on such subjects, for their most important concepts are "clashing" with real life. The specific help given to educators is that we are jointly assessing the content of each major topic and class, and sponsor roundtable meetings. We must write and publish small method aids dealing perhaps with the most complex topics. This may not be perfect but we shall gain experience.

Major plans exist also concerning the work of VUZ social scientists. Citywide seminars are now being sponsored separately for teachers of history, philosophy, political economy and scientific communism, dealing with the most topical problems of restructuring the teaching of these subjects (the association has set up respective sections). We are planning to hold regular seminars for heads of social science departments, at which the most topical problems will be discussed (based on real information on all aspects in the life of the capital).

Naturally, we also need to establish practical relations with the State Committee for Public Education and the RSFSR Minvuz, above all so that the public may participate in the elaboration of the new programs and in

reviewing the already written textbooks and, possibly, participate in their writing. We believe that without taking into consideration the experience and views of the educators on all levels it would be hardly possible to solve these problems on the required level. It would be desirable to combine the activities of our organization with the social science laboratories of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. The unified efforts of state authorities and public organizations will unquestionably help in the radical restructuring of the teaching of social sciences throughout the entire public education system.

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'Absolute' Safety or Acceptable Risk?

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[Article by Nikolay Sergeyevich Babayev, doctor of physical-mathematical sciences, scientific secretary of the Scientific and Technical Council of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and Igor Ivanovich Kuzmin, leading scientific associate, Institute of Nuclear Energy imeni I.V. Kurchatov]

[Text] Unquestionably, the accident at the Chernobyl AES dealt a serious blow not only at Soviet but also at the global nuclear industry. It undermined the faith of the public in the assertions of specialists concerning the safety of the nuclear power industry and demanded of them a responsible analysis of the reasons for the catastrophe and the adoption of constructive measures which would protect society from the possible repetition of such events.

In our view, in their most general aspect the results of such a study which was made by Western specialists are contained in the statement by K. Walski, president of the Nuclear Industrial Forum (United States). "In the long-range," he writes, "we will most likely reach the conclusion that the lessons in security, taught by Chernobyl, were already learned in the United States as a result of the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant. This event marked the beginning of a series of changes in the design of the reactor and the procedures for its running and control methods."

Unfortunately, we must admit that a striking lack of attention was displayed in the USSR toward the lessons of the accident at the American AES. Yet, had we drawn proper conclusions from that accident, in April 1986 the operators of the Chernobyl AES would have hardly turned off at the station, so light-heartedly, one safety system after another, mindlessly undertaking to violate operational rules. It is difficult to imagine that in 1986, as in the past, reactors of the RBMK type were considered one of the main components in the structure of the Soviet nuclear power industry. It would be of some interest now to quote the remark on the subject of the

viability of RBMK reactors, made by L. Marshall, chairman of the Central Electric Power Production Council (Great Britain): "There are no reactors in the West whose design would be similar to the one in Chernobyl and, on the basis of my information about that system, I consider unlikely that in the West such a reactor would have been easily licensed."

The reasons for the accident at the nuclear power plant and its consequences were thoroughly analyzed after the Chernobyl tragedy. New technical measures of safety were adopted at our AES and possibilities are being studied to prevent violations of regulations governing the operation of nuclear equipment and in the elimination of consequences of potential accidents of varying scales.

Like the entire economy of the country, the nuclear industry is in a stage of perestroika, which requires the search for and adoption of new approaches to the solution of the problems existing in this area. It is necessary, above all, to formulate contemporary safety criteria and to develop a respective methodology for securing this safety. Unfortunately, the roots of the extensive way of thinking and acting are very deep and their positions remain very strong. The old traditional methodology which is not the least important culprit for the accident in Chernobyl, is stubbornly defending its priorities in the nuclear power industry.

We shall try to analyze the traditional methods and approaches to the problem of safety in this economic sector, indicate their limitations and formulate certain new objectives and criteria without claiming in the least to be offering to the readers a certain integral theory. Our objective is to provide more information proving the need for a radical updating of the methodological safety arsenal in the nuclear power industry.

Abandon Departmentalism!

The first step toward the elaboration of the new methodology, in our view, should be the rejection of the departmental approach to ensuring safety. Unfortunately, this approach—the unavoidable offspring of the administrative-command system—remains prevalent to this day. For example, here is the way the safety of nuclear power plants is defined in the basic document "General Regulations on Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (OPB-82):" "AES safety means the characteristics of AES, under normal operational conditions and in the case of accident, to be such as to limit the radiation influence on the personnel, the population and the environment within the stipulated limits. A level of safety is considered acceptable if the stipulations of the special rules and regulations have been observed."

Therefore, "AES safety is an AES feature..." the implementation of which is assumed by the departments responsible for their design, building and operation.

Such departments (Minsredmash, Minatomenergo, Gosatomnadzor) are not interested in the considerations on which the "special rules and regulations" are based, for it is another department that is responsible for observing them (the USSR Ministry of Health). However, if a system of democratic procedures, which make it possible to balance the interests of the various departments has not been developed in the society (not to mention the interests of the various social groups!), inevitably each one of them begins to consider its own tasks as self-seeking and to increase outlays in its own area which it considers the most important. What are the consequences of all this?

Let us consider the methods with the help of which efforts are made to improve safety. This includes, for example, excluding the human factor among the reasons which could lead to an accident. Today each department tends to solve this problem on the basis of its own interests. Departments are responsible for the designing, building and operating of AES by upgrading the quality of nuclear power plants and creating ever more complex and extensive technical safety systems aimed at eliminating the unreliable human factor. In this case the alternate approach is totally ignored, such as reducing the frequency or totally eliminating human "breakdowns" by improving the socioeconomic living conditions of the personnel handling AES control panels which, by definition, is not within the range of interests of these departments. Increasingly trusting in machines, they are investing more and more million rubles in engineering safety systems. The result of this is that a purely engineering answer to safety becomes the "embodiment of supreme wisdom," and the question of its real social usefulness is simply not discussed. Meanwhile, it is obvious that AES personnel, concerned with their housing problems and with feeding and clothing their children, will allow many more "breakdowns" while manning the control panel than people who are not burdened by such concerns.

It is impossible on the basis of departmental positions to realize that outlays for the development of engineering safety systems draws funds away from areas which produce goods and services and improve the material and cultural living standards of the population. Today, when expenditures on ensuring safety are absorbing a significant percentage of social material resources (in the nuclear power industry as much as 30 or more percent of the capital outlays for the building of AES), the problem of optimizing them assumes great importance. The formulation of the problem itself is impossible within the framework of a departmental approach and, actually, so far it has been totally ignored. It is difficult to agree with the quite widespread claims that contemporary equipment could, at a high cost, reduce to a minimum the likelihood and consequences of an accident. The equipment can do that but at what price? Disproportionately high outlays for its development mean that under the conditions of limited material resources we shall be forced to abandon the accelerated development of the

social and cultural areas, the material facilities for education and upbringing, etc. In our view, if society follows this path economic and social problems will pile up which, in the long run, will bring about precisely a reduction in safety. For in the final account the basis of human security is a healthy process of social development. Therefore, the problem of ensuring safety today is not only scientific and technical but, increasingly, socio-economic. Consequently, in the search of decisions we must not rely on traditional methodology oriented toward the satisfaction of departmental interests.

Today we must acknowledge and honestly tell society that in our country there is virtually no scientific substantiation for the location of industrial enterprises. This applies not only to nuclear power plants but also to chemical plants, gas pipelines, etc. All decisions are subordinated frequently to a single departmental task: install a new capacity and provide more output as soon as possible. But how will the various projects behave, depending on their capacity and density of location in the case of an accident at one of them? How will possible harm be related to departmental facilities (closeness of raw materials, transportation conveniences, manpower availability)? There is simply no one of whom to ask such questions. In recalling Chernobyl we, who deal in basic science, must admit that in our time we did not provide those who made decisions about building of this and other AES a scientific method for the location of industrial enterprises which are particularly dangerous to man and the environment.

Therefore, the first major step toward upgrading safety is to abandon departmentalism in the study of this array of problems. This important concept, which requires the elaboration of a new safety methodology, was formulated for the first time (in our country at least) and substantiated by Academician V.A. Legasov. It was precisely on his initiative that a decision was made to set up within the USSR Academy of Sciences a nondepartmental Institute on Problems for the Safe Development of the Nuclear Power Industry (according to the initial plan the topics covered by this institute would include also power-intensive chemical technologies). From this viewpoint safety must be considered not as a feature of the target, for which a given department is responsible, but as the protection of man and the environment from the harmful effects of the technosphere in general. In our view, this key term could be formulated as follows: "Safety means the protection of all people and their environment from excessive danger." This definition must become fundamental in all documents which regulate the development not only of the nuclear power industry but also of other industrial sectors.

Incidentally, it is precisely thus that this term is interpreted in MAGATE methodology: "Safety means the protection of all individuals from excessive radiation danger."

Thus formulated, the problem demands a systematic approach and a consideration of engineering, economic and social factors and universal human values in determining not only the immediate but also the long-term consequences of decisions made under conditions governed by the limited nature of all types of resources. The formulation of the decisions themselves will require an open democratic discussion, the main purpose of which will be to establish what is consistent with the interests of society and what is not. In a democratic society every person has the right to speak out when problems affecting his health, personal safety and the future of his children and grandchildren are considered.

Contemporary Approach to the Problem

If we accept this formulation of the term "safety," a strictly stipulated program for research in this area should not create any objections. To begin with, it is necessary to identify and quantitatively to define the potential threats (in other words, to assess the likelihood of a specific type of accident and the scale of the possible harm in that case). Second, to formulate a methodology for comparing the various types of danger and earmark an acceptable risk level above which the danger becomes excessive. Finally, using engineering and organizational measures, build a system for protection from excessive danger.

In many countries AES are the only type of electric power plant for which the government demands detailed quantitative assessments of the level of risk to the population and the environment. Western countries use the system of the probability risk analysis which calls for modeling the consequences of a disaster (such as melting of the active zone of the reactor) with an assessment of the possible emission and dispersal of radioactive matter. The combination of results with the model which describes the density and structure of the population, the regional infrastructure and resources, make it possible to compute the scale of possible consequences, i.e., the risk. It is thanks to such computations and computer experiments that very detailed scenarios have been created of possible major accidents in Western AES and in the struggle against their consequences. Assessments of the risk level of nuclear power plants are open to public discussion. The most important conclusion which follows from theoretical evaluations and the entire experience in the operation of the AES is that the use of even the most efficient technical safety systems and most advanced method of monitoring technological processes does not ensure and, in principle, cannot ensure the absolute reliability of the work which would exclude the possibility of an accident. This conclusion applies to virtually all complex contemporary technologies of major national economic significance. However small the likelihood of an accident which, under adverse circumstances, could lead to major economic losses, and is a threat to the ecological situation of entire areas and

the lives of a significant number of people, the risk of its happening always exists. Such is the inner nature of the functioning of complex systems which obey the laws of probability.

The methodology for the formulation of substantiated rational decisions, taking the risk factor into consideration, has already become common to all industry of some countries. It is used as a basis in determining the ways of further scientific and technical progress. Naturally, it calls for answering the very difficult question of what is considered acceptable risk, i.e., what level of safety can be considered adequate? Furthermore, such a methodology calls for paying equal attention to both means of preventing an accident and means for the elimination of its consequences should the accident, the risk of which is below the acceptable level, nonetheless take place.

Our country has adopted and, to this day, continues to support a concept which seems more humanistic on the surface, based on the requirements of "absolute" security of AES, which would totally exclude any danger whatsoever related to the operation of nuclear power plants. We must admit that today we are virtually alone in such an "ideal" consistency. The concept of "absolute" security is the base for formulating the corresponding standards not only in the nuclear power industry but also in other sectors. A document which regulates labor safety stipulates that "labor safety is a condition for labor in which the influence of dangerous and harmful production factors is excluded." Naturally, this approach does not stipulate the study of various technologies to be applied in cases of accident. Consequently, probability assessments of risks for even a single Soviet AES are either unavailable or, at least, inaccessible even to experts.

The words of A. Blix, MAGATE director general, sound like a severe blame addressed at us: "I do not know whether such evaluations of risk were made concerning Soviet reactors, but I am confident that, particularly after the Chernobyl accident, such studies, similar to those we have observed in the West, will be carried out in the Soviet Union. There are no reasons whatsoever to believe that the Soviet government is predisposed, any more than any other government, deliberately to expose to a risk the population of large cities." The probability analysis of risk, which has been used in the West for more than 10 years now, has made it possible to take a number of new steps aimed at further enhancing the safety of AES exploitation. The statistical data which were published confirm a steady drop in the number of various incidents occurring at foreign AES over the past 3 years.

Our concept of "absolute" security is aimed, by virtue of its very nature, only at concentrating facilities on the prevention of accidents. As a result, our entire national economy is not always ready to localize and eliminate the consequences of major accidents. Thus, in the case of

the Chernobyl AES, many decisions on the technological level had to be made only in the course of dealing with the accident, under extreme conditions, requiring urgent and extensive experimental work which could (and should!) have been carried out ahead of time.

Risk evaluation studies are very expensive. For example, the probability risk analysis of an individual nuclear power plant in the United States cost as much as \$2 million and takes 10-20 man/years. But if the Soviet AES are "absolutely" safe, naturally, the departments do not have to spend millions to study their behavior in accident situations. By definition such accidents are excluded the moment the station begins operations. Therefore, responsibility for the lack of financing research related to a probability risk analysis in the running of AES should be assumed above all by science and not by the administrative-bureaucratic departmental apparatus. In this case the latter would act on the basis of the rules developed by scientists. By virtue of its departmental nature, however, science as well was not interested in abandoning the concept of "absolute" safety.

In an article written by us together with V.A. Legasov, as early as 1979, on the analysis of and lessons from the accident at the American Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, we drew the following conclusion: "Under certain circumstances, despite the existence of safety measures, conditions for an accident may arise at AES with damages to the active zone and the release in the atmosphere of a small amount of radioactive substances." This claim triggered the categorical objection of our ministry. Most amazingly, however, it met with no support even among the specialists at the Nuclear Energy Institute, engaged in research in the area of nuclear reactors. It was only after the intervention of the then director of the institute's nuclear reactors department, V.A. Sidorenko, who was one of the co-authors of the article, that the article was published in the journal PRIRODA in 1980 and was at that time the virtually only material which informed our public at large of the probability of an accident at a nuclear power plant.

The increased interest shown by the public in problems of safety in the country is understandable and justified. Under the conditions of glasnost, the ecological situation and increased industrial accidents urgently call for issuing a social and governmental instruction on expanding the scale of work in this area. However, no radical changes have taken place in the attitude of the departments toward safety problems. That precisely is the essence of the stagnation which continues to dominate this very tense area of our life. It is precisely this that makes us sound the alarm concerning the further development of safety studies.

Let us reemphasize that the accident at Three Mile Island drastically changed the entire methodology applied in solving problems of safety in the Western countries: they converted from the ideology of

"absolute" safety to that of acceptable risk, determined by economic and social conditions. Even after the Chernobyl tragedy, however, we totally lack the resolve to take a step in this direction.

It is believed by many that the term itself of "acceptable risk" is immoral, for it could be interpreted as some kind of right to plan for accidents involving a risk below the "acceptable" level. This makes a certain sense. However, it is much more immoral to delude ourselves by relying on an actually unattainable "absolute" safety. A risk considered acceptable yesterday becomes unacceptable today; tomorrow a new step will be taken toward safety if we are able to maintain an adequate pace of social development. Furthermore, the acceptability of one risk or another is determined by society, whereas "absolute" safety is stipulated by the departments. In our view, this says everything.

For the sake of fairness let us note that we already have made some progress in the desired direction. Thus, the new "General Regulations on Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (OPB-88)" (the draft of this document was completed last year), which replaced the current OPB-82, formulate the following requirement: "The doses of radiation of the personnel at a nuclear power plant and of the population, as a result of the release of any radioactive substance from a nuclear power plant, must be below the stipulated limits and on a sensibly attainable low level" (authors' emphasis). This means that we must demand assessments and further lowering of the risk if the steps necessary for such a lowering are defined as "sensible."

The Concept of Safety in the Nuclear Power Industry

Thus, the further development of the nuclear power industry in our country must be based on a clearly formulated safety concept in a regulatory document (or law). It must become thoroughly familiar to the population and accepted precisely by the population and not by one department or another. We believe that such a concept should be consistent with the following objectives and criteria:

1. The individual risk, i.e., the level which determines the threat to any person as a result of an accident at an AES or any other nuclear industry enterprise in the area of its location must not exceed 0.1 percent of the daily risk to which the person is exposed in the course of his activities (travel in an automobile or any other means of transportation, a walk in the country, work at home, etc.). The daily risk is assessed at 10^{-4} per year per person, or lower. In that case, the individual risk related to the operation of AES will be 10^{-7} . In the case of a lethal outcome, for example, this risk could be presented as follows: If all potential reasons for death have been reduced to naught, excluding the one which is a consequence of operating an AES, the people living in the vicinity would have an average life span of 10 million years.

2. The social risk, i.e., the level which is considered dangerous in terms of cancer or genetic disease for the entire population living in the area of an AES does not exceed 0.1 percent of the overall mortality rate caused by cancer and genetic damages related to other causes.

3. Subsequent to a possible AES accident, after a short period of time (10 to 20 years) its territory becomes suitable for use for any purpose whatsoever without restrictions.

4. Reducing the risk below the "individual" and "social" levels should be based on economic laws. In other words, the acceptability of any lower risk level must be consistent with the social and economic possibilities of society.

Such objectives and criteria, which ensure the protection of man and the environment, should be expanded in the concept by adding the requirement of making quite substantial capital investments related to the building and operation of AES.

5. The likelihood of the melting of the active zone of the reactor, which leads to the "loss" of an AES, should be no more than 10^{-5} power per reactor-year. This means that economic losses in the case of accident would amount to 0.001 percent of all capital investments in the nuclear power industry.

Finally, taking into consideration the fact that the nuclear power industry is a national economic sector, where discipline and organization must be strictly maintained and the requirements of documents regulating the operation of AES must be strictly observed, it is important to stipulate in terms of the personnel in the nuclear industry measures of responsibility, including criminal responsibility, for actions which threaten work safety in the sector, as has been done, for example, in the field of aviation.

We have not discussed in this article difficult and topical problems such as the burying of radioactive waste, the moving of nuclear fuel outside the AES cycle, possibilities of alternate sources of energy, etc. We believe, however, that the approach we suggest could provide a new impetus for the scientific (but not departmental!) study of these and other problems and for involving the public in the discussion of the possible ways of the country's development, taking our objectives and real possibilities into consideration. Perestroika must not ignore even a single sector of our activities; not to mention such a responsible and strategically important one as the state's power industry.

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School of Great Revolutions

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[Article by Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Plimak, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] In the year of celebration of the bicentennial of the French Revolution, it would be pertinent to turn to its experience, to compare it with that of the Great October Revolution and to establish the certain similarity which exists between the "models" of 1789 and 1917 as well as their tremendous dissimilarity.

Both events have had a major impact on the course of world history for the past 200 years. This was pointed out on 7 December 1988 by M.S. Gorbachev in his United Nations speech: "Two great revolutions—the French of 1789 and the Russian of 1917—had a powerful impact on the very nature of the historical process and radically changed the course of world events.

"Both, each in its own way, gave a tremendous impetus to human progress. It was precisely they that also largely shaped the way of thinking which is still prevalent in the social consciousness. This constitutes a tremendous spiritual wealth.

"Today, however, a different world is rising in front of us, for which different ways leading to the future must be sought. Naturally, such search must be based on acquired experience. However, we must also see the radical differences between what was yesterday and what is today."

'Blood-Shedding Revolutions are Repeated Spasmodically and Fruitlessly'

It was significantly after their colleagues in the West, that Russia's progressive philosophers and leaders took the path of revolutionary struggle. They could learn from the lessons of the Western revolutionaries. At first, these lessons were discouraging.

Indeed, in the revolutions of the 17th to the 19th centuries, the slogan of freedom (we take into consideration the French "model") led the masses to the struggle but did not seem to be implemented in reality. The overthrow of the "despot" monarch proved to be a prelude for a new division of the "liberated" nation into opposite camps. The rebelled "lower strata" in town and country not only destroyed the homes and castles of the aristocracy but also began to demand "equalization" of property and the execution of the rich, and the new "tyrant" rulers. Furthermore, the leaders of the revolution themselves were totally unable to agree among each other on ways of erecting the "building of freedom." A bloody struggle developed among their different factions and in the course of it radicals inevitably turned to the

masses for support. However, the radicals were inclined to promote the energy of the masses only as they made their way to power, and began to fight the "anarchy" of those same masses the moment they came to power.

As a result of the alienation of the radicals from the masses, the ascending revolutionary movement began to decline and the upsurge was followed by a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat—a Thermidor. Moderates once again came on top, sending the radicals to that same guillotine which the radicals had prepared. Meanwhile, they were able to make striking changes in the mores and customs of the renovated society: the fiery enthusiasts of the revolution disappeared from the political arena, replaced by cold-minded careerists and smart operators. The system of requisitions, equalization and thrift was replaced by unrestrained speculation and profiteering. From a simple defender of the new order, the army became its controller. Political changes ended when the power was usurped by successful revolutionary leaders.

The results of the great revolutions of modern times—the English (1640-1649) and the French (1789-1794) assumed a clear outline toward the turn of the 19th century. By defeating absolutism and eliminating the feudal ways they contributed, above all, to the establishment of new exploiting bourgeois relations in the economy. They led to the domination of Cromwell and Bonaparte in politics. This trend was strengthened by the 1848-1849 revolutions in Europe, which took a down trend almost immediately. The proletariat which participated in them was still not able to turn the course of the struggle to its own advantage.

"Bloody revolutions are repeated spasmodically and fruitlessly," noted Herten's KOLOKOL in 1858, "bringing, instead of civil freedoms, shameful despotism. They are always ready again and again to break out and quiet down, lacking the necessary strength to establish a social form which would satisfy the needs of the people."

This formula, which was developed by N.P. Ogarev, expresses the most profound trend in Russian revolutionary thinking between the end of the 18th and middle of the 19th centuries in terms of its attitude toward Western revolutionary experience. We find the most meaningful interpretation of this trend in the theory of the "cyclical nature" of the revolutionary process, formulated by N.G. Chernyshevskiy by the turn of the 1860s.

'Short Periods of Intensive Work'

Chernyshevskiy considered revolution a much more efficient form of historical dynamics than tsarist reformism. However, he cautioned that the revolutionaries had not mastered this means of change and that revolutions did not lead to total success.

Chernyshevskiy believed that a historical result which would be more or less beneficial to the people could be achieved through a series of "short periods of intensified work"—through revolutions. Each one of them would end—by virtue of the alienation of the revolutionaries from the masses—with the triumph of reaction. In turn, however, the reaction prepares conditions for a new round of revolution. This goes on until absolutist (followed by Bonapartist) forms are replaced by parliamentary forms which make possible the relatively peaceful implementation of the "legitimate" demands of the people. It was thus, in his view, that matters would proceed until the establishment of socialist forms.

However, our specialists still do not properly appreciate the instruction given by Chernyshevskiy to fleeing comrades (1871). "He told us," recalls V.N. Shaganov, who was one of them, "that since the time of Rousseau in France and, later, in other European countries, the democratic parties had become accustomed to idealizing the people, to ascribing to the people hopes which could never be realized but which led to even more bitter disappointments. The people's autocracy led only to transferring such autocracy to Napoleon I and, failing to correct this error, repeatedly transferred it through plebiscites to Napoleon III. Any party which has military power on its side can monopolize to its own advantage the supreme rights of the people and, thanks to clever support, become the alleged exclusive representative and defender of the rights of the people.... By becoming the executor of its people it (Bonapartist autocracy—author) treats the people as though they were dead and handles the people's property as it wishes.... Along the way it suppresses speech and conscience, for these are things which lead to trouble for the authorities.... What jailer would allow, in a gesture of good will, a prisoner to appeal for the destruction of the jail?"

"Naturally," Shaganov goes on in expressing Chernyshevskiy's thoughts, "forms (parliamentary—author) are an unreliable thing.... On the other hand, it is perhaps a good thing that forms are unreliable. They always make possible the struggle among parties and the victory of one party over another and, in practice, the victory is always progressive. A shapeless monster, an all-absorbing leviathan, is more frightening."

What we see in front of us are the result and the synthesis of Chernyshevskiy's political concept. Bonapartism was a phenomenon which worried this great Russian revolutionary more than anything else. The task of defeating Bonapartism as an authoritarian-political form which hinders historical development, and replacing it with rule by the people, drew the closest possible attention of the founders of scientific socialism as well, in the 1850s-1870s. But let us now turn to yet another topic which is also underestimated in our country for the time being, the last major article by Engels (1895) "Introduction to the Work of K. Marx *The Class Struggle in France from 1848 to 1850*."

'The Period of Revolutions from Below Has Stopped for a While, Followed by a Period of Revolutions from Above'

Engels begins his work by explaining the correlation between Marx's revolutionary concept of 1848-1850 and the "recent historical experience," above all the French experience of 1789-1830.

Methodologically, this variant of the change which was becoming apparent to the leaders of the proletarian party in the class battles of 1848 meant a change—through the conscious interference of the proletarian party in the revolutionary process—of its "cyclical" nature and the transformation of the "revolution by a minority" into a "revolution by a majority," and thus the prevention of Thermidor and the further ascending progress of the revolution.

This plan could not be implemented because of the insufficient development of the countries of continental Europe and the weakness of the proletariat. It turned out, above all, that the capitalist foundations of society still had the great ability of expanding and that the "economic revolution," which spread throughout Europe starting with 1848, led only toward the end of the 19th century to the development of large-scale industry in France, Germany, Poland and Austria and its beginning in Russia.

Engels further noted that it was precisely at that time that the separation into two great classes—the proletarian and the bourgeoisie—which had existed in 1848 only in England and France, in the latter limited to Paris, became reality.

However, it was precisely at the time when the European proletariat, represented by the parties of the Second International, was developing as a force which could make history that the conditions governing its struggle began to change radically. Engels gives priority above all to militarism, which made chances of an uprising of the type of onslaught of 1848 much less favorable. At the same time, the drastic shrinking of the opportunity to wage an armed proletarian struggle was paralleled by a significant expansion of the opportunity to wage a legal, a parliamentary struggle.

All in all, the introduction of forms of bourgeois parliamentarianism in Europe was a rather slow and twisting process, which was not completed by any means; in Germany and Austria it led to the establishment of hybrid forms—constitutional monarchies. In turn, the establishment of parliamentarianism turned out linked to the start of a policy of social reformism by the ruling forces and parties in Europe. It was observed in England in the 1830s and 1840s and by the end of the 19th century it moved to Germany, affecting France to a

lesser extent. However small was the limit within which the ruling classes could march in step, as Engels said, with "historical development," the working class made use of the new situation.

In interpreting the acquired experience, the author of the "Introduction..." supports the essentially new idea of the penetration of the proletariat into the governmental and economic agencies of the bourgeois society by challenging the bourgeoisie for each elective position. Engels draws an even broader conclusion, that of the advantages of legal versus clandestine forms of struggle. Obviously, he anticipated further major shifts in the awareness of the ruling class. Comparing the then practice of the social democrats to the tactics of the party of change, which was known in the Roman Empire as the Christians, he recalled their tremendous successes and the uselessness of the mass persecution of Christians, including those unleashed by Emperor Diocletian (Engels compares his actions to those of Bismarck in 1878-1890). Engels further notes something **much more essential**, which is not simply that the persecution had to come to an end but that "the next autocrat of the entire Roman Empire, Constantine, who has been named by the church as Constantine the Great, proclaimed Christianity a state religion" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 22, p 548. Subsequent references to this publication will cite volume and page only).

Ever since it was published (initially with significant cuts), Engels' "Introduction..." has been and is still used by the leaders of the European social democrats to substantiate their strictly reformist tactics. Unquestionably, Engels' work contains hints of an entirely new proletarian tactic. However, to consider it as simply reformist would be a tremendous mistake.

Engels' formula "we are much more successful with legal rather than clandestine means or with coups d'etat," merely noted the situation which had existed in Germany in the 1890s and nothing more. In general, Engels never formulated any absolute or eternal formulas. He clearly pointed out that the "period of revolutions from below" had ended only "for a while." In that same "Introduction..." he did not delete the slogan of preparations for a "big revolution." "Wherever it is a question of the total restructuring of the social system, the masses themselves must take part in it. They themselves must know the purpose of the struggle, the reason for which they are shedding blood and sacrificing life" (vol 22, pp 344, 346).

Such a double level in the "Introduction..." is understandable. It is precisely in his last works that Engels actually noted the entry of the capitalist world into its monopoly stage of development, which was fraught with frightening upheavals. In one of his remarks on the third volume of "*Das Kapital*," which came out in 1894, Engels emphasized truly prophetically that if "competition on the domestic market yields to the cartels and the trusts," conversely, at the finally developed world

market there begins a "general industrial war," a war for global domination. "Therefore," he concluded, "each of the elements which opposes the repetition of the crises of the old type carries within itself the embryo of a much greater future crisis" (vol 25, part II, p 32).

Alarming thoughts on a possible "world war," the outcome of which "is totally unpredictable" (such thoughts were particularly valued by Lenin), appear not only in the "Introduction..." but also in many other works by Engels. He cautioned that the war could lead the proletariat to victory but could also throw it back, triggering a wild outburst of chauvinism and militarism.

In the 20th century, after two world wars, we can see how far-sighted Engels was. We also know something else, that the events of a "great revolution" may turn out quite different from what he assumed. Socialism was to begin its establishment in Russia, a country of a **medium-poor** development of world capitalism (see "*Leninskiy Sbornik XL*" [Leninist Collection No 40], p 425), and was not to win in the developed capitalist countries, although the 1917-1918 general European crisis offered such an opportunity to some of them.

Lenin: '1794 Versus 1921'

Russia gained its own experience in revolution only at the turn of the 20th century. Naturally, the richest experience was that of October 1917.

The victory of the Proletarian Revolution in Russia was facilitated by the world war and the mortal clash between imperialist countries, which prevented them from creating a unified anti-Soviet front. This victory, won in a relatively backward peasant country, was also facilitated by the existence of the foundations of a large capitalist industry, a proletarian vanguard tempered in class battles, the general dissatisfaction with the war and the growth of the agrarian revolution. Lenin's famous slogans (peace to the peoples, land to the peasants and power to the soviets) drew on the side of the bolsheviks the broadest possible masses. However, although life confirmed the accuracy of the basic view on external and internal conditions for a profound revolution, "it turned out, as it has always turned out in all histories of revolutions, that the movement developed in zig-zags" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 65. Subsequent references to this edition will indicate volume and page only).

The revolutions in the West were "delayed," although the opposition shown by the European proletariat to attempt at intervention helped the Soviet system to endure. Within Russia 3 years of Civil War ended with the dislocation of the national economy, the death of a significant part of the proletariat and also the latter's becoming declassed. It is true that the intervention of the proletarian state in economic relations continued and

even assumed war-communism aspects, partially under the influence of military necessity and partially under the influence of revolutionary enthusiasm.

The system of war-communist concepts along with the taking of practical steps eliminated the unwillingness of the peasant to farm under the conditions of coercive confiscation of their grain and of food surplus requisitioning. Peasant uprisings broke out in this country, which had just come out of a tremendous class battle; the delegates attending the 10th RKP(b) Congress heard and felt the frightening word of caution: Kronshtadt.

It is noteworthy that whereas in the approaches to October 1917 Lenin was interested in the positive and aggressive experience of the Jacobins (revolutionary terrorism, revolutionary control over the rich, speed and depth of change—see vol 34, pp 190, 174-175, 195), during the critical year of 1921 he turned to their negative experience and their inability to prevent Thermidor:

“General political significance of the question: question of the **peasant** (petit bourgeois) **counterrevolution**. Such a counterrevolution is already facing us.”

“2. A theoretical excursion:

(a) A bourgeois or socialist revolution? **The struggle will decide it...**”

He also wrote: “The petit bourgeois element will fall...

“‘The model’ of the French Revolution...” also: “1794 versus 1921.”

Also: “Thermidor? Soberly **perhaps**, yes? Will it? We shall see” (vol 43, pp 371, 386, 387, 403).

It was no accident that it was precisely at that time that Lenin would remind us of the law of the “cyclical nature,” noting, referring with Engels to the experience of the English and French revolutions, that “apparently there is a law which demands of the revolution to advance **farther than it can manage**, in order to consolidate less significant changes....” (vol 53, p 206).

The NEP and the replacement of food confiscation with tax-in-kind was a strategy deliberately carried out by the Bolshevik Party, which made it possible, in Lenin’s assessment, drastically to reduce the realm of application of coercive steps and, above all, to preserve the power of the proletariat under the conditions of a disparity between “our economic and political forces...” (vol 43, p 216). Still in 1921, as confirmed by the French communist J. Sadoul, he was told by Lenin that “the Jacobin workers are more perspicacious and more firm than the bourgeois Jacobins. They had the courage and wisdom to do their own Thermidor” (INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA No 4, 1966, p 236).

In other words, the revolutionary process began to turn from an uncontrollable catastrophic process into a process controlled by the revolutionaries.

Nonetheless, the 1921 “zig-zag” was not the last in the history of the proletarian revolution in Russia....

The Stalinist ‘Revolution from Above’

History is an expert in all kinds of surprises. No more than a couple of years after the introduction of the NEP, Lenin noticed new threats to the development of the proletarian revolution in Russia and, being already gravely ill, tried to warn the party and the people about them.

His final articles and letters described our not quite usual conditions leading to the further growth of civilization: we had begun, ignoring the moaning of the Marxist pedants, “not from the proper end,” with the assumption of political power by the proletariat, and only then, with its help, did we intend to bring up a backward country to the heights of global industry and culture. Lenin also noted a number of radical reforms and steps which would open the real way to reaching these objectives.

The most radical reorganization of the country started at the end of the 1920s under most difficult conditions (breakdowns of the NEP, difficulties in grain procurements, and a difficult international situation). In implementing Lenin’s behest (we need industrialization “this alone is our hope,” vol 45, p 405), the Stalinist leadership nonetheless **struck out** the NEP and the Leninist cooperative plan, thus blocking the path taking the country gradually into socialism under conditions of civil peace.

The task of finding funds for the accelerated development of the heavy and defense industries in a poor petty-farming country, which had been denied the possibility of loans, the releasing for this purpose of millions of workers, obtaining great amounts of commodity grain to meet the needs of export and the rapidly growing cities, was solved by the leadership by restoring many of the features of “war communism.” However, this also marked the restoration of some major features of the bourgeois revolutions, which may have seemed to have vanished by then, clearly demonstrating the accuracy of Lenin’s statement to the effect that “there is no fixed boundary dividing a bourgeois from a proletarian revolution...” (vol 44, p 463).

Above all, industrialization itself completed for the sake of Russian capitalism that which it had been unable to achieve until 1917. During the crucial period of the 1920s and 1930s, the processes of initial accumulations which, as it were, backward tsarist Russia could not complete, were completed. The peasantry, hastily and coercively rallied within kolkhozes and sovkhozes, lost

the feature of the "free individuality of the worker himself" (Marx). The very foundation for efficient farming was lost for many years.

The cultural revolution as well had to be developed under very difficult circumstances. "...At the start," Lenin said, "we should be satisfied with true bourgeois culture and, to start with, we could do without any particularly extreme types of culture of the prebourgeois order...." (vol 45, p 389).

It was in the USSR that the process of consolidation and centralization of the gigantic governmental machinery was actually started, first under the system of absolute rule but then strengthened by the bourgeois revolutions. Naturally, the strengthening of the governmental principle and the conversion to administrative-command methods in economic management and in controlling the entire life in the country had an objective foundation at a certain stage. However, features which Marx had noted at the stage of bourgeois revolutions, such as the independence of the authority and its "supernatural domination of the actual society" (vol 17, p 544) or, in a word, the appearance at this point no longer of a bourgeois but of a socialist "all-absorbing leviathan," were not accepted by the then party leadership as a forced and temporary anomaly in the development of the country. Conversely, essentially the "leviathan" was proclaimed to be the socialist standard.

Furthermore, at the very start of 1933, Stalin proclaimed three concepts: "the vestiges of the dying classes" are scattering, concealed and doing harm, throughout the country; we must "intensify" the class struggle; it is the state power that will undertake this struggle; as to its withering away, it will take place through its "maximal strengthening" (see J.V. Stalin, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 13, pp 207-211).

A couple of years later, having assumed control of the inflated administrative apparatus and, above all, through violence, he hurled his repressions against the vanguard of the people.

Naturally, in analyzing Stalin's "revolution from above," we must consider the process in its entirety and not merely its back-pedaling, zig-zags, deformations and costs. As a whole, it would be erroneous to deny the socialist trend of the changes which had taken place in the country in the 1930s or to belittle the historical accomplishments of the party and the people. The country's industrial potential rose by a factor of 3.5-4; the technical base of agricultural production was updated. The private sector was abolished in the economy. The national republics were economically drawn upward toward the center. A new socialist culture took shape and the aspect of the individual changed.

However, what was actually created in the USSR and acquired sufficiently stable forms was a specific type of social formation without analogue in history, to which

not only socialist trends were inherent. Also inherent to it was a partially objectively determined and partially arbitrarily created huge inflated state principle in the life of the country, the statification of the basic means of production and dictatorial-terrorist forms of personal power, the appearance of a privileged bureaucracy, not controlled by the people, forms of socialist "alienation" of the working people not only from the authorities but also from orders, ownership, the domination of the residual approach to problems of material and social insurance of the people and a kind of Arakcheyevist regime in ideology, science and art.

Many Trotskyite and bourgeois works ask (and answer the question in positive terms) whether a "Thermidor" took place in the USSR in the 1920s-1930s. However, their authors do not notice (or are unwilling to do so) that the processes which took place in France at the end of the 18th century and in the USSR in the 1920s-1930s were by no means of the same type.

In France Thermidor meant turning a society which had rushed ahead in its revolutionary development back to its "normal" bourgeois framework and the destruction of the Jacobin vanguard which was blocking bourgeois encroachments.

In Russia, a country which was relatively backward and had not entirely solved the problem of bourgeois development, a proletarian revolution had taken place in 1917. It too rushed "ahead" in 1918-1920—toward "war communism." However, Lenin and the party themselves turned the country back to the framework of the NEP. While doing this, they preserved the main gain of the revolution—proletarian power—and sharply limited the freedom of allowed bourgeois relations. Subsequently, the NEP opened to the Soviet system an entirely new historical alternative, that of the gradual conversion of the petit bourgeois peasant masses, which accounted for 80 percent of the country's population, to the path of socialism through the cooperatives. It was this alternative that Lenin substantiated in his "Political Testament." However, in the USSR this alternative was blocked (in this case a great role was played by the fierce struggle within the party's leadership, the winner of which Stalin emerged in 1929). In the 1930s a high percentage of the revolutionary vanguard had already been destroyed as a result of Stalin's repressions. However, this did not occur in the least against the background of the strengthening of bourgeois relations. Conversely, Stalin's "revolution from above" hastily eliminated them totally. To use Marx's terminology, what came out was something like "rough communism."

Stalin's "revolution from above" was an exceptionally complex process which is as yet by no means adequately familiar or totally eliminated by us. It took the country out of its backwardness but also in a number of respects, it set it back. It made most radical changes in society within which, however, progressive, life-bringing and reactionary and bloody features became intertwined.

This "revolution" triggered the enthusiasm of the masses and the system of "emergency measures." It encompassed exploits by the people and the monstrous crimes by the authorities.

We are now reaching a conclusion which takes us to our present. Having solved at a huge cost certain historical problems but failing promptly to eliminate the Stalinist administrative-command system, the system of stagnation which followed it broke down totally and proved to be totally incapable of solving the vital problems of the people at a much sharper historical turn.

'More Socialism!'

The essence of the present situation can be expressed as follows: a tremendous growth of the forces of progress and incredible worsening of the conditions of their struggle.

The profound revolution which took place in Russia during World War I, the victory of the USSR over Hitlerite Germany in the Great Patriotic War and the people's democratic revolutions in a number of countries drastically narrowed the geographic framework of world capitalism. The appearance of a socialist alternative to the development of capitalism and the establishment of the world socialist system are the most important results of the development of events in the 20th century.

In turn, all of these revolutionary changes proved to be the fuses for just as profound anti-imperialist changes in the colonial outlying areas of the capitalist system. As a whole, here one could notice a huge variety of forms of struggle, already predicted by Lenin (see vol 45, p 381). Also exceptionally varied proved to be the ways of postrevolutionary development of the third world countries. By no means are all liberated countries following the capitalist way able to repeat it under contemporary conditions in its classical variant. On the other hand, the countries with a socialist orientation are experiencing a tremendous difficulty as they seek a way of development.

Having put an end to its internecine wars, the capitalist world entered, particularly after World War II, the path of radical internal transformation and compensation of the losses suffered. It was able to bring into action major reserves and to apply its tremendous practical experience, interpreted through a variety of debates and ideas and theories.

The elimination of a number of negative phenomena inherent in the imperialist stage of capitalism was helped by the struggle of forces which opposed the processes of production monopolization and antidemocratic methods of social management (all of these processes and methods were, according to Lenin, hindrances obstructing the development of its production forces). In this

case the antimonopoly forces greatly helped to intensify the influence of economic development factors: increased production diversification, etc.

In recent decades capitalism made a technological leap forward, from its industrial to its postindustrial phase. The integration trends in the development of capitalism and the processes of production socialization intensified sharply. All of these changes largely affected the essential relations within capitalism which was forced to compete with socialism and which tried to "beat" it. Contemporary capitalist production cannot do without governmental and, now, also supragovernmental regulation. Its regulatory functions (on the macro- and microlevels) are also performed by the big corporations which developed on the basis of the shareholding ownership but, above all, of the market. Small- and medium-scale production displayed amazing viability. Multinational corporations also appeared, whose realm of influence spread on entire parts of the globe. The liberation of the colonies became for capitalism a source of new economic relations and highly profitable operations.

Another one was a very substantial per capita increase in the GNP. As was the case during Engels' time, a characteristic law operated in bourgeois parliamentary society: the parties which assumed power were forced to take increasingly into consideration the interests of the broadest possible population strata and to codify them in legislative acts and in various social institutes and programs. None of this eliminated contradictions within capitalism, such as periodical crises in its economy and finances, a relatively low living standard of some strata related to certain traditional production sectors (coal mining, metallurgy, and so on), the impoverishment in a number of countries of marginal strata, the domination of bureaucratic structures in politics, the manipulation of public awareness, etc. Unquestionably, however, such contradictions had become milder. The social democrats, the liberal bourgeois democracy and even the neoconservatives contributed to perfecting the mechanism itself of the evolution of bourgeois society. As a whole, the ability of the ruling classes to be in step with "historical development" turned out to be much greater than it seemed to Engels in his time.

On the other hand, the position of the working class as well changed sharply. As early as the mid-1960s, Soviet scientists (A.A. Galkin) had noted that "the contemporary working class in the industrially developed countries opposes society not as an alien substance but rather as its component. In a rather significant share of the working class there is a certain interest in improving said society.... It favors the radical improvement of the social system but not at the expense of the destruction, albeit temporary and partial, of production forces" (see *"Istoricheskaya Nauka i Nekotoryye Problemy Sovremennosti"* [Science of History and Some Problems of Our Time]. Moscow, 1966, p 244). The evolution of previously hostile class forces from an uncompromising

attitude toward social compromise and from total confrontation to partial consensus was noted also by authors of latest works (see, for example, Yu. Borko, "On the Mechanisms for Self-Development of Contemporary Capitalism" KOMMUNIST No 15, 1988).

Forces which were confrontational in the world arena and global processes which were revealed began to encourage constructive cooperation instead of confrontation. The development of militarism, which Engels noted, assumed huge dimensions toward the end of the 20th century, making a military solution to world disputes senseless, for such a solution would mark not only the suicide of the warring sides but also the death of the human species as well. The threat of its doom came from yet another side. The ecological situation in the world is worsening and the uncontrolled tempestuous growth of social production forces in the immediate future could irreparably disrupt the very balance between man and nature. Unequal economic relations between developed capitalist and developing countries threaten to shake up the entire world order; the process of the progressive lagging of the latter and the accumulation within them of all kinds of "flammable material" is continuing.

The crisis in contemporary civilization, which broke out and is worsening, imperatively demanded the joint activities of all countries and social forces throughout the world. Marx conceived of a united mankind as being created on a communist basis. The appearance of global problems raises an even more difficult and grandiose task, that of creating a mankind united in its efforts under the conditions of a socially heterogeneous world. This task now concretizes the new political thinking. Largely thanks to the initiatives of the USSR, it is increasingly becoming the practice in global relations. However, neither the USSR nor the socialist system as a whole have been able so far to highlight with the same type of persuasive power the attractiveness of the socialist ideal and the creative potential of the socialist alternative.

This is not a subject for pessimism: socialism is younger than capitalism by several centuries and, essentially, the peaceful competition between them is only beginning. However, the optimistic vision of the prospects of socialism should not consist of thoughtless or distorted facts. It presumes a clear determination of the reasons which prevented us from reaching the same level as that of capitalism, in a number of essential parameters, and presumes a precise indication of the ways and means for the elimination of such a situation.

The paradox of the final decades in world history is that the mechanism for the self-dynamics of the capitalist system, subordinated, we believe, to the rule of spontaneous economic laws and fraught with insoluble contradictions, turned out, at a given point in history, more efficient and constructive than the self-motivating mechanisms of the socialist system which, one may have thought, was built on the basis of the conscious scientific

management of constructive social processes. We did not fully take into consideration that such a management requires the replacement of the bureaucratic command-administrative system with an essentially new self-management mechanism; all too long we ignored the Leninist stipulation that "a victorious socialism which does not provide for full democracy is impossible" (vol 27, p 253).

It was precisely thanks to the use of the potential of bourgeois democracy that capitalist society was able to undertake to "know itself" at the proper time and to make respective corrections in the capitalist system. It was precisely because of the failure of Soviet democracy (not the declarative but the real one) that the respective "self-tuning" was poorly implemented in the 1950s and 1960s and actually stopped during the period of stagnation which, actually, was the price paid for the lack of democracy in our society and the lack in it of glasnost, and scientific freedom, and payment for the uncontrollable nature of the apparat power structures.

Our lag was openly, courageously and calmly stated at party fora, starting with the April Plenum. The course formulated by the party and adopted by the people toward perestroika with its main slogan of "more socialism!" means, actually, the following: we must not only eliminate (which was largely accomplished by the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses) the most hateful manifestations of the cult awareness. The task now is to ascribe to all essential relations within socialism a qualitatively new nature and humanistic, human traits to the entire Soviet society. It is then and only then that we could say that we have implemented Lenin's behest: we have created a republic "truly worthy of the name Soviet, socialist, and so on, and so forth," capable, at a tremendous speed, to develop production forces and "to prove to one and all clearly that socialism has within itself gigantic forces and that now mankind has come to a new development stage which offers inordinately brilliant opportunities" (vol 45, p 392, 402).

'Such is the Merciless Formulation of the Problem'

"It is only in a situation when there will no longer be any classes or class antagonism," wrote Marx at the dawn of the communist movement, that "social evolutions will no longer be political revolutions. Until then, on the eve of each general restructuring of society, the final word of the social sciences will always be the following:

"'Battle or death; bloody battle or nonexistence. Such is the merciless formulation of the question' (Georges Sand)" (vol 4, p 185).

Today the world is on the eve of an unparalleled universal restructuring. Although classes and the class struggle by no means disappear in the course of this, class antagonism becomes modified. Now revolutionary parties and movements set themselves the conscious objective of leading society to the level of contradictions which can be solved through civilized means of struggle.

But those same social revolutions, although classes and the class struggle remain, no longer are political revolutions, and turn into evolutionary movements. This process also takes place within the socialist and capitalist systems and in relations between them. It is true that this process has by no means fully encompassed the third world; the retention in a number of cases of dictatorial regimes, the continuing export of counterrevolution and the constant threat of antidemocratic coups d'etat do not allow the forces of progress to this day to drop the armed forms of struggle from the agenda. Nonetheless, we must realize that today a certain "exclusion" of an entire array of countries from the overall conditions of the nuclear age, as well as the possibility of repeating the models of the prenuclear age, are relative. Furthermore, local conflicts have a tendency to develop into regional and even global conflicts. Correspondingly, the forces of progress in the hotbeds of tension today have begun to seek compromise solutions to disputes and to aspire to restrain political extremism which is still making itself known. Correspondingly, the final word of social science is beginning to be heard throughout the world not at all as formulated by Georges Sand. Today it is a question of a struggle for life. A bloody battle today means nonexistence. One can say that "such is now the merciless formulation of the question."

Let us sum up all of this. We did not in the least claim to provide an analysis of all types and varieties of political revolutions, but of the two greatest of them. The 1789 and 1917 "models" were the most complex and the bloodiest forms of human creativity. They demanded of the people tremendous sacrifices, creating authoritarian-despotic regimes, such as Bonapartism and Stalinism, with a virtually steely ruthlessness.

Sooner or later, however, through the complex historical twists and turns, time revealed the tremendous positive content of these revolutions, which restored, like a phoenix from the ashes, and after temporary losses, a content which became the common gain of civilization. It turned out that mankind had not wasted its time by attending this harsh school of revolution, although in the different classes of this school and at its different levels different lessons were taught: political freedom, defense of the working man and protection of the flower of the nations. These lessons must not be forgotten as we build a new, a global civilization.

On this level we found as exceptionally fruitful one common thought expressed at the Moscow meeting of representatives of parties and movements (November 1987) by the Greek socialist G. Papandreou, on the need to "synthesize" the ideals and slogans of the French and the October revolutions and to "synthesize" the values which were proclaimed by the ages of the Renaissance and socialism, and to enrich them with new ideas promoted by ecological, antiwar and national movements. "The way to such a synthesis," he noted, runs only

through a profound revolution in the field of democracy, a revolution in the center of which will be man and whose motive force will be the active participation of all citizens the world over."

Such a synthesis does not demand in the least of us the crossing of some kind of "ideological Rubicon," which symbolically separates February from October and October from the French Revolution, which is something some bourgeois ideologues are trying to promote. However, this synthesis would be extremely suitable to a heterogeneous yet united mankind which will help to solve the problem of its survival at the turn of the millennium. It would be suitable providing that the forces which are making a new profound revolution will apply civilized means of struggle, which would also ensure not only the unity but also the variety of the forms of progress and the competition, comparison and reciprocal enrichment between them. The variety of forms of human progress, as is today becoming clear, are also the greatest gain of mankind and should not be eliminated.

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A New Stage in Poland's Life

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[Review by N. Bukharin, candidate of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, of the book "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya. Fevral 1981-Iyul 1988 Goda" [Selected Works. February 1981-July 1988] by Wojciech Jaruzelski. Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, Moscow, 1988, 527 pp]

[Text] The publication in the USSR of the selected works of W. Jaruzelski, PZPR first secretary, makes it possible for the Soviet reader to become thoroughly familiar with the crucial problems of development of people's Poland and the PZPR course toward socialist renovation and political and economic reforms.

The exceptionally complex and contradictory situation governing the social crisis demanded of the party the search for new and more efficient and frequently non-traditional ways of solving it and creative ideas and ways and means of solving sociopolitical and economic problems. As Jaruzelski notes, the socialist renovation in Poland "is not the younger sister of Soviet perestroika or a protective maneuver in the face of the social tension of the 1980s. Nor is it the consequence of pressure on the part of the West. It is a truly Polish concept of general restructuring of all aspects of life." Nonetheless, a great deal of the experience gained by the PZPR is of importance not only to Poland but also to other countries which have taken the path of socialist renovation and to world socialism as a whole.

W. Jaruzelski's "*Selected Works*," include his speeches, addresses and articles from 1981 to 1988. The book opens with the programmatic speech delivered on 12 February 1981 at the meeting of the Polish Sejm and ends with the speech delivered on 13 July 1988 at the Polish-Soviet Friendship Meeting at the A. Warski Shipyards, during the visit paid to Poland by M.S. Gorbachev. The book includes key addresses and speeches: at the 9th (1981) and 10th (1986) PZPR congresses, at most important Central Committee plenums and meetings of the Sejm, at different meetings, and so on. The collection reflects all basic stages in the development of the party and the country in the 1980s, such as the events of 1980-1981, the period of martial law and after it was lifted, and the particularly significant period after the 10th PZPR Congress, when the party undertook to seek solutions aimed at the acceleration of economic and political reforms in the country.

The selected speeches make it possible to obtain a detailed idea of the way the line followed by the PZPR toward socialist renovation was shaped and refined. From the very first it was aimed at strengthening the basic values of socialism. The process of renovation was linked to Poland's emergence from of the state of crisis. The most important structural component of the PZPR long-term political line was the restoration of the Leninist principles and standards of internal party life, the restoration of the leading role of the party in society and the strengthening of its leading role in the state. The renovation requires fundamental democratization of the political system, establishing a national consensus among the Poles and their unification, rallied around the lofty patriotic objectives of Polish society. The economic reform presumes the creation of a new economic mechanism involving economic management methods, which would ensure the efficient activities of economic units on all levels. "The laws of the current stage in the development of our socioeconomic system are manifested in the socialist renovation," Jaruzelski emphasizes. "Consequently, the profound reforms implemented on the initiative of the party are an objective necessity" (p 441).

This publication convincingly shows the extensive profound work done by the Polish communists for their implementation and realization, and the enrichment of the forms and methods of party political activities. It is a serious and frank discussion by the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee on the ways for the implementation of revolutionary changes in Poland and on the achievements and difficulties encountered in the process of change.

The implementation of the formulated line began under the difficult conditions of an economic crisis, a weakened confidence of society in the authorities, a sharp political struggle, the imposition of martial law and Western economic penalties. It was necessary to surmount both social instability as well as the conservative and opportunistic trends within the party and society.

Economic reforms began as of 1 January 1982. Gradually, a process of democratization of sociopolitical life developed. The aspect of the country began to change thanks to the radical measures which were taken.

The implementation of the economic reform soon proved that this was a very lengthy and conflicting process which encountered a variety of obstacles and barriers. It became clear that the direct introduction of all the components of the new system under the circumstances of a profound economic imbalance was impossible. The economic reform brought up in the society a variety of frequently clashing interests. As a result, by the end of 1985 the implementation of the reform became obstructed. By that time a certain stabilization had taken place in the transitional "hybrid" economic mechanism within which elements of the old and the new system coexisted, which greatly hindered its functioning and lowered its efficiency. Progress became obstructed. The 10th PZPR Congress was faced with the need to define the task of the second stage in the economic reform.

Essentially, it was the reform of the political system that accounted for the initial phase. Changes here were manifested also in the enhancement of the activities of some old political institutions (this was particularly visible in the Sejm and in the allied parties), and the replacement of a number of inefficient institutions with more flexible ones (the People's Unity Front with the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, the old trade unions with the new ones, etc.). This was manifested also in the creation of entirely new political institutions and mechanisms (a state and constitutional courts, a public defender of human rights, a referendum and other). The appearance of a political system which combined the elements of the old and the new was the result of such changes. The preservation of the changed centralist-bureaucratic economic management system while the economic reform was "running idle" became a real obstacle to the further advancement of the political system. It became clear by 1986 that the political impetus which was gained by renovation during the period of martial law had exhausted its possibilities. The study of the distance which was covered and the experience of the USSR made it possible for the Polish party leadership to draw the essential conclusion that "renovation and perestroika are not a one-time action but a dialectical and, therefore, a continuing process. Both our parties are well aware of the fact that it does not develop easily.

"The Polish experience proves that during the first phase we must, above all, overcome doctrinaire obstacles and worn-out ideological phraseology and, frequently, an understandable concern triggered by changes in the rules and guidelines. This is followed by mental sluggishness, passive opposition, and fear of violating individual and group, departmental and regional interests, frequently concealed behind pseudoreformist blabbering. This is simply a difficult and, occasionally sharp struggle between the new and the old and the national and the private" (p 502).

Today the PZPR actively works within the broad channel of perestroika implemented in the USSR and a number of other socialist countries. The collection of Jaruzelski's works describes in detail the way the activities of the PZPR created conditions for accelerating the process of change and the way the party matured and thus became able to take new revolutionary steps on the path of reform.

At the 10th Central Committee Plenum (December 1988-January 1989), the PZPR self-critically admitted that although under the state of emergency a great deal had been accomplished, as in the past this had been insufficient compared to the expectations of the public and its true needs. The time had come for more comprehensive and basic changes. "Poland is currently experiencing an exceptionally difficult period," Jaruzelski said at the accountability party conference of the Pomorskie Military District (February, this year). "It is a question of whether we shall be able to cross this difficult threshold and implement the radical course of the reform. This is its socioeconomic "to be or not to be."

The 10th Plenum became an important landmark and a major line in the development of PZPR policy, leading to socialist renovation. The implementation of its resolutions will make it possible to achieve a major turn in the life of the country and the party. It is obvious, nonetheless, that this process will trigger a number of new problems.

The PZPR has taken a big step in the further development of the ideology and theory of socialist renovation. By participating in recent years in the joint theoretical and political searching by communist and worker parties in the socialist countries and taking its own traditions, needs and conditions into consideration, the PZPR has made substantial progress in interpreting the new model of socialism. It decisively rejects the Stalinist model. As W. Jaruzelski figuratively said, "we have deleted once and for all the Polish version of Stalin's *Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)*." Based on the common principles and laws governing the building of socialism, the PZPR is developing its own Polish model of social, economic and political life. The party emphasizes that it will uniformly and systematically uproot all the vestiges of Stalinism, and promote the rebirth of the democratic and humanistic nature of socialism.

The Central Committee Politburo theses for the 10th Plenum stipulate the following: The party sets itself the task of building a "modern, democratic and pluralistic socialism, a socialism which will be rational from the social viewpoint, combining high level productivity and economic efficiency with humanistic values." Its main objectives and values are the following: humanism, the good of man and his needs and expectations; labor: productive, well-organized, constituting the main source of existence and self-expression of man; social justice as the equality of vital opportunities and measures, the most important of which are work efficiency and quality;

democracy, manifested in the participation of the citizens in the exercise of governmental power and glasnost in social life; the rights of man and the citizen in their socioeconomic, political and spiritual aspects; freedom, understood as an awareness of the scope of initiative and variety of human aspirations and actions in economics, politics, science and culture; patriotism, embodied in labor and a feeling of responsibility for the homeland, the people and their state; internationalism, expressed in the cohesive interconnection with the forces of progress, democracy and socialism and respect for the rights and original characteristics of other states and nations.

At the same time, the PZPR emphasizes that these values must be asserted through the growing efficiency of the dominant role of the public ownership of the means of production in the national economy, supported by socioeconomic and political guarantees; through the leading role of the working class, allied with the peasantry and the intelligentsia; through the role of the party, consistent with the socialist system, constantly and actively implemented with the help of democratic mechanisms, interacting with the entire left wing of the Polish public, thus asserting its mandate of leadership of society; through Poland's firm position, allied with the USSR and within the community of socialist states. The approach to the shaping of a number of such objectives and values and their identification are, unquestionably, of creative and innovative nature, based on the traditions of the Polish people and their experience in the development of socialism.

The PZPR concepts are aimed at the further intensification of the political reform in Poland and the establishment of a sociopolitical system based on a state of socialist parliamentary democracy and a civilian society. The concept of socialist parliamentary democracy stipulates that the Sejm and the people's councils, the rights of which are based on democratic elections, perform the role of a real center of governmental power. The tripartite coalition of the PZPR, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party should become a strong center rallying a broad front of left-wing social forces. It must be based on alliance and partnership interaction, respect for the ideological and political subjectiveness of the partners and the coordination and joint implementation of plans for the country's socioeconomic and cultural development.

Political and trade union pluralism and the acknowledgment of its existing differences, and pluralism within Polish society, as well as real contradictions as a source of its development, are a structural component of the PZPR concepts concerning the governmental system.

The PZPR favors taking into consideration the variety of interests and aspirations of social forces, the expansion of the coalition in the exercise of power in which a position is ensured in the political arena to a constructive opposition which accepts the constitutional order and acts within its framework. This can and must

contribute to the better solution of existing contradictions within the framework stipulated by the law and within the governmental structures.

The PZPR line stipulates that the reconstruction of the civilian society should eliminate excessive centralization of social life. It should strengthen the activeness of every citizen and of individual groups. It should lead to a rejection of the practice of excessive regulation of social life. The various organizations which meet the variety of social needs are increasingly becoming forms of manifestation of social activeness. The intensification of the process of creation of such associations and the formulation of the legal conditions for their functioning are assisted by the new Law on Societies.

The PZPR proceeds from the direct interconnection between the creation of a new formula of political pluralism and a new model of trade union pluralism, on the one hand, and the creation of a strong and broad national consensus, on the other. Pluralism is considered as a means and a way to achieving the objective, which is national consensus. In this connection, W. Jaruzelski has stated that "our invariable objective remains the radical and definitive restructuring of social life through the creation of the type of model of socialism within which, both today and tomorrow, all citizens who acknowledge the priority of the interests of our common state and the inviolability of its foundations—the socialist system—could find a place. It is within such a context that we should consider the national consensus as well, as a firm and necessary foundation for a broadly conceived pluralism."

The purpose of the guarantees for a consensus on the basic and fundamental problems, including those which affect the rules of behavior of the individual partners, is to set the necessary conditions for pluralism to be not confrontational and anarchic but instead serve the unification of the Polish people rallied around a constructive national program. The PZPR is aspiring toward a type of compromise and consensus on basic problems which would make it possible to reconcile that which is truly necessary with that which is proclaimed and included in the requirements. It conceives of the consensus not as something ossified, based on the principle of "winners and losers," but as the only sensible way to act by all forces within Polish society and, above all, for offering a greater opportunity for solving the basic problems of Poland. This possibility must be jointly protected by all sociopolitical forces in the country. The PZPR tries to prevent the division of the working class, the disturbance of public order, the destabilization of the socialist state and the paralysis of the economic reform. "Efforts at promoting an antagonistic division between rulers and ruled, an atmosphere of aggressive disputes and unrestrained settling of accounts must yield to the principles of joint administration, joint economic management and joint responsibility for the future and

prospects of the development of Poland," Jaruzelski emphasizes. As he said at the press conference after the 10th Central Committee Plenum, "One cannot go forward by looking back."

The process of achieving national consensus, linked to the expansion of pluralism, will not be easy or free from struggle. However, the PZPR wishes it to be consistent with the principles of political standards and mutual respect, which helps to surmount confrontational stereotypes, abuse and hostility. It was precisely this that was proved by the roundtable held by the government coalition, the trade unions and the constructive opposition.

As to the functioning of the PZPR itself it has unquestionably taken major steps toward modifying its role in sociopolitical and spiritual life since the start of the 1980s; it has made substantial progress in the democratization of internal party relations, making the style, forms and methods of work consistent with the new social conditions. However, as was noted at the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum, this is as yet insufficient, for "the present model of the party is experiencing an obvious crisis. It does not guarantee adequately efficient activities under the new conditions and does not lead to such activities." The historical significance of the plenum is found, above all, in the fact that it made an attempt to define the contemporary model of the Marxist-Leninist Party.

The PZPR has charted a course toward substantial changes in the structure and work methods of the party, consistent with the objectives of the efficient implementation of its role in a pluralistic society, under the conditions of a socialist market economy. Under the new situation, it is becoming the guarantor of the social system and the safe existence of the people. Such tasks can be solved only by a party with a clearly manifested ideological aspect and political orientation, and a socially approved program for the country's socialist development. The Central Committee Plenum expressed itself in favor of a party which has adopted the best traditions of the Polish people and which represents the interests of all working people, the working class above all. The PZPR tries to become a party which is united in matters of principle and a mass party, internally democratic and efficient in its activities.

W. Jaruzelski has described these changes in the party model as a "turn." He said: "Do we intend to create a new PZPR? Yes, if it is a question of changes in the organization and methods of activities. No, if it is a question of its socialist objectives and ideological aspects." The PZPR changes not its ideals but only its work practices. From a party which "deals with everything" it must convert into a party which, on the one hand, is a creator and an inspirer and, on the other, a spokesman for public control and for assessing the complex and varied processes of socialist renovation which are taking place.

While remaining a key political force of socialist Poland, the PZPR must act through political methods. It must come closer to the people. It must observe the pluralistic rules of the game. "The times are past when it was simply possible to proclaim, decree or predetermine," noted the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee at the meeting between the Warsaw PZPR Committee and the first secretaries of the primary party organizations (last March). "Now practical proof is required to the effect that the party is needed by the enterprises and that the working people take it into consideration. Our time demands to be closer to the people and to struggle against manifestations of callousness and bureaucracy."

In defining its principles and forms of political leadership in the socialist state, the party particularly emphasizes the fact that it is an ideological and political force and not a managing or administrative one. It sets the priority trends in the development of the country and contributes their implementation. Correspondingly, it promotes the total rejection of the substitution or duplication of the state power authorities and, of late, it has been restructuring its internal organization on the basis of the functional principle. Guided by its program, the party's members are developing within the representative authorities, together with their allies, trends and a program for governmental activities. Shaped as resolutions promulgated by the legislative authorities, they will be mandatory to the executive authorities. They will be answerable for the implementation of the resolutions to the Sejm and the people's councils and, within the framework of these institutions, to the party as well. This will call for upgrading the level of the club of PZPR deputies in the Sejm and in the deputy party groups in the people's councils, self-management authorities and public organizations. It is thus that the PZPR tries to achieve the clear and efficient division between political and executive authorities and between the functions of the party and the state authorities.

The PZPR is substantially modifying the implementation of its role in society. In answering the question of whether political pluralism would weaken the party's positions, Jaruzelski noted that "our role in society and the state depends, above all, on ourselves. It depends on our will to strengthen the existing coalition, on the search for constructive partners, on our ability to argue and convince and, above all, on the daring of initiatives and efficiency of actions."

On this basis, the PZPR has adopted a new approach to its role in the social organizations. The party members must earn their position in these organizations through their personal authority. They must win democratic elections thanks to their activeness and not because they have been nominated by superiors. This is an area in which the party does not promote cadres and where the party cadres prove their possibilities in the course of open rivaling programs, concepts and personalities.

The PZPR wants neither the party nor its authority to be identified in the awareness of the public with bureaucratic institutions and the administrative apparatus. The 10th Central Committee Plenum stipulated that the premises of party authorities, including the Central Committee, must remain open to all and be decisively different from ordinary offices. One must feel in them the pulse of life. They must be accessible also during nonworking hours for purposes of various meetings, debates and interesting projects.

The PZPR is redefining its role in the economy as well. Under the present circumstances the party is in favor of not having any institution or establishment which would formulate and determine the type of economic mechanisms and special measures which are necessary for the implementation of one national economic decision or another. It tries to become a power concerned with the strategic trend in the development of the national economy to be consistent with the vitally important objectives of socialism and the principle of social justice, closely related to efficiency. The party members are called upon to implement their obligations properly whatever their position, and thus to create the necessary moral and political structure for the implementation of socioeconomic assignments.

For the past few months, the PZPR Central Committee Politburo has no longer dealt with current economic problems. The party's efforts and those of its agencies are aimed at solving problems of socioeconomic strategies. An example of this is the formulation in the autumn of 1988 within the PZPR Central Committee of the "Basic Stipulations of the Plan for the Consolidation of the National Economy," which are mandatory for the party members participating in the activities of governmental agencies. This document, which sets the position of the party in the field of the economy, is mandatory for the party committees and all PZPR members, who must comprehensively support the implementation of the party's policy.

The changes which are currently being made in the style and methods of PZPR internal party work and in its structure contribute to the more systematic orientation of the party toward activities within the democratic institutions, i.e., the Sejm, the people's councils and the various forms of self-management agencies, societies and public organizations.

Another purpose of the changes in the mechanism and work style of the PZPR is to make a more radical turn toward internal party democracy and debates which would ensure the manifestation of different platforms and ideas before the making of final decisions. The party considers differences in the views and opinions a normal and even quite valuable phenomenon. This was demonstrated both by the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum and the latest accountability campaign.

The plenum made it incumbent upon all party authorities to observe the principle of extensive internal party discussion and consultation with the nonparty members of draft resolutions, particularly those pertaining to the most important problems. It called for a consideration of the expediency of introducing in internal party practice the institution of referenda. Its resolutions call for strengthening the democratic nature of elections in the PZPR and for instilling in them of a competitiveness of styles and methods of work and the concept of the implementation of party programs and policies. The purpose of this is for the structure and style of activities of the party optimally to contribute to the identification of strong, initiative-minded and creative individualities.

The political clubs, centers for sociopolitical thinking and leftist orientation societies and press rostrums are called upon to help revive ideological life in the PZPR. "As a whole, however, the party cannot turn into a debate club," Jaruzelski noted at the PZPR provincial conference in Katowice (last March). The PZPR's slogan is "as much democracy as possible in the process of programmatic searches and discussions, and as much discipline and responsibility as possible in the implementation of resolutions." This should ensure the more efficient implementation of the principles of democratic centralism. Unity in party activities requires nationwide political campaigns and, above all, elections to parliament and to people's councils. In addressing himself to the party members, the PZPR Central Committee first secretary said: "We must be strong through our unity and cohesion, democracy and discipline, daring in theoretical thinking and efficiency in practical actions."

Under the new political and economic conditions, the PZPR pays particular attention to strengthening the role and significance of the primary party organizations which W. Jaruzelski has metaphorically described as the "party infantry." The party tries to make these basic units profoundly aware of their significance, to feel their independence and to have the opportunity to display the broadest possible initiative in achieving the jointly earmarked programmatic objective. The Central Committee has made it incumbent upon the party committees and agencies to provide comprehensive aid to the primary organizations in this area.

The aspiration systematically to promote debureaucratization of the party management system, to strengthen the role and autonomy of primary level committees, drastically to restrict instructions "issued downwards," and to make more extensive use of reports and views going "upwards" has strengthened within the PZPR. The party committees have been asked to make fuller use of their statutory possibilities in establishing horizontal relations, interaction and exchange of experience among party organizations and party members. This organically proceeds from the enhanced significance of cooperative production relations in economics and social life.

The struggle for the electorate and the increased significance of the territorial levels in connection with the decentralization of state management and the economy determine the need to enhance the activeness of the party at the places of residence of its members and the creation of primary party organizations based on the territorial principle. Of late territorial PZPR committees have already been established in the most densely populated microrayons of a number of large cities. Some of the party members who live in such microrayons but work in enterprises or establishments, operate under their aegis.

The PZPR is oriented toward the further strengthening of the supremacy of party committees over the executive authorities and the party apparat. It calls for increasing the participation of Central Committee members in the decision-making process and for organizing, between plenary sessions, periodical meetings of small groups of Central Committee members to discuss one problem or another, to make more efficient most Central Committee plenums, to ensure the increased efficiency of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat, and to reduce to a minimum the participation of managers in state administrative units in the executive authorities of party committees, etc.

In accordance with the resolutions of the 10th Plenum and based on the experience of a number of provincial party organizations (above all in Slupsk), the party apparatus was restructured on central and provincial levels. The purpose is to make a decisive turn from sectorial to functional structure and to ensure the closer interconnection between the activities of the full-time apparatus and the party aktiv. On the basis of the resolutions of the 11th Central Committee Plenum (last March) the 12 departments were reorganized into three (office of the Central Committee Secretariat, and departments of internal party economy and cadre policy) and 15 problem commissions for intraparty work, ideology, international affairs, work with the intelligentsia and the young, etc. One half of the members of each commission are members of the Central Committee and the other half are members of the Central Committee apparat and the party aktiv. The commissions are headed by Politburo members and Politburo candidate members and Central Committee secretaries; each one of them has a secretarial department or a secretariat in charge of organizing the work. The commissions define party policy in their respective areas, formulate the concept of party work and implement cadre policy in a specific social area.

In the course of the meeting between the bureau of the Warsaw PZPR Committee and the first secretaries of the primary party organizations, W. Jaruzelski said: "I would have a rather low view of our idea and our accomplishments and programs, and of our political and moral forces had I feared to accept the test of democracy. The party neither wishes to be nor can be an invalid supported with a variety of prostheses. We are powerful

enough to use our own voice and we can act aggressively and efficiently. We are not a losing party but, on the contrary, a party which was able to emerge on a new path and to surmount the burden of the past. This is not a retreat but a regrouping of forces, a breaking of the 'chains.'"

In offering this collection of speeches and addresses to the Soviet readers, W. Jaruzelski wrote that in the 1980s the PZPR has had to solve exceptionally difficult problems. Within that time it has been able, on the one hand, to eliminate the dangers threatening the foundations of socialism in Poland and, on the other, to find, on the way of surmounting the crisis, new and creative solutions. The way the PZPR links in its practical work the values of scientific socialism with the specific situation in the country is confirmed by the ideas and conclusions of the 10th and 11th Central Committee plenums. The achievements in the theoretical thinking and social practices of the party are a guarantee that it is following the true way.

The experience of the PZPR is of major interest, and not only a cognitive one, to the Soviet party members. The PZPR Central Committee first secretary, in indicating that his addresses during the period of the visit of M.S. Gorbachev to Poland mark the end of this work, emphasizes the historical significance of this event in terms of relations between our peoples, parties and states. These relations have entered a new phase. As they become enriched with every passing day, they are developing on the foundations of equal partnership.

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Marxists and Christians; On the Problem of Dialogue

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[Article by Lev Nikolayevich Mitrokhin, doctor of philosophical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy]

[Text] In the 1960s and 1970s, usually what was meant by "dialogue" was meetings between Marxists and Christians to discuss conceptual problems and ways of practical cooperation. After the 27th CPSU Congress, this term gained a broader and more meaningful content. It became the symbol of a new realistic and "civilized" approach to the solution of grave international problems and a form of manifestation of a sober and responsible policy which took into consideration the entire specific nature of the nuclear era. However, this did not push into the background in the least relations between communists and believers.

Now, it appears, everyone agrees: The religious factor is an organic and active component of many such political processes taking place in the world, without the consideration of which their reliable interpretation and forecasting is impossible. This factor, however, does not merely include church organizations, religious parties or preachers but, above all, hundreds of millions of believers who perceive the world around them through the lens of a religious outlook and interpret its "language" motivations and incentives of social activities. Let us emphasize that the overwhelming majority of the population on earth consists of believers, for which reason a political organization which is incapable of organizing a reciprocal understanding with them risks to find itself isolated.

In the past few decades the communist and worker parties have paid increasing attention to such problems. Naturally, in the past as well situations developed in which a dialogue became particularly important to them. Thus, in the 1920s the problem of relations with the "Catholic world" urgently faced the Italian communists; in 1936 Maurice Thorez called upon religious Frenchmen to struggle jointly against the threat of fascism. Now, however, in the age of growing global concerns, cooperation between Marxists and believers (subsequently it will be a question primarily of Christians) has become a profound objective need of the overall socio-historical process. Hence the need to take a new look at the relationship between these two most influential world conceptual systems and to interpret their place in the contemporary spiritual-political situation. In the final account, many concepts about religion, which were considered almost basic, lost their creditability (incompatibility between religion and scientific progress and democratic movements, its "irreversible" crisis in the age of the scientific and technical revolution, etc.). It is time to replace such forced and scattered views with the results of a purposeful study of the place held by the religious problem within the overall strategy of the communists and the role of dialogue in the implementation of said strategy.

In this case the following problem is of key significance: What is the possible positive result of such a dialogue and how to achieve it? Many good wishes and suggestions have been expressed on this account: The demand for sincerity, good will, readiness to reach an understanding, etc. In themselves, however, such appeals are (to use Marx's expression) of a moralizing nature and cannot answer the question. The main thing must be explained: Is the fruitfulness of a dialogue linked to a mandatory compromise on essential conceptual views or else is there any kind of meaningful area of reciprocal rapprochement which would make it possible to reach agreement without encroaching on the basic philosophical concepts of the interlocutors. In other words, do Marxism and Christianity have common, albeit not always realized, and obvious features (ideals, values, principles) which could ensure and stimulate joint social activeness?

The way to solve the problem appears unquestionable: we must make a comparison between Marxism and Christianity. This may seem simple and the sacramental phrase "unlike religion, Marxism teaches us that...." comes to the tip of the tongue. However, the correlation of the already existing conceptual content of Marxism and religion (let us describe it as "horizontal") will be of little help. We must bring to light the "vertical" dimension of this content, i.e., the nature of its dependence on social life and sociopolitical activities. Consequently, we must consider the way Marxism developed in a specific historical circumstance and, step by step, as it establishes its attitude toward religion, the way their points of contact and reciprocal attraction and repulsion became gradually established.

Naturally, we do not have the possibility to describe even briefly the process of the shaping of the Marxist doctrine, striking in terms of its purposefulness and intellectual power. Let us merely note that one of its inseparable components was the development of a scientific understanding of religion, the criticism of which, at that time, was a form of manifestation of radical democratic views. Thus, the Young Hegelians considered religion the main obstacle to a sensible understanding of the social structure. Marx welcomed such views. However, he soon afterwards reached the idea that the key to the democratization of society passed not through the criticism of religion (theology) as such but was to be found in the realm of politics, not in changing awareness per se but in the revolutionary reorganization of the social system.

As early as October 1842, as editor of RHEINISCHE TAGEBLATT, Marx called for the newspaper to become "the organ of a political debate and action," rather than an "organ of theological propaganda, of atheism..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 39, p 391. Subsequent references to this edition will indicate volume and page only). Religion, Marx emphasized, should be criticized "more in connection with the criticism of political orders than political customs related to religion..." (vol 27, p 369), and the task of the "German-French Yearbook" was considered by Marx as "finding the new world through the criticism of the old" (vol 1, p 379).

In the yearbook Marx clearly formulated the thought that religion is derived from social structures. Therefore, the elimination of the "Christian state" does not undermine the positions of religion in the least, for religion even in countries with a republican system "displays viability and strength.... However, since a religious life is a life of imperfection, the source of this imperfection should be sought only in the essence of the state itself" (vol 1, pp 387-388). It is precisely the stipulation that religion "is not the reason of laic limitations but only its manifestation" (ibid.) that forms the initial principle through the development of which the founders of Marxism formulated the communist strategy on the religious question.

Above all, they systematically opposed attempts on the part of the reactionary state to convert religion into an instrument of their domination. Therefore, it was a question of eliminating official religion and implementing the principle of the freedom of conscience. In January 1843, Marx wrote: "We thus assert only that no one should be thrown in jail or deprived of his property or any other legal right on the basis of his moral character and political and religious convictions" (ibid., p 182). In 1848, in their "Demands of the Communist Party in Germany," Marx and Engels formulated the following programmatic concept: "Total separation of the church from the state. The clergy, of whatever faith, must be paid exclusively by its voluntary communities" (vol 5, p 2).

Decisively opposing the taking of coercive-administrative measures toward believers and the fact that "the police has stuck its nose into this" (vol 19, p 30), Marx and Engels with equal firmness condemn the "Kulturkampf" of Bismarck, the conservative, and the requirements of the vulgar atheist E. Dühring who called for "banning religion" as well as similar views shared by the followers of A. Blanqui who, despite all his errors, as characterized by V.I. Lenin, was an "unquestionable revolutionary and a zealous supporter of socialism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 16, p 451. Subsequent references to V.I. Lenin's works will indicate volume and page only). In our literature this view is usually explained by the fact that the founders of Marxism realized the inefficiency of the efforts to ban religion. Actually, they had no doubts on this account. "...Coercive measures against religion are senseless," Marx said, for example, in 1878 (vol 45, p 474). However, to develop such an attitude on the basis of narrow pragmatic considerations means to distort the very essence of Marxism.

Let us recall the main feature of Marxism, which was totally warped in its "abridged" presentation and subsequent prejudiced commentaries. In asserting communism as the objective of the revolutionary activities of the proletariat, Marx and Engels proceeded from the real interests of the working people, of specific individuals. It was a question of creating the type of social form "the basic principle of which is the full and free development" of every individual (vol 23, p 605). It was no accident that they categorically rejected the barracks-style, the coarse "communism which comprehensively rejects the personality of man" (vol 42, p 114).

In other words, from the very beginning Marxism did not pit universal human interests against those of the working class and its political party. The doctrine of the historical mission of the proletariat expressed the conviction that this class alone could, by freeing itself, free all society and put an end to any type of exploitation. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the creation of the Communist Party and the slogan of revolution were, to Marx and Engels, necessary means for the implementation of an ideal which, as we know, they linked to the

withering away of the state and the blossoming of truly human relations in which "the simple laws of morality and justice" would become the "highest laws governing relations among nations" (see vol 16, p 11). For that reason, true Marxism not only excludes the suppression of the democratic rights of the working people as a means of attaining its ideals but, conversely, considers the implementation of these rights a mandatory prerequisite for specific social changes. It is a noteworthy fact that, proclaiming the freedom of belief as an inalienable democratic right of the citizen and condemning any discrimination of people based on religious affiliation, Marx and Engels used the term "freedom of conscience," i.e., a basic category of moral awareness.

Nonetheless, they explained, in terms of its nature, this principle is bourgeois-democratic. "The ideas of freedom of conscience and religion expressed in the area of knowledge merely the domination of free competition" (vol 4, p 445). The communists, who are fighting for a socialist reorganization of society, operate on the basis of the positions of proletarian atheism, which is inherent in the dialectical-materialistic doctrine. Its essence was expressed by Marx in his "*Critique of the Gotha Program*:" "Freedom of Conscience! ...The workers party must make use of this opportunity and express its conviction that bourgeois "freedom of conscience" is nothing more than tolerance toward all possible kinds of religious freedom of conscience, whereas the workers party, conversely, tries to free the conscience from the religious drug" (vol 19, p 30).

Freedom of conscience in its consistent Marxist and humanistic understanding opposes both religious as well as anti-religious fanaticism; it decisively rejects the pitting of believers against atheists, orthodox against infidels and the "pure" against the "impure." Freedom of conscience is incompatible with insulting religious feelings or the persecution of dissidents, be they believers or atheists. A democratic rule of law state does not encroach on the freedom of conscience of its citizens.

If, however, religion is not the reason but the manifestation of a secular limitation, "getting rid" of it is possible only by eliminating the rule of alien social forces which irreversibly cause it. Hence the assessment of the religious problem as being subordinate to the practical revolutionary activities, as a fundamental principle of Marxism separating it from all kinds of leftist, anarchic or vulgar-atheistic programs and slogans.

In November 1842 Marx called for "less flouting the screen of 'atheism'" (vol 27, p 370). "*German Ideology*" sharply criticizes the position of the Young Hegelians according to which "under the real struggle once again the struggle against a religious illusion—God—was palmed off" (vol 3, p 224). "As to the question of religion," Engels wrote in October 1847, "we consider it an entirely secondary problem which should never be a reason for quarrels among people who belong to the

same party. Nonetheless, a friendly discussion on theoretical problems is entirely possible and even desirable...." (vol 27, pp 95-96).

In other words, the attitude of the communists toward religion is determined not by circumstantial considerations but a scientifically reliable understanding of the social roots and nature of religion. This thought was especially emphasized by Lenin in characterizing the attitude which Marx and Engels had toward religion: "In the case of people who are careless in discussing Marxism and people who neither can nor are willing to think, this story is a hash of senseless contradictions and confusions of Marxism: some kind of broth made of "consistent" atheism and religious "indulgences." ...Anyone, however, who is more or less capable of adopting a serious attitude toward Marxism and of considering its philosophical foundations and the experience of international social democracy can easily see that the tactics of Marxism toward religion are profoundly consistent and thought-out by Marx and Engels and the fact that what dilettantes or the ignorant consider as confusion is the direct and inevitable conclusion based on dialectical materialism" (vol 17, pp 417-418).

Before Marx the "fraud theory" was prevalent among the critics of religion, according to which religion was a type of ideological communicable disease instilled in society by money-grubbing "priests and tyrants," who speculated on the ignorance of the masses. Christianity, Voltaire wrote, was based on the interweaving among "the basest possible deceptions by the basest possible scum." For that reason, religious dogmas and moral principles were considered as hypocrisy and obscurantist prescriptions which "corrupted" (this expression is still arbitrarily found in works on atheism) healthy human feelings and ideals.

Marx totally rejected such an interpretation: Religion is "a link in the real world," and can be understood only on the basis of the "self-breaking up and self-contradictoriness" of its earthly grounds. Furthermore, a religious awareness is a historically natural and only gradually eliminated way of the "practical-spiritual" perception of the world. In the final account, it is not simply instilled "from above," but is spontaneously formed "from below," through the practical awareness of the people who live under the conditions of a perverse world." Engels, for example, noted that "Christianity, like any other major revolutionary movement, was created by the masses" (vol 21, p 8).

The appearance of Christianity marked a turning point in European culture, and it is no accident that Engels characterized the author of the "Revelations of the Apostle John" as representing "an entirely new phase in the development of religion, a phase scheduled to become one of the most revolutionary elements in the spiritual history of mankind (vol 22, p 478). This revolutionism consisted not only of the fact that Christianity had categorically condemned cruelty, violence and

money-grubbing but also that it had suggested a new scale of values, praising the "suffering and burdened." It was precisely Christianity that was the first on the European Continent to raise in an universally accessible manner the question of the specifics and meaning of unified human history, the idea of equality among all people and granting the morally responsible individual, finally, "inner freedom" of conscience. Yes, all of this was expressed in mystic terms. At that time, however, no other way was possible. The fact remains that for many centuries the broad masses expressed their cherished hopes and social ideals in the language of religion; religion was the ideology within which freedom of thought and humanism developed, as a rule in the guise of "heretical" and sectarian movements in defense of the "live" faith of the people, as opposed to the "bookish," "parchment" wisdom promoted by clericalism. Its followers tried to achieve the dream of social justice and the triumph of moral relations and build the "kingdom of God" here, on earth.

The Marxist ideal was established in the course of the critical summation not only of the old social theories but also the humanistic ideals of the working people, formulated in an utopian, mythological and religious-mystical form, i.e., expressing the real earthly interests "circuitously" (Marx). On the basis of a broad historical perspective we can say that it was precisely Marxism, conceived in terms of its real and profound humanistic content, that is a legitimate heir to these ideals, cleansed from a historically transient form. In this mission it opposed both the attempts of the clerical circles to resmelt the popular hopes into a weapon in the hands of reactionaries and oppressors, as well as the callousness of vulgar atheists, who ignored the real popular roots of religion and who reduced its history to the activities of church organizations.

But was such cleansing possible? Social concepts are perceived as inseparably related to conceptual ones (faith in God) and their separation may seem impossible. However, this is a mistake. Conceptual and sociopolitical views are different levels of spiritual culture and social ideology and the link between them allows a great deal of slack. Incidentally, this is confirmed not only by the history of Christianity but also by the political deployment within current religious trends and churches.

Let us emphasize, above all, that the social base for the manifestation and reproduction of a religious outlook is incomparably broader than any given political stance. "Christianity," Marx wrote, "does not judge of the values of state forms, for it is unaware of the differences existing among them. It teaches as religion should: obey the authorities, for all authority comes from God" (vol 1, p 110). In an effort to justify their privileges on earth, the representatives of the ruling church interpret religious concepts their own way, set up strict dogmatic systems and defend them by all possible means.

This ability to express individual and historically variable political interests in a universal form, coming from "the ages" (God's will), and using a special language within which the real earthly roots of such interests are diluted, is the specific nature of religion and its unique suitability to serve as the protective ideology of the different regimes. However, paradoxical though this might seem, it is also the root of its weakness and source of inevitable confessional frictions and conflicts.

Something curious becomes apparent. Religious ideology, understood by the masses and speaking their language and, at the same time, blending with the official positions, becomes a field in which politically opposed feelings could ripen and crystallize. Within it (let us repeat, within the religious outlook) unorthodox, free-thought concepts appear, which inherit the attributes of official catechism: appeals to the higher divine truth, acceptance of the absolute authority of the "sacred writings," irreconcilability toward dissidence, and aspirations to play a Messianic role. Marx pointed out this feature of religion by noting that "religious narrow-mindedness is also both a manifestation of true narrow-mindedness and a protest against this actual narrow-mindedness" (ibid., p 415). Briefly, we can note the following basic situation: in real life the division between social and political forces by no means simply coincides with the conceptual pitting of religion against godlessness. This, precisely, is the foundation of the realistic and vital nature of the dialogue.

The preparations for a socialist revolution in Russia sharply faced the bolsheviks with the question of the attitude toward religion and the church, to which Lenin paid very close attention. In developing the ideas of Marx and Engels, he demanded, above all, putting an end to the "shameful and accursed past," when "medieval inquisitorial laws existed and were applied (and are still included in our criminal codes and statutes), which could persecute a person for his faith or faithlessness or which violated his conscience.... The full separation of the church from the state is the demand which the socialist proletariat formulates toward the contemporary state and the contemporary church" (vol 12, p 144). At the same time, he emphasized, the program of the bolsheviks "is entirely structured on a scientific, specifically materialistic outlook," for which reason "it necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism" (ibid., p 145). However, Lenin categorically opposed "giving priority to the religious problem, a priority which does not belong to it in the least, and which encourages the splintering of forces engaged in the truly revolutionary, economic and political struggle, for the sake of third-rate views or fantasies...." (ibid., p 146). This concept was clearly formulated as follows: "The unity of this truly revolutionary struggle waged by the oppressed class for the creation of heaven on earth is more important to us than the unity of views of the proletariat about paradise in heaven" (ibid.).

One should look at the truly historical significance of Lenin's strategy and its subsequent implementation.

This was the first time that the attitude toward religion and the church was defined under the conditions of the socialist revolution and in the course of the building of socialism. Hence the particular value of the experience of the Bolshevik Party to the entire international communist movement, as well as the special responsibility of the Soviet state and of the church itself for activities during that complex time. It is currently becoming increasingly clear that in the period of Stalinist rule and in subsequent years the programmatic concepts of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the religious problem were subjected to gross distortions. The very essence of Marxism—its general humanistic spirit and trend—was emasculated and was absolutized and converted into a means of justifying the terroristic dominance of the theory of the class struggle. Real people and their interests and concerns began to be considered voiceless “cogs” and raw material for the building of the hierarchic power pyramid.

However, tens of millions of believers lived in the country, who did not yield in the least to centralized ideological standardization. Their fate was unenviable. They were considered the cost of past history and an undesirable ballast. In frequent cases they became the innocent victims of repressions and violence, consistent with the notorious concept of the aggravation of the class struggle in the course of the advance toward socialism. This violated the main requirements of Marxism-Leninism: the religious question was absolutized and separated from the real building of socialism; priority was given to administrative-bureaucratic and antihumanistic criteria and considerations.

This picture had yet another truly sinister aspect. The persecutions of the clergy and the believers inevitably triggered antisocial moods and religious fanaticism and, in the final account, created grounds for the influence of individuals who tried to use religion for anti-Soviet purposes. For example, it was no accident that excesses and crimes allowed during the time of collectivization increased the activities of religious groups opposing it (Fedorovists, Krasnodrakonovists, Buyevists, True Orthodox Christians, etc.). A tragic situation developed: believers and religious organizations were not only refused political trust but everything possible was done to make them fit the “image of the enemy.”

Alas, things were not limited to internal political aspects. The style of diktat, intolerance and suspicion of any independent opinion were manifested clearly in the international communist movement. This was expressed in the fact that that attitude toward religion and the church, as it had developed in our country, was proclaimed the universal model for preparations for and making of socialist changes and was prescribed to all foreign parties regardless of their own experience. This concept had a pernicious influence on the ability of the communists to strengthen their alliance with the broad popular masses, a high percentage of whom were believers.

In the 1950s, when the threat of a new, nuclear this time, world war arose, the need for a dialogue as a means of solving universal human problems became obvious. The inspired phrase “from anathema to dialogue” became the symbol of such a change, gradually realized by the church as well. However, for quite some time after that a dialogue was considered a peripheral, a purely intellectual measure which sometimes triggered direct opposition. The increased role of the religious factor and, above all, the energetic participation of religious organizations and believers in the West in the antinuclear and social protest and the movement of the “basic communities” in Latin America, and so on, were needed for making unquestionable the fact that a dialogue was an imperative of the time.

Lenin wrote that “*The Holy Family*,” contains “one of the most profound and famous statements made by the founders of contemporary communism” (vol 37, p 443), namely: “Along with the substantiation of historical action there will be an increase in the size of the mass which adopts it as its own project” (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 2, p 90).

Indeed, we have become the witnesses of a tempestuous growth of mass democratic movements which formulate their own sociopolitical programs in the course of sharp polemics, reciprocal criticism and testing of their practical values. An essential aspect of this process is the interrelationship between religion and Marxism, which has been widely acknowledged as the doctrine of revolutionary change of society. In other words, the need for a dialogue is dictated by the objective requirements of the sociohistorical process and the specific living fabric of social life in which inevitably and independently of the activities of ideologues and their views and interpretations, the followers of these two conceptual systems interact, repelling and attracting each other, thus in turn creating the dialectics of social forces.

The facts prove that awareness of this fact may assume a variety of shapes. We are familiar with a number of cases in which consistent Marxist criticism of capitalism has drawn the sympathetic attention of progressive church leaders, developing in their minds the idea of the possibility of reconciling religious with Marxist doctrine. This, however, is an illusion. Marxism is an integral doctrine which includes clear historical and economic concepts and a dialectical-materialistic philosophy. If its individual components are separated from the single entity and considered only to the extent to which they are consistent with the social views of the theologians, Marxism itself becomes inevitably distorted. At that point it becomes essentially a question of the radicalizing of the social views of religious leaders, which is possible within the framework of the different concepts and, in itself, is by no means equivalent to a conversion to Marxist positions.

Such a conclusion may prove fatal to the future of the dialogue. However, it is too early to put an end to it.

A dialogue is a specific phenomenon. Its meaning does not consist in the least of discussing Marxist and religious doctrines per se (anymore than religious proselytism or atheistic reeducation). They are considered in a strictly defined aspect, as possible means of solving social problems, the urgency of which is realized by both sides. Hence the first and mandatory prerequisite for dialogue is acknowledging the inviolable priority of a number of pressing social problems and, consequently, the adoption by its participants, both Marxists and believers, of universal human values and ideals (peace, equality, freedom of the individual, human rights, charity, compassion, etc.) as well as the condemnation of specific phenomena of social life (nuclear war, racism, fascism, exploitation, oppression, genocide, etc.). Otherwise the dialogue loses its subject and becomes purely ritual and "instructive." This does not exclude in the least the critical evaluation of the position held by the opponents on a wide variety of key conceptual problems: transcendentalism, the meaning of life on earth, the source of human morality, etc. The purpose, however, is the same: to determine the extent to which Marxist (or respectively Christian) interpretations are efficiently helping the masses to understand and resolve the pressing problems of human community life. It is precisely such a practical orientation of the dialogue that creates the real problem area in which the views of the participants can be meaningfully compared and come closer to each other.

At that point what happens to the essential conceptual differences? If a person is religious this means that he accepts a certain system of dogmas, standards and symbols. As history has indicated, this system constantly changes, not by withdrawing certain dogmas or "symbols," but in the course of the reinterpretation of their significance, their social significance above all. The latter, in the final account, depends on the specific-historical experience of the mass of believers. For that reason, within the same religion there appears a striking variety—in its diachronic and synchronic aspects—of sociopolitical views supported by different trends, associations, groups and ideologues.

For example, all Christians proceed from the sinfulness of man and the need to struggle against it. However, a "sin" could be interpreted in a variety of ways. Conservative theologians interpret it as a condition of the individual soul of man who must dedicate all his efforts to his personal salvation. Liberal preachers (such as the representatives of "social evangelism") viewed "sinfulness" as social injustice and demanded reforms for its elimination; Martin Luther King considered racism a manifestation of "sin" and called for its immediate elimination through "direct nonviolent action." In the 1960s, Colombian priest C. Torres Restrepo allowed the possibility of an armed struggle against the oppressors. Therefore, the alternative here is not whether to be "for" or "against" religious faith, whether to be a theist or atheist. The watershed is different: Which interpretation

should be considered historically progressive and contributing to the solution of the most pressing social problems, and as most consistent with the real interests of the broad masses?

Therefore, the essence of the dialogue is to decode the "earthly" human content which is presented as religious symbols and to find the type of interpretation which would ensure to the greatest extent the achievement of humanistic objectives. Naturally, the discussion is sharp on both sides. It also presumes the manifestation of the real humanistic meaning of the Marxist views, the study and awareness of cases of their abuse, the replacement of universal human interests with political greed by individual organizations and even individuals. It means the self-criticism of equal partners and a dialogue is contraindicated in the case of people not ready for it. In a certain sense, in its own way the dialogue reproduces the historical destinies of social thinking and its difficult historical "choice" of the most efficient ways for the embodiment of the humanistic ideals and a choice (if we speak of the international public opinion) which still remains open to new suggestions.

The specifics of the dialogue can be clearly seen in the antinuclear protest. The majority of Western Christian organizations participate in it. Although each time appeals for peace involve references to the will of God and it is thus that the reasons of war are explained in an illusory metaphorical way, their real-earthly and humanistic value remains unquestionable.

However, this is only one side of the coin. The other is that religious preachers frequently exploit eschatological topics and speculate ever more willingly on the people's fear of the nuclear threat. Such is the leading theme of the "New Age" religions or "cults," which, in the United States alone, number several million members. The same could be said of the fundamentalists, who openly ally themselves with extreme-right political circles. They shamelessly use religious faith for their egotistical interests and in the struggle against the "devilish" forces which may mean anything they like. The doctrine they preach of the eminent and inevitable Armageddon actually reconciles the people to the idea of the inevitability of a nuclear catastrophe which is considered the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies.

Yes, the Bible does include the prophecy of the "last judgment" and its acceptance is a structural element of Christian doctrine. However, this is a detail of the overall plan of providence and not a chronicle of events of the 20th century. Furthermore, the Bible categorically stipulates that the people will not know the precise day of the "second coming." Therefore, the "religious right" is nurtured by motivations for which people support a religious outlook, and which they use in support of specific militaristic programs.

The influence of such appeals to the believers, who rate highly the authority of the "sacred writings" must not be underestimated; therefore, peace-making activities presume the refutation of such speculations. Does this mandatorily mean turning to atheism? Not in the least. It is a question of criticizing the efforts to promote specific reactionary political concepts to the rank of "age-old" given truths. This criticism is voiced by many contemporary theologians without any fear of being considered godless.

The topic of the dialogue, naturally, is not limited to the struggle for peace and includes a wide range of pressing socioeconomic problems. An example of this is found in the Latin American countries, where the so-called primary communities have become widespread. This is a particular popular religious feeling which has developed within Catholicism. It involves a discussion of urgent problems of the continent, such as the elimination of poverty and illiteracy and dependency on imperialism. Such activities have become the ferment for the "theology of liberation," the supporters of which have repeatedly proclaimed the importance of the "political-liberation mission of the church," and the need for the revolutionary transformation of society. Let us particularly emphasize the high rating they give to the Marxist analysis of social evil and the aspiration to use its method for their own purposes. All of this creates real grounds for a practical and productive cooperation between Marxists and Christians. Particularly impressive is the experience in such cooperation in Nicaragua where, as we know, a number of ministers in the Sandinista government are members of the clergy. The overall situation on the continent was clearly described by the Argentine communist Juan Rosales: "Marx and Christ meet in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Argentina, wherever Christians and Marxists, while reciprocally respecting their convictions, realize that they must act jointly as well as together with the other democratic forces in order to save the peace and secure the future."

The ties between the church and the reactionary policy of the colonialists, particularly with apartheid, is being ever more firmly condemned by religious leaders in the African countries, where a number radical theological doctrines have been developed. Similar processes are also occurring in Asian countries, in the Middle and Near East, for instance. In short, it is a question of symptomatic profound phenomena which characterize the spiritual stress of our age.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible to make decisions and pursue a realistic policy based on "common sense," not to mention dogmatic views which replace active thinking. Let us recall the words of Palmiro Togliatti in his "Memorandum:" "The problem of religious awareness and its content and roots within the masses and the problem of eliminating it must be formulated differently from what it was in the past.... if

we want to be understood. Otherwise, it may seem that the hand we extend to the Catholics may appear a kind of transitional step and even a manifestation of hypocrisy."

A great deal has changed in the human community over the past 25 years. However, the urgent relevance of developing theoretical problems of dialogue has still not been fully realized. Furthermore, frequently concepts presented in the name of scientific "militant" atheism not only do not contribute to the understanding of the real situation but, conversely, make it more difficult. Let us cite a single but quite indicative example.

Sooner or later, in the course of the dialogue an argument breaks out on the subject of Marx's statement that religion is the "opiate of the people." This has been energetically discussed by theologians (X. Johnson, E. Fuchs and Martin Luther King), as well as Marxists (such as Fidel Castro, for instance). Let us not be crafty. It is precisely this Marxian statement that frequently becomes the stumbling stone in developing reciprocal understanding and trust on the part of believers. The trouble is that ignorant dogmatists have turned into a sacrament their own primitive understanding of Marx's views, presenting it as a criterion of a conceptual principle-mindedness.

Comparing religion to opium is not a definition of religion but a sketch, an expressive metaphor which had become popular long before Marx. "Oh blessed stupidity! You support the church with your opium!" exclaimed one of Voltaire's characters. This image is familiar to the bourgeois critics of religion; it is found in the works of Voltaire, Rousseau, Marechal, Kant, Heine, Br. Bauer and Feuerbach. Therefore, let us interpret this metaphor and understand it specifically in its Marxist and not, shall we say, its Voltairian sense.

The first time that Marx used it was in his article "On the Critique of Hegelian Philosophy of Law. Introduction" (end of 1843-January 1844), and used it no longer. In substantiating the need to convert from a criticism of religion to the criticism of politics, he wrote: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed being, the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of a spiritless order. Religion is the opiate of the people" (vol 1, p 415). We cannot speak of any dialectical-materialistic content of this statement, for at that time it did not exist as yet. A decisive step toward it would be made in "The Holy Family" (1844) and, particularly, the "Theses on Feuerbach" (spring of 1845) in which Marx would emphasize the essential distinction between his views and "any preceding materialism," and in "German Ideology" (1845-1846). Many years were to pass before the publication of "Das Kapital" (1867) in which the mechanism leading to the appearance of illusory fetishistic forms of awareness (both worldly and religious) would be brought to light with scientific accuracy and reliability.

Under the conditions of political reaction and increased activities of orthodox "advocates of serfdom wearing a cassock," God searching and God building, V.I. Lenin singled out this statement as the "cornerstone of the entire world outlook of Marxism on the matter of religion" (vol 17, p 416), and as a clear and easily understandable image indicating the social nature of religion. However, it could become the "cornerstone" only within the context of all Marxism, taking into consideration the subsequent mature works by Marx and Engels. It would be the worst kind of doctrinairism to replace the labor intensive procedure of the creative mastery of Marx's atheistic legacy and the study of the contemporary qualitatively new age with ritual reactions of exhortation. Therefore, in the strictly scientific (and not ordinary, so to say pharmaceutical) understanding, this image does not require any kind of apologetic interpretations.

We are impressed by the growing volume of foreign publications dealing with this dialogue. The authors include heads of communist parties, social scientists, politicians, philosophers and members of religious circles. Equally amazing is the poverty of domestic publications on this problem. We are forced to note that Soviet researchers have lost the initiative in the formulation of creative tasks triggered by the conflicting development of the contemporary religious factor and are satisfied most frequently with the mechanical application of "common truths," to the changing reality. Obviously, some academic personalities responsible for the study of the contemporary international labor movement assume, as in the past, that problems of religion are the concern of the workers in mass culture, who are interested in the "clarity" of atheistic propaganda and not one of the most important sectors of contemporary social science.

By its very essence the dialogue is oriented toward the future and, therefore, it requires the rejection of stereotypes and confused concepts. It demands a new political thinking and a realistic assessment of the present situation in the world. It is a practical and equal cooperation between believers and nonbelievers, who sincerely feel the global concerns of mankind and their own responsibility for its future. It is a prototype of the type of normal and civilized relations among people of different convictions, who are trained by the lengthy and painful process of the development of mankind, tortured by the arbitrariness of despots intoxicated with their own power, regardless of whether they presented themselves as divine messengers or trustees of the historical process and mandatory universal happiness.

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Sensible Sufficiency Is a Way to Reliable Peace
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[Article by Lev Semenovich Semeyko, doctor of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute]

[Text] The question of the purpose, nature and scale of the military power of a state under contemporary conditions is one of the basic lines separating the new from the old political thinking in the field of security. The old, which remains characteristic of many Western politicians and military strategists (and, let us honestly acknowledge, was until recently inherent in us) is based on the formula of "the more the better." There even are those who believe that it is only military superiority that can reliably guarantee the safety of a country. Understandably, with such an approach the eternal competition on the military-technical field is inevitable.

The new political thinking rejects this approach. The essence of the concept (or principle) formulated by our party on the topic of sensible sufficiency is, briefly stated, that the state needs a minimum of military potential which would ensure a reliable defense but would be insufficient for attack and for mounting wide-scale offensive operations in depth. Naturally, it is not easy to find this minimum, for this requires the comprehensive and thorough consideration of a large number of factors—political, military, economic, scientific and technical, and psychological.

The 27th CPSU Congress, at which the concept of sensible sufficiency was proclaimed for the first time, defined its main starting concepts: greater reliance on ensuring reliable security above all through political rather than military-technical means despite the full importance of the latter; interconnection between sufficiency, strategic parity and security; and maintaining sensible sufficiency not only in terms of one's own military potential but also the potentials of other states, so that there can be equal, reciprocal and general security. Understandably, this will require the combined efforts of all countries and existing military and political alliances. Only then would no one fear for his own safety.

As we can see, it is a question of a concept which is both national and international. "Sufficiency is a concept of security as derived from the collective actions of states. Peace and law and order can no longer be maintained by two or three, albeit most powerful, countries. It is a function of specialized institutions and mechanisms which can combine the efforts of many within a single will," was the USSR position as presented at the third special session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in the summer of 1988.

The conclusion of the INF Soviet-American Treaty marked the beginning of the appearance of a new historical reality—a turn from the principle of superarmaments to that of sensible defense sufficiency. Nonetheless, the comprehensive theoretical work on its profound meaning remains unfinished. For example, no thorough studies have been made of the correlation between sufficiency and parity under nuclear and nonnuclear conditions of military confrontation or on the relative importance of the various factors which determine sensible sufficiency (such as the influence on sufficiency of the structure of armed forces, the quantity and quality of armaments, the extent of confidence, or the geographic position of the sides), the interconnection between sufficiency and glasnost in the military area, etc.

Yet all of this is exceptionally important. We need answers not only to theoretical but also to practical questions, since mere statements and declarations by either side on its exclusively defensive intentions remain nonetheless insufficient to calm the fears of the opponent. In this case substantial material confirmations in the military and technical area are needed.

Naturally, it would be wrong to reduce the concept of sensible sufficiency merely to the scale of the armed forces, although this is also exceptionally important, for it is, so to say, the very "fabric" of sufficiency. It is a question of a category with a broader meaning: a political concept of the purpose, structure and activities of the armed forces and the military-diplomatic means of ensuring their sufficiency in a nuclear and a nonnuclear world. "We include in this," M.S. Gorbachev answered a question by American senators, "the exclusively defensive nature of the military doctrine, parity and equal security, changes in the nature of military activities and structure of the armed forces and their deployment, and mandatory reduction of armaments and armed forces and strict monitoring. There are a tremendous amount of problems here and they are exceptionally difficult."

Their difficulty consists, above all, in seeing to it that sufficiency in the necessary minimum of a country's armed forces would not conflict with the maximum interests of national and reciprocal and universal security and the maintenance of strategic stability. To this effect, said minimum should be, unquestionably, not only reciprocal but also strictly defensive. It is of essential importance for the nature of the armed forces of the state, in terms of their quantitative and qualitative level, regardless of the military-political situation not to be provocative, i.e., not to create the temptation to engage in aggressive actions or, conversely, make the other side fear for its own safety. For military superiority could be no less dangerous than insufficiency, particularly if such a superiority were to develop in countries or coalitions supporting a power solution to international conflicts while insufficiency would appear in peace-loving countries. Therefore, the approximate balance or parity of forces needed for restraining purposes is a necessity dictated by interests of reciprocal safety.

But what is the correlation between sufficiency and parity? For example, how many nuclear weapons are necessary within the framework of parity until this weapon has been eliminated? What about nonnuclear weapons? Generally speaking, what are we to understand by sufficiency and parity in a nuclear and a nonnuclear world? All these and other questions, particularly under the conditions of a developing military-political dialogue between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, acquire much more than simply academic significance.

In this connection, it would be hardly possible to be satisfied with the only definition provided in our official sources of nuclear parity as we find in the military encyclopedia: "Preservation of approximate equality of potentials of nuclear forces and systems of weapons of the opposite sides with a view to ensuring their identical safety." But what precise type of equality and parity of military potential indicators are we talking about?

The answer to this question is impossible without determining, above all, the nature of equality: quantitative or qualitative, taking into consideration all the factors of the strategic situation. The simplest variant is the strictly quantitative one. However, even here by no means is everything simple. For example, there could be equality in the number of means of delivery of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, inequality in terms of nuclear warheads or vice versa. Variations in the other indicators, quality above all, are also possible. It is possible to have fewer but better weapons and, as a result, to be equal in the ratio of forces.

We are reminded of an example which has become classical. In considering the dialectical interconnection between quantity and quality, Engels quotes in "*Anti-Duhring*" the words which Napoleon said on the subject of the French cavalry (disciplined but inept on horseback) and the cavalry of the Mamelukes (undisciplined but superb in single combat): "Two Mamelukes were unquestionably superior to three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal in strength to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen usually defeated 300 Mamelukes and 1,000 Frenchmen always defeated 1,500 Mamelukes (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 20, p 131). As we can see, in analyzing the correlation of forces and the outcome of a battle the range of quantitative indicators is substantial, even taking only two quality characteristics into consideration. It becomes even greater with a wider range of quality as is precisely the case in a nuclear missile confrontation.

Let us recall, for example, the view of Robert McNamara, the former U.S. secretary of defense, who claimed that a Soviet-American nuclear parity already existed during the "Caribbean Crisis" (October 1962) when, according to his estimates, the United States had 5,000 warheads while the USSR only 300. Each side, however, despite a difference in the number of warheads by a factor of 17, could deal a crushing retaliatory strike if

attacked. Therefore, the approximate parity in the quality of nuclear power performed a restraining function, despite the tremendous disparity in quantitative indicators in strategic weapons systems.

Does this mean that now, 25 years later, and even more so in the future, one could freely accept substantial quantitative differences in the nuclear arsenals and undertake unilateral disarmament, believing that, in any case, we would have "a sufficient" amount? This is absolutely unacceptable, for under the conditions of a remaining military threat, it would involve a tremendous risk to the country's security.

Let us consider above all the purely military risk. Recent achievements of the scientific and technical revolution have made it possible to take the type of leap in the qualitative characteristics of nuclear armaments now makes them assume greater importance than quantitative indicators. Considering a great disparity in the number of warheads or their carriers, such quality factors would become dominant, to such an extent that they could destabilize the situation. The possibility would appear of dealing a disarming strike by the quantitatively superior side. The likelihood of this would be even greater should that side, would furthermore gain superiority in antimissile defense forces and means, particularly in space. Consequently, in this matter the greatest possible vigilance and substantiated caution must be displayed so that the actual sufficiency of the nuclear arsenal would not be replaced by its fiction.

In all likelihood, in this case the objection would follow: What kind of mass first nuclear strike could one speak of if such a strike would become suicidal to the aggressor? As many scientists claim, the aggressor would perish even without a retaliatory blow. He would perish from the inevitable catastrophic consequences of the large-scale use of his own nuclear weapon (radioactive fall-out, changes in the habitat).

Unquestionably, such a likelihood cannot be excluded. The harsh lessons of Chernobyl have taught us a great deal. However, something else should not be forgotten also. In the West, in the United States above all, there are numerous members of military-political circles who still do not believe that such a catastrophic outcome is possible and who rely on the possibility of victory in a nuclear missile war. Is this not the reason for which they are boosting to such an extent the creation of "clean" nuclear warheads, the use of which would present virtually no threat to the attacking side? Was it not the reason for which the United States is still avoiding an agreement on the total ban of nuclear tests? Finally, is this not the reason for perfecting the method itself of mounting nuclear missile strikes? These and other questions are legitimate. Elementary prudence and responsibility for the fate of the country require a constant consideration of the political course and the practical actions of the

other side and the scale of the really existing military threat. This precisely applies to the real threat without overestimating or underestimating it and without plunging into extremes.

An entire array of other essential factors exist, which must be taken into consideration, such as political, psychological, etc.

Therefore, the significance of the quantitative factor in the balance of armaments must not be belittled. It would be equally wrong, however, to exaggerate it, in an effort to have more of everything at all cost. This would lead to the economic exhaustion of the country. Quantity is not synonymous with sufficiency. Its main criterion is the guarantee of the inadmissibility of war and reliable defense.

Under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution and the changing military-political situation in the world, the quality factor in establishing the limits of sensible sufficiency becomes exceptionally important. As was emphasized in the materials of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the efficiency of defense building must be "henceforth ensured through primarily qualitatively parameters, both in terms of technology and military science as well as the structure of the armed forces. It should guarantee the reliable security of the Soviet state and its allies and be made strictly consistent with our defense doctrine."

Understandably, the range and nature of defense sufficiency could be determined by the country's military-political leadership, taking mandatorily into consideration all factors of the military confrontation and the complex balance of the security interests of the sides. It is precisely this approach that made it possible for the Soviet Union to conclude the INF Treaty with the United States, based on quantitatively unequal reductions, without threatening its security.

Under specific circumstances, a sensible agreement on a quantitative parity of nuclear armaments within a certain limit or sublimit, which the sides should not violate, would be justifiable and sensible; or else an agreement could be concluded of having "no more" than a certain quantity of one type of strategic armaments or another. Thus, for example, in the course of the current Soviet-American talks on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive nuclear armaments, the parameters of reciprocal parity restrictions are becoming apparent: have no more than 1,600 strategic means of delivery and no more than 6,000 warheads for them.

Naturally, reducing the Soviet and U.S. strategic potential by one-half would not as yet lead to an optimal level of their sufficiency, for 6,000 warheads is a huge number. We must continue to reduce them further, in order to come closer to the maximal reduction in the level of nuclear armaments which has been defined independently by Soviet and American scientists and experts at

approximately 500-600 single-warhead (monoblock) and mobile and, therefore, difficult to target, ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to the specialists, such a nuclear potential (excluding submarines carrying ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) would be entirely adequate so that, while remaining as minimal as is possible, it could guarantee a retaliatory blow, i.e., perform the function of military-political containment and ensure the stability of the situation.

However, it would be unwise and extremely risky to rely forever on nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is a firm opponent of the concept of nuclear containment, as an immoral and antihumanistic means which could doom to destruction all life on earth. Our ideal is not "500-600" nuclear warheads for each side but "absolute zero," the full and universal elimination of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons. At that point, one would assume, the implementation of the concept of a truly—precisely truly—sensible sufficiency of military potentials, freed from "superarmaments" would become possible.

The limits of sufficiency are not a constant value. In the case of the Warsaw Pact they may be reduced or increased depending on the actions of the United States and its NATO allies; in all cases, however, they should be such that a firm defense could be reliably secured. The nature of retaliatory measures aimed at preserving parity, but within the range of sensible sufficiency, assume particular significance in this connection. In this case errors are fraught with major costs and may lead to increased tension and unjustified expenditures of forces and funds. Yet it is precisely on this that in frequent cases the other side is relying. As we know, by allowing ourselves to become involved in the arms race in the recent past we suffered great losses in the socioeconomic development of the country and in international affairs. The proper conclusions from this have been drawn today.

The principle of sensible sufficiency presumes the use of asymmetric responses, of a nontraditional nature. The time of mandatory duplication of all military preparations made by a potential enemy is in the past, although the need for it in some specific cases, naturally, cannot be denied. Flexibility in responsive actions should pursue the main objective, which is to preserve the strategic balance and the ability for reliable defense and, therefore, to help prevent nuclear war. Nonstandard decisions deprive the West of the possibility to impose upon us an arms race in various areas. By acting in this manner, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, "we shall maintain the country's defense capability on the level of a sensible and reliable sufficiency, so that no one will be tempted to violate the security of the USSR and its allies."

The problem of sufficiency in conventional armed forces and armaments deserves particular attention. This is the biggest, the most varied and expensive component of military power of any nuclear or nonnuclear country.

According to United Nations data, the world arsenals for conventional armaments total more than 140,000 tanks, 35,000 combat aircraft, 21,000 helicopters, 1,100 surface combat ships and more than 700 assault submarines. Something else is also important: it is precisely the growth of conventional armaments and armed forces that create a direct threat of aggression, for despite its entire tremendous power, a nuclear weapon cannot help to occupy a territory. It is precisely conventional forces that can benefit from the results of the use of nuclear weapons in the course of their further combat operations. A nonnuclear war could develop into a nuclear war. Furthermore, in terms of their destructive power, conventional armaments are already becoming comparable to nuclear weapons, which increases our concern even further. Therefore, in comparing conventional armed forces, the sides are particularly sensitive to disproportions and asymmetries in their structure, number, deployment, quantity and quality of armaments, etc., for this triggers a great deal of fear, suspicion and lack of clarity concerning the military-strategic situation. Finally, we must take into consideration also the fact that the members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO will have, in the course of the initiated talks, to solve problems of radical reduction in conventional armed forces and armaments covering an area from the Atlantic to the Urals, problems which are tremendous in terms of volume and difficulty. All of this makes the problem of sufficiency of nonnuclear forces very significant. This applies to our country as well, whose conventional armed forces account, according to Western estimates, for 90 percent of the forces of the Warsaw Pact.

Particularly important here, above all, is an essential specific concept concerning the approaches to the levels of sufficiency. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members are guided by the concepts formulated by Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, as follows: "In terms of conventional means, sufficiency means a quantity and quality of armed forces and armaments which can reliably ensure the collective defense of the socialist community." As we see, this formulation is quite flexible and does not establish any kind of specific level of power of conventional forces. Actually, this cannot be done, for it will always depend on the nature of the military confrontation. Corresponding concepts were formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress on this matter.

Nonetheless, an answer to the following question is important in establishing the military-political foundations of sufficiency in conventional forces: What means of action should be applied in repelling aggression? This particularly applies to the relatively lengthy period during which the armed forces of the opposite sides will begin to acquire a nonaggressive status. It would be probably hasty totally to exclude even the hypothetical likelihood of a military conflict during that period of time. It is possible, theoretically speaking, to apply, for example, the method of static defense ("not a step back"). Another variant would be active defense, which

would combine holding one's positions followed by a decisive counterstrike launched against the invading enemy. Finally, one could be oriented toward a subsequent large-scale counteroffensive, moving combat operations to the territory of the aggressor, with a view to his final routing. It is hardly necessary to prove that each of these concepts requires a different structure of the armed forces, their size, deployment, type of armament, system of operative and combat training, etc.

On this subject, so far our press has discussed both the readiness to repel aggression through defensive actions, including counterattacks and counterstrikes in individual areas, as well as the ability to deal a crushing retaliatory blow "making the aggressor feel it." Obviously and above all, this is not one and the same. One may assume that "crushing blows" are a more decisive form of military operations. Furthermore, it is a noteworthy fact that the territorial limits of counteroffensive operations are not specified. All of this is frequently used in the West as a reason for attacking the very nature of the defense doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and the concept of sensible sufficiency. "Today there are no reasons to believe that 'sensible sufficiency' marks a change in the organically offensive Soviet military strategy or its abandonment," states the latest Pentagon pamphlet "*Soviet Military Power: Danger Assessment*."

We believe that shedding light on the question of sensible sufficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces, taking into consideration their possible operations in repelling aggression, is extremely necessary. It would contribute, in particular, to surmounting the traditional bias and mistrust shown by the West and to improving the level of information of the broad circles of the world public. Guided by the new political thinking and the defensive nature of our military doctrine, obviously it would be expedient to state that sensible sufficiency should guarantee the repelling of aggression and the unconditional restoration of the territorial status quo, should it be violated in the course of military operations. Naturally, this would require maximally active defense which, however, would not turn into subsequent large-scale offensive operations deep within enemy territory. Preventing a repeated invasion by the aggressor could be achieved through both political and military—nonoffensive—means. We believe that the respective official explanations on this account would not only confirm the strictly defensive trend of the military doctrine of the USSR and its allies but would also contribute to the openness and predictability of military activities, which the Warsaw Pact countries have called for.

Basic logic indicates that both sides should be governed by nonaggressive concepts, in order to ensure a truly reliable and equal security. Under the conditions of full reciprocal implementation of the concept of sensible sufficiency and nonaggressive defense, the very formulation of the question of the need to have counterstrike forces would acquire, one may assume, a different nature.

In the course of the discussion, in the presence of Soviet experts, our foreign colleagues frequently ask the following question: Is there a difference between the concepts of "sensible" and "defense" sufficiency? Different opinions have been expressed on this account. We believe that there is no essential difference between these concepts, for essentially it is a question of the two aspects of **sufficiency**: it should be sensible in defining the minimal scales of the necessary military potential and, unquestionably, defensive from the viewpoint of its nature and purpose. The ideal of a sensible (defense) sufficiency is the lowest possible level of armed forces which would ensure a military balance, deprived of means of mass destruction and oriented toward nonaggressive defense.

As General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, has pointed out, on the practical level the principle of defense sufficiency means the following: "giving the armed forces a nonaggressive structure; maximally limiting within their structure the striking systems; changing deployment, based on the implementation of strictly defensive tasks; lowering the parameters of the mobilization deployment of the armed forces and amount of war industry output."

The orientation of the military doctrine of our country and of allied countries toward the concept of nonaggressive defense marked a new and essentially important step forward. It is inseparably related to sensible sufficiency and contemplates radical reciprocal steps aimed at disarmament and strengthening true security, on the European Continent above all.

The document "On the Military Doctrine of Warsaw Pact Members," which was adopted at the May 1987 Warsaw Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, emphasizes that the purpose is to achieve "a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe down to a level at which neither side, in securing its defense, would have the means of launching a sudden attack against the other side and the deployment of offensive operations in general."

The decision of the Soviet leadership unilaterally to reduce the size of troops is the initial practical step in the reorganization of our Armed Forces in accordance with the adopted defensive military doctrine, for such reduction will affect, in particular, tank, landing-assault and landing-crossing units and formations deployed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which can mount offensive operations, something which has particularly concerned the West, giving the remaining divisions a purely defensive structure. As the American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS noted, in the past "we said that we had heard about 'sufficiency' in defense but what does this really mean? Today Gorbachev undertakes to prove this in fact in Eastern Europe and in the European part of Soviet territory."

Understandably, maximal results can be achieved if practical steps to create a nonaggressive defense are taken on a reciprocal basis by all the members of the opposing military-political groups. This would bring about not only a substantial drop in the level of their military parity but, which is the main thing, a strengthening of strategic stability. It is precisely at that point that each country in Europe would feel that it lives in a state of reliable security.

The level of military confrontation must be reduced particularly in areas in which an asymmetry and an imbalance have developed. We must see to it that the indicators of the respective armaments are consistent with the requirements of defense sufficiency. In the West, for example, the opinion has been expressed that from this viewpoint it is hardly legitimate to have a Warsaw Pact superiority over NATO in tanks, which will remain even after their unilateral reduction (in a ratio of 50,000 as against 30,000). However, if we pose this question in this manner, on the other hand, clearly conflicting with sufficiency would be the numerical superiority of NATO in tactical assault aviation, which amounts to some 1,300 combat aircraft presenting a threat of sudden attack, as well as naval armaments. The need for a balanced elimination of such disproportions appeared a long time ago and the Warsaw Pact countries are ready, in the course of the initiated talks with the members of NATO, to discuss and settle the "sensitive" question of the balance of armed forces as a set—on land, sea and air.

Obviously, in the more distant future one could reach an agreement, taking quality indicators into consideration, in achieving a new type of parity in nonnuclear forces. For example, from the viewpoint of sensible sufficiency, it is not mandatory to pit 1,000 airplanes from one side against 1,000 airplanes on the other. Thus, one could have the necessary number of less expensive antiaircraft systems in addition to a certain relatively small number of airplanes.

Furthermore, we must not forget that defense armaments are much cheaper than offensive ones. Thus, a modern tank or bomber may be hit by a defense weapon the cost of which would be no more than 0.5-5 percent of its cost. This proves the high economic profitability of a defensive potential.

In addition to a reciprocal reduction in armed forces and armaments, it would be also expedient to create on the European Continent nuclear-free zones, zones with lowered level of armaments or, perhaps, tank-free zones, and to make use of the entire range of measures of confidence, including on-site monitoring, etc.

Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that the measures of confidence in the military area, implemented currently in Europe in accordance with the resolutions of the Helsinki and Stockholm conferences, including

timely notification about exercises and maneuvers, various types of inspections and monitoring, are important not only in themselves. At the same time, they have essentially begun to clear the way for the implementation of the idea of sensible sufficiency.

Therefore, the idea of sensible sufficiency of armed forces, which is attractive from the viewpoint of the superior interests of the security of all countries and nations, is unquestionably realistic although difficult to achieve. It is realistic providing that the countries on either side are interested and show good will. This is confirmed by the businesslike atmosphere which was established from the very beginning at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, with the participation of all Warsaw Pact and NATO members. In the course of the debates not only differences but, which is most important, similarities of views on a number of matters became apparent.

What is the attitude in the United States and the other NATO countries toward the idea of sufficiency? It has long enjoyed support by a number of social democratic parties in Europe, among scientists and among broad public circles. This idea, related to the concept of non-aggressive defense, has been studied, in particular, by noted experts such as A. von Buelow and A. von Muller (FRG), F. Barnaby and General M. Harbottle (Great Britain), F. von Hippel (United States), A. Boserup (Denmark) and many others.

According to F. Barnaby, for example, nonaggressive defense means a system in which "the structure, training, logistic support and the military doctrine itself are aimed, in their totality, not at offensive but at unquestionable sufficiency for reliable defense. Nuclear armaments should be used only for a retaliatory strike, in an extreme case." Other supporters of nonaggressive defense in the West reject the use of nuclear weapons.

As to official circles, their position is substantially different, although, obviously it would be simplistic to see in it a uniform "no." It is true that they do not use the concepts of "sensible sufficiency." However, the idea itself, in its different expressions, may be encountered in some documents and statements. Let us consider as an example the final communique of the meeting of the NATO Military Planning Committee (May 1988) which proclaims the intention of "continuing to aspire to attaining objectives related to armament control by upgrading security and stability on a lower level of armaments." However, as we know, words by no means match deeds. Such is the case here as well. The proclamation of good intentions is accompanied by directly opposite steps, aimed at "compensation" and "further rearming." General W. Altenburg, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in describing the objectives of these steps, said: "After the conclusion of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the need to maintain a high (!) level of armaments and combat readiness has become greater than before." Indicative in this connection is

that, while in principle approving the decision of the Soviet Union of an unilateral reduction of armed forces, the NATO countries not only failed to follow its example but asserted, at the meeting of the council of this alliance, their support of the concept of "nuclear threat" in the implementation of their military programs.

The position assumed by the United States is quite equivocal. On the one hand, of late, it appears, Washington has begun to show a certain drift toward understanding the need to lower the level of nuclear confrontation, as confirmed by the Soviet-American INF Treaty and the talks on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments of the USSR and the United States.

On the other, however, it is still unwilling to abandon the hope of achieving global superiority. Therefore, sufficiency itself is viewed through the lens of the postulate of "peace from a position of strength" for, it is claimed, it is precisely superiority that ensures the possibility of preventing a war, using the threat of the stronger fist and, should war break out, to win it. Such concepts imply tremendous military expenditures and broad programs to improve strategic and conventional armaments and to create a ground-space anti-aircraft defense system. Naturally, all such actions, which urge on the arms race, do not fit in the least within the concept of sufficiency of military potentials or common sense in general.

Despite all difficulties and obstacles, mankind is taking its first steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and toward a nuclear-free world and reliable general security. This road will be long and lengthy. However, its foundations must be laid as of now.

Reciprocal sensible sufficiency of armed forces, under the conditions of the elimination of nuclear weapons plus nonaggressive defense in their purpose would be the possible military formula of security starting with the beginning of the 21st century. Its implementation would eliminate from all countries and peoples grounds for concern for their safety. This would save huge resources which could be successfully used for peaceful purposes. Mankind would be given a broad opportunity for the solution of urgent socioeconomic and global problems and for radically improving and humanizing international relations.

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On Inability to Attack
18020013p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7,
May 89 (signed to press 21 Apr 89) pp 122-125

[Article by A. von Buelow]

[Text] The editors asked Andreas von Buelow, FRG Bundestag deputy, representing the German Social Democratic Party, and an expert on problems of security policy, to share his viewpoint on the question of nonaggressive defense. The author presents it in the following theses.

1. The two confronting alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—state that they do not wish to attack each other, although there is a great deal of tension between them, based on differences in their systems, differences which, obviously, will continue to exist. These two blocs, which are unwilling to attack one another, should not resort to reciprocal threats. The silent and senseless display of weapons and counterweapons which is going on, and the continuing arms race, which is aimed at a conflict, which they would like to avoid, look more like the affected behavior of a pack of monkeys aimed at making an impression rather than the behavior of sensible people who know the horrors of war and can imagine the consequences of a nuclear slaughter. Until recently, the Soviet Union deemed possible, should the West launch an attack on it or its allies, to roll across Western Europe and, possibly, all the way to the Atlantic. In the case of an attack from the East, NATO threatens to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Threats using demonstrations and menaces, and scenarios of doom and invasion, are possible and effective. In the final account, however, they conflict with any sort of political and economic common sense.

2. Both alliances could, should they wish to do so politically, replace the status of reciprocal threats with jointly coordinated security. Unlike the present FRG defense minister, I see no grounds whatsoever to assume that the demilitarization of the East-West conflict, with the preservation of communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe, is impossible. In the final account, even the thoughtless religious wars of the Middle Ages were demilitarized according to the formula of "cujus regio, ejus religio" ("to each country its religion," Latin). It is only on the basis of such a compromise that the societies obtain the possibility for further peaceful evolutionary development.

3. The means of achieving reciprocal security under the conditions of demilitarization is the reciprocal readiness for defense while rejecting the capability of sudden and deep attack.

4. For quite some time defense with the shield and the sword has been possible. The sword is a weapon for attack and counterattack. The shield, conversely, is suitable for defense only. All armament systems which can penetrate in depth within a defended territory are structural components of the contemporary "sword." It is a question of tank formations which, with their capacity rapidly to seize territory, face the defending side with an insoluble or virtually insoluble problem of stopping and pushing back the enemy. This includes self-propelling artillery as well as deep-penetration assault aircraft and airborne forces. Today the forces of the "shield" consist of a dug-in infantry, artillery deployed in mined areas and antitank helicopters flying over one's own positions. The more we are able to reduce, on either side, the forces of the "sword" and purposefully to strengthen the power of the "shield," the closer we will approach a guaranteed ability of defense and eliminating the ability for attack.

5. In the language of military doctrines and strategy, this means that both sides will limit themselves to the reliable defense of their advance lines in their allied area, ensuring the ability, in any case, to restore the previous status. The Warsaw Pact should abandon its concepts of the possibility of moving the advance line of defense on the territory of Western Europe. After the Budapest and East Berlin declarations, it has become clear that the Warsaw Pact is ready to do this. Both sides must also abandon the doctrine of aerial attack.

6. The types of weapons which are particularly suited for penetration in depth in enemy territory, such as tanks and other armored vehicles, combat helicopters and aircraft, missiles and other flying machines of respective range of flight, artillery, based on reciprocally agreed upon criteria, and tactical nuclear weapons, should be maximally scaled down to reciprocally agreed upon levels identical for both sides.

7. An objective for Central Europe could be, in particular, that of reducing the number of tanks to an equal number of 5,000 by either side, the formations of which would be deployed in different locations and would be unable to achieve a fast concentration.

a. In the advanced defense area, on either side of the border, no armored units would be deployed but only means of antitank and antiaircraft defense, sappers, infantry, artillery observers, etc.

b. Behind them a second defense area with 2,000 tanks and respective armored vehicles would be deployed. This would cover the Eastern part of the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and, in the West, Denmark and the FRG. In the zone of combat operations of each corps in the areas free from tanks, other defensive formations would be deployed, as well as artillery and other means of combat support, armed with primarily defensive weapons and, as the final part of the defense potential, on each side of the combat operations there would be one tank unit of brigade or regimental size.

c. Each third Eastern and Western defense area, which would include Poland and the Soviet Union to the Urals, on the East, and France and the Benelux countries, to the Atlantic, on the West, could have, respectively, 3,000 tanks and other armored vehicles each (again regionally deployed, which would make their concentration difficult). The remaining armored units should be kept under special control.

8. The system of nonaggressive defense on either side would make the waging of aggressive wars impossible. Whereas so far one could assume that an attack launched by 90 divisions from the East would mean, in terms of Western defense, the need to repel 108,000 moving targets, including 30,000 tanks, with the defense system I described such an attacking mass would be reduced, in any case, down to 3,000 tanks. Western defense would be able to deal with such a force. Therefore, in the system of

mutually guaranteed defense the attacked country would, from the military viewpoint, possess superior forces compared to the aggressor. His armed forces, substantially reduced by a system of nonaggressive defense, and possessing only a counterattack potential, would be quite severely battered should they attempt to breach in depth staggered "shield" systems. Therefore, the attacking side, decisively weakened in advance, would encounter the fresh forces of inactivated counter-attacking residual defense reserves. As a result, hopes for success in an offensive warfare will no longer be justified.

9. Having eliminated any offensive forces which could seize territory, it would be necessary also to abandon the doctrine of anti-aircraft defense on either side. If there is no longer any second or third wave of aggressive forces, no one would need air domination over enemy territory. At that point the facilities will be directed only toward the ability to defend oneself from the air over one's own territory.

10. The system of reciprocal measures of confidence should be expanded in the following areas: reducing the scale of exercises. Mandatorily announcing them in advance. Maintaining observers at the exercises. Communications officers should be present at the remaining tank units. There should be on-site inspection and control over replacement of personnel. There should be a reduction, withdrawal to the rear and control over mixed equipment, which could be used for offensive purposes, restricting and controlling rear and supply services, restricting the call of reservists over and above those necessary for a normal cycle of exercises, etc.

11. Under those circumstances, even from the present viewpoint, tactical nuclear weapons, stipulated in the strategy for flexible reaction, as compensation for the actual or imaginary weakness in the area of conventional armaments, would become unnecessary. If conventional wars become more inconceivable by virtue of the nature of the defensive structures, there would be no need for tactical nuclear armaments as something which could protect from war. Threatening with tactical nuclear weapons Poland or the GDR, for example, would become senseless. The third "zero option" (elimination of short-range nuclear missiles—editors) would become the mature result of prudence. The dependence of the FRG on the U.S. nuclear "umbrella," in compensation for the actual or imaginary weakness in the area of conventional armaments would be eliminated or substantially reduced.

12. Ability for defense without the ability to attack could be achieved only through joint actions. A one-sided structure of the armed forces incapable of attack by either side, with the maximal ability for attack by the opposite side is inconceivable. We must intensively discuss the political and military aspects of doctrines, strategies and foundations of the combat use of troops and armaments and their structures. It would be naive to

assume that the Soviet Union would undertake unilaterally to disarm without any concessions on the part of the West in terms of the size of its armed forces. This, however, does not exclude the fact that both sides, the West and the Soviet Union, would take unilateral measures to come closer to a condition of stability. A real breakthrough is possible only if it is accomplished jointly.

13. The view of the federal government, to the effect that the Warsaw Pact would become structurally incapable of attack if it reduced down to the NATO level only its tanks and artillery, seems unconsidered. The balance of forces based on such a limited reduction in armaments would be similar to the condition which existed between France and Germany in 1940, i.e., having a numerical balance with no stability whatsoever. The operative minimum to which Western military and politicians willingly refer, is different for the attacking and defending sides; 20,000 tanks are too many for attack but too few for defense. It is only the decisive reduction of all land and armored troops that would deprive both sides of the capacity to advance.

14. The reduction in the amount of armaments on either side down to 95 percent of the Western level in terms of tanks and artillery, considered by the NATO countries, while ignoring naval forces, tactical nuclear weapons and combat aircraft, appears unconvincing. It is difficult to set to rest the suspicion that NATO is not interested in a real reduction of armaments.

15. Nonetheless, together with its allies, the Soviet Union has seized the initiative in all areas of disarmament, including changes in military doctrine and the structure of armed forces and undertaken the creation of nonaggressive defense. The Budapest and Berlin declarations of the Warsaw Pact opened new opportunities for talks. Their proposals defined the ratio of forces with the help of openness and monitoring, and thereby achieving the objective not by increasing armaments but through disarmament, starting with a reduction in the size of the armed forces by 500,000 men on either side, and giving defense a strictly nonaggressive structure, are aimed at demilitarizing the conflict between East and West. The UN speech of General Secretary Gorbachev made a great impression on the Western public by the seriousness and openness of the Soviet initiatives. The unilateral elimination of 10,000 tanks and the disbanding of six tank divisions and redeploying the Soviet units in the GDR and the reduction of forces are very pleasing steps which contribute to breaking the ice of the cold war.

16. The peoples of the Western countries must urge NATO to join in these initiatives. We, Europeans, who remember the horrors of World War II, can only regret if our energy, abilities and well-being continue to be involved in the military confrontation between East and West. Wars between highly civilized countries can only

cause harm. We should make them virtually impossible not by threatening violence with weapons but with the help of a coordinated and deliberately implemented nonaggressive defense.

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Not to Pursue But to Check One's Course

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[Review by A. Ulyukayev of the yearbook "Sorevnovaniye Dvukh Sistem" [Competition Between the Two Systems]]

[Text] The words competition between the two systems have triggered in many people a kind of allergy developed during the period of stagnation, falsehood and doublethink. The paradigm of race, struggle and catching up at all costs creates and duplicates stereotypes, such as "better die than lose." The very approach to the development of socioeconomic systems, from the viewpoint of who can score more points and who would cross a milestone faster, imposes upon the economy false guidelines and leads to a distortion of ways and means, which is a very dangerous political disease. We must achieve the goals we have set ourselves for our own sake and not for the sake of hurting the Americans more. Yet, in real life, most frequently the opposite occurred: the incentive to build one project or another or to formulate national economic programs was the aspiration, at all cost, to have something that was the most powerful, the highest, the biggest, etc. The "report competition" led to unrestrained falsifications and, to the aspiration to create at all cost the appearance of a successful outcome of the struggle and present a good face while playing poorly. An entire methodology developed with criteria, indicators and ratings favorable to us.

Does this mean that the time has come to throw the intersystemic comparisons "off the modern steamship?" I believe that it has not. It is hardly worth it, having burned our tongues on the milk of quantitative competitions, to try to cool off the water of analytical comparisons. What is important is to draw lessons from the errors of the past and to develop the spirit of free competition and pluralism of assessments and conclusions. The problem must be switched from the level of propaganda to that of thorough scientific discussion.

The analysis of the annual yearbooks "Competition Between the Two Systems. Studies, Discussions and Information" enables us to speak of real although not always confident steps in this direction. This publication was started 25 years ago but the new realities under discussion are found essentially in the 1987 and 1988 issues and the just published 1989 collection.

Participating in it are interesting and creatively thinking scientists such as M. Lemeshev, I. Lukinov, N. Rimash-evskaya, Ya. Pevzner, R. Entov, Yu. Shirayev and others. The ordinary simplistic-dogmatic publications are being gradually replaced with serious studies of the comparative efficiency of economic systems, the adequacy of their response to the challenge of the contemporary stage of scientific and technical progress, and the possibilities of the utilization of the achievements of Western economic culture under the conditions of contemporary socialism. The book provides extensive original referential-information material.

The problem of perestroika of the national economy and the radical economic reform has literally flooded the pages of these collections. In solving these most important problems and promoting the new aspects of humanistic, democratic and economically effective socialism, we must constantly compare our achievements against those of the West. No big discoveries are necessary, nor should we subject to criminal neglect unused discoveries, or "courageously" endure jolts, hits or potholes. Such a comparison will help us in selecting the best way to achieve the normal well-being and a comfortable life which the Soviet people deserve.

The article by B. Bolotin "Status and Prospects of the Economic Competition Between the Two Systems," included in the 1988 yearbook, provides abundant and interesting food for thought and for such comparisons. Let us consider this article as an example of the new approaches to intersystemic comparative analysis.

The study and summation of the rich factual data, based on weighed methodological approaches, enabled the author to develop a number of tables with the help of which he sums up the results of economic development from World War II to the present and determines the foreseeable future of the thus revealed trends. What does a weighed methodological approach mean? It means, first, the choice of synthetic indicators which can adequately detect shifts in the correlation between economic systems. In this case, he uses an indicator of end production of the sector, measured by the intersectorial method. Second, it means computations based on averaged correlations of currencies and prices in the USSR and the United States, which ensures their greater comparable. Finally, it means the use in the analysis of

average annual indicators of 5-year periods, which make it possible to avoid distortions related to short-term fluctuations (poor harvests or crises).

The result of such investigations is a trend toward substantial and steady reduction, starting with the 1950s, of the superiority enjoyed by the USSR in growth rates, while retaining it on the scale of the entire postwar period. The correlations among average per capita indicators (in percentages) have changed in favor of the USSR while the absolute falling behind in terms of the average per capita indicator of the national income has remained virtually unchanged. Also significant is the falling behind of the level of social labor productivity, although in terms of percentage figures, it has declined (at the start of the 1950s the level of the USSR was about 15 percent that of the American; at the start of the 1980s it was approximately 30 percent). In terms of absolute figures this lag (based on the average indicator of annual output in material production) even increased by 20 percent. The main share of the "guilt" for our lag is found in agriculture. Whereas in industry the level of Soviet labor productivity is 45 percent of the American, it is under 10 percent for agriculture.

Also quite interesting are the projections of the dynamics of economic correlations established by B. Bolotin, although we must approach them in a sober and considered manner. The point is that they rest on essentially heterogeneous foundations. The prospects of development of the American economy are determined on the basis of evaluations and long-term forecasts made by the United Nations, i.e., they are based on an independent expert evaluation. Our prospects are directly derived from official documents and the tasks they set. If such tasks are met by the year 2000, the average per capita level of the national income in the USSR would be approximately 70 percent and in industrial and agricultural production, 80 percent of the American; unlike the preceding periods, the absolute amount of our lag in terms of average per capita indicators of the national income will be reduced somewhat and the USSR will come a little bit closer to the United States in terms of labor productivity in industry (up to 67 percent) and in agriculture (up to 14 percent).

This item, which is exceptionally saturated with information, contains 27 tables. Let us provide an "excerpt" from them, combined within a single table.

Indicators of Comparative Dynamics of Economic Developments of the USSR and the United States in 1950-2000 (in Dollars)

USSR - United States	Years						
	1951-1955	1961-1965	1971-1975	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000
Per Capita National Income	930/4200	1570/4600	2635/5900	3535/6825	4100/7275	4925/8000	6125/8850
Per Capita Industrial Output of Industrial Commodities	500/3225	1120/3625	2200/4650	3200/5125	3700/5525	4485/6150	5550/6750
Per Capita Output of Agricultural Commodities	265/730	355/735	440/740	465/725	510/740	565/755	645/775
Social Labor Productivity	3100/21050	5060/28725	8315/36350	11200/40775	13850/47975	18765/58925	26300/73950
Annual Output Per Person In Industry	5500/28500	10000/35000	16500/45000	23000/51500	28000/59000	38500/69500	54000/81000
Annual Output Per Person In Agriculture	1600/19625	2500/31250	4100/46000	5000/53500	6100/58700	7550/64650	9500/70850

Remark: All data are average annual indicators of 5-year periods, depicted in dollars, in 1980 prices, with a computation of prices based on parity purchasing power of the ruble and the dollar.

Our current statistical information for the first 3 years of the 5-year period will enable us, to a certain extent, to assess the realistic nature of these forecasts. Industrial output increased approximately accordingly, while the growth of the national income and agricultural production was substantially lower. The dynamics of labor productivity turned out to be not lower and, in agriculture, even higher than the estimates. However, we must take into consideration that data for 1986-1988 are given in actual rather than fixed prices (as in B. Bolotin's computations). Furthermore, the accuracy of these figures is somewhat diminished by the retained practice of repeated computation.

Economic comparisons, similar to those quoted in the article under consideration, make it possible to gain a clearer idea of the progress of the future. This is necessary also for the correct solution of today's problems.

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Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors
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May 89 (signed to press 21 Apr 89) p 128

[Text] Editors met with journal readers at the House of Scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Center of Biological Research in Pushchino, Moscow Oblast. The discussion was focused on the results of the elections of USSR people's deputies, the course of the economic reform and the problems related to the organization of scientific research and cadre training. The participants in the meeting also discussed a number of articles in *KOMMUNIST* and expressed their wishes.

The theoretical and practical problems of the renovation of socialism, national economic perestroika and results of the electoral campaign for the election of USSR people's deputies were discussed at a meeting between journal associates and the ideological aktiv of Kievskiy Rayon in Moscow.

Problems of the course and prospects of the radical economic reform and the situation of the country's national economy were discussed at a talk with the collective of the V.I. Lenin Central Museum.

The article by A. Golovkov and I. Lomakin "Science: Cost Accounting and State Support," which was published in issue No 5 of this journal, was discussed at the All-Union Scientific Research Marine Fishing and Oceanographic Institute. Members of the institute, one of the authors and representatives of the editors participated in the exchange of views.

Problems of the further development of cooperation between NOVA MYSL and *KOMMUNIST* were discussed at a meeting with J. Kase, editor-in-chief of NOVA MYSL, the theoretical and political journal of the CZCP Central Committee and L. Tomashevski, deputy editor-in-chief of that journal.

The editors were visited by a group of radio journalists from Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The talk dealt with problems of reform in the political system and perestroika in the spiritual life of Soviet society.

KOMMUNIST was visited by H. Deubler-Gnelin, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, H. Schumacher, head of mission of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Moscow, and J. Tidke, senior associate of the Social Democratic Party Parliamentary Group in the FRG Bundestag. Problems of the reform of the political system in the USSR and perfecting the style and methods of work of the CPSU to provide ideological support of perestroika were discussed.

The editors were visited by Paul Frayes, editor of the economic department of the Dutch newspaper *HANDELSBLAD*, and the newspaper's Moscow correspondent Laura Starank. The guests were interested in problems of development of a socialist market and the financial improvements of the Soviet economy.

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